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The methodology used in the dissertation is a paired comparison 
of Ireland (‘Social Partnership’ 1987-2005) and Australia (‘The Accord’ 
1983-1996), with reference to other cases of central wage bargaining in 
liberal economies. The primary research question is, what explains the 
stability of Irish central wage bargaining in comparison to the 
decentralization of wage bargaining experienced in Australia in the late 
1980s and early 1990s 
There are two conditions that must be sustained in order that 
central wage bargaining is stable in open liberal economies. First, 
public sector wages must be kept under strict control and large wage 
drift must be avoided. Second, export sector employers must be able to 
exercise pay flexibility. Pay flexibility is defined as encompassing an 
outcome dimension (exporters should be allowed to give pay increases 
above or below the centrally agreed wage bargain increase) and a 
process dimension (exporters should be allowed to set wages with a 
minimum of interference from third parties, be they wage setting 
institutions or trade unions). 
The two necessary conditions of public sector wage control and 
export sector pay flexibility are found in the Irish case explaining 
central wage bargaining stability, but not in the Australian case,   
   
explaining its wage bargaining decentralization. In Ireland after 1987, 
the stability of the system has been enabled by a concerted effort by 
policy-makers to de-couple pay movements between the public and 
export sectors. This is achieved through allowing export employers pay 
flexibility, while ending old patterns of public sector relativities-driven 
wage bargaining. This is in contrast to the late 1970s and early 1980s 
where large public sector wage drift caused the decentralization of 
wage bargaining. The Australian system decentralized because wage 
arbitration institutions created during a closed trade policy regime 
interfered with the process aspect of pay flexibility of exporters. These 
institutions intruded into wage setting at the plant level, and 
enhanced the power of trade unions to influence and alter the wage 
setting process. This provoked a successful export-employer led 
offensive on the central wage bargaining system.   
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Chapter 1 
Research puzzle, argument & methodology 
 
1.1 The research puzzle 
Three liberal economies1 have attempted to centralize wage 
bargaining in the last 30 years in an attempt to slow wage growth, 
reduce inflation and boost employment growth: Australia, Ireland and 
the UK. One country, Ireland, has tried it twice: once in the mid to late 
1970s and early 1980s with little success or stability, and since 1987 
(Social Partnership (SP)) with apparent success and stability. Australia 
tried centralized bargaining after 1982 (the Accord), but it collapsed in 
the early 1990s. The difficulties of the short-lived Social Contract in 
the UK between 1974 and 1978 are well known.2 
The locale of wage bargaining has proven to be an important 
variable in studies explaining variation across countries and time of 
inflation, unemployment, economic growth, and wage inequality.3 
Centralized wage bargaining is associated with a distinctive set of 
deliberative policy institutions defined as ‘corporatist’. Centrally struck 
                                                 
1 The liberal economies are Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK, Canada 
and the USA. 
2 I define a liberal economy as one with a welfare state with low 
decommodification of the labor market than Christian democratic or social 
democratic economies (see Esping-Andersen 1990, 41-44, 47-54), patterns of (lower) 
public spending than social or Christian democratic economies (Iversen & Wren 
1998) and one with market-enhancing or pro-market coordinating regulatory regimes 
of corporate governance, vocational training, industrial relations and innovation 
(Soskice 1999, 110-112). 
3 For instance, on the role of wage bargaining for macro-economic outcomes, 
see, Cameron 1984; Lange & Garrett 1985; Calmfors & Driffill 1988; Freeman 1988; 
Soskice 1990a; Alvarez, Garrett & Lange 1991; Bleaney 1996; Garrett 1998; Hall & 
Franzese 1998; Franzese & Hall 2000; Iversen 1999; 2000; Garrett & Way 1999; 
2000; Way 2000; Traxler & Kittel 2000. On the effects of wage bargaining on income 
distribution, see for instance: Pontusson, Rueda & Way 2002; Rueda & Pontusson 
2000; Wallerstein 1990.   2 
   
wage deals in corporatist states are a key component of policy 
compromises between organized labor and the state in so-called social 
corporatist countries [Katzenstein 1985, 116-123). The locale of wage 
bargaining has been used a defining feature of a type or variety of 
capitalism. 
According to the varieties of capitalism (VOC) literature, liberal 
market economies (hereafter LMEs and include Australia, Canada, 
Ireland, New Zealand, the UK and the USA (Soskice 1999)) are unable 
to sustain peak level bargaining or corporatist arrangements (King & 
Wood 1999, 377; Soskice 1999, 110-112, 123; Hall & Soskice 2001a, 
30). The lack of organizational capacity of labor and employers to 
sustain agreement and guarantee compliance with central agreements 
is the primary reason for this inability (Thelan 2001, 75-78; King & 
Wood 1999, 376-378). 
What is happening with respect to centralized wage bargaining is a 
significant theoretical question. But aside from the effect that changes 
in wage bargaining have on the macro-economy or on the way 
countries consult with groups in the crafting of public policy, 
developments in wage bargaining institutions reflect on the larger 
issue of whether international political-economic forces are inducing 
convergence of institutions and institutional design across the 
advanced capitalist economies. The existence of Irish centralized wage 
bargaining, in 2005 entering its nineteenth year of operation, and of 
the Australian experiment in the 1980s suggests that liberal market 
wage bargaining institutions may not necessarily move towards a  3 
   
greater market enhancing equilibria or convergence on the lightly 
regulated American model.  
Centralized agreements have been struck and centralized wage 
bargaining regimes have survived long periods in liberal economies. If 
the Irish and Australian cases do provide evidence that a move by 
these liberal economies in a more regulated direction is possible then 
this suggests that the widespread assumption that the English 
speaking nations at the least are moving towards a US lightly 
regulated and freer market model is wrong.4 Moreover, since these 
countries are expected to be the most likely to move in the US model 
direction, evidence of pro-coordination developments that are stable 
casts serious doubts on neo-classical and liberal orthodoxy that 
growing trade and capital market integration is slowly stripping away 
regulation and market altering institutions throughout the advanced 
capitalist world.5 Even if it is conceded that convergence towards a 
more liberal market model is occurring throughout the advanced 
capitalist states, then any observed and explained differences between 
the Irish and Australian cases in this dissertation would suggest 
significant variation around this model are possible.  
This dissertation examines two cases, Australia 1983-1996, and 
Ireland 1987-2005. The purpose of the comparison is to dissect how a 
stable centralized wage bargaining system is achieved (in the case of 
                                                 
4 This includes the predictions of varieties of capitalism theory (further 
discussed in chapter 3) 
5 For an essentially neo-classicist view that regard institutions as slowing but 
not stopping the trend to free market regulatory regimes caused by growing 
international trade and financial integration, see Frieden & Rogowski 1996, 31-36, 
42-44.  4 
   
Ireland after 1987) and to compare that stability and the cause of that 
stability with a case where central wage bargaining decentralized 
(Australia 1983-1996). The comparison in explaining stability and the 
reason for a key case’s decentralization should be able to shed 
considerable light on what causes decentralization of wage bargaining, 
and the necessary conditions for central wage bargaining to survive in 
a liberal economy. While my argument may extend to all cases, that is, 
it may apply to social democratic and Christian democratic countries6 
(or coordinated market economies if that categorization is preferred7), 
this dissertation’s research design does not allow that assertion to be 
made or for that issue to be answered with any degree of satisfaction. 
Instead, I confine my argument to liberal economies, and answer the 
following questions: 
• Why has Irish Social Partnership survived for at least 18 years, 
whereas the Australian Accord decentralized wage setting after eight 
years? What caused the decentralization of the Australian system? 
What has sustained the Irish system? 
• Is there any evidence to suggest that Ireland post-1987 
represents a new breed of economy?  
• What are the implications for the debates over institutional 
convergence to the answers to the first two sets of questions? 
                                                 
6 See Esping-Andersen (1990, 35-52) for the categorization. 
7 The coordinated market economy concept is explored in the brief discussion of 
then varieties of capitalism approach to comparative political economy in chapter 3).  5 
   
1.2 Overview of the argument 
1.2.1 General principles 
My dependent variable is the sustainability (or lack thereof) of 
centralized bargaining arrangements in advanced capitalist countries 
with liberal economies. Centralized wage bargaining in open liberal 
market economies remain stable, centralized and sustained when two 
necessary conditions are fulfilled: exporters have pay flexibility (are not 
constrained) and the public and non-trade sectors are pay disciplined 
by central agreements. When either of these conditions is violated, 
wage bargaining becomes decentralized. The effect of these two 
variables – export sector pay flexibility, and public/non-export sector 
pay restraint – on liberal market economy centralized pay bargaining 
stability is shown in table 1.1.8 
I define pay  flexibility as encompassing three broad capacities. 
First, to either increase wages in order to recruit and retain labour. 
Second, to hold wage increases to a minimum or to cut wages in order 
to cope with falling demand and profits, and finally, in the exercise of 
                                                 
8 Do considerations of partisanship change this argument? In the long-run, 
wage bargaining centralization between 1965 and 1982 has been associated with left 
government and increased union density (Cameron 1984, 166; Western 1997, 39-
41). Therefore it could be argued that wage centralization in liberal economies may 
co-vary with left partisanship, and that changes in the partisanship of government 
explain changes to wage bargaining institutions. However, in Australia, the major left 
party (the Australian Labor Party, or ALP) presided over the decentralization of wage 
bargaining, and there is every reason to believe that the 1996 reforms by the new 
right-wing government did not differ substantially from ALP policy immediately 
before the 1996 election. In Ireland, every major political party has been in a 
government coalition that has overseen Social Partnership. While the failure of the 
Social Contract in the UK (again under a left government) may have helped the 
Conservatives into power in 1979 and broken the Keynesian consensus that enables 
Thatcher’s government introduction of broadly monetarist policies (King & Wood 
1999, 377-378), the evidence for partisan effects in liberal economies is poor. Rather 
the reasons for decentralization appear to come from developments within the 
economy.  6 
   
pay setting, managers do so with a minimum of organized labor input 
into the process. In practise, this means that enterprise or local 
bargaining and wage setting predominates in the export sector, and 
that exporters prefer non-union environments. Flexibility therefore has 
two dimensions: a process dimension (organized labor and central 
institution free) and an outcome dimension (actual wage outcomes). 
Where outcomes are satisfactory to exporters, they will not worry so 
much about organized labor and central wage bargaining institution 
input and structuring of the process, but where outcomes become 
problematic, employers will become politically active against organized 
labor and the centralized system. 
 
Table 1.1  
Causes of wage bargaining stability & change. 
 
   
Public /non-exported sectors: little or 
no drift 
 
Public /non exported sectors: 
high drift 
 
Export sector  
pay setting 
constrained 
 
Australia (1983-1996) 
Wage bargaining decentralization 
 
 
No liberal economy observations 
 
 
Export sector  
pay setting 
flexibility 
 
Ireland (1987-2005) 
Central wage bargaining stability 
 
Ireland (1970-81) 
Australia (1975-1981) 
UK (1974-1978) 
Wage bargaining 
decentralization 
 
 
Pay flexibility ensures that pay determination in the export sector 
is attuned to their specific strategic needs and profitability, in turn 
enabling competitiveness and export and economic growth. These 
macroeconomic effects are major concerns of policy-makers in liberal 
market economies, who once the decision to open the economy has  7 
   
been made orient labor market policy towards lowering unit wage costs 
and improving the competitiveness of exporting firms and non-
exporting firms who must compete with imported goods and services. 
The rationale of this policy strategy is to reduce unemployment. 
Policy-makers are also concerned about the economic health of the 
export sector when debt and balance of payments or current account 
problems are acute. Because payment deficits in an open economy by 
definition involve an outflow or export of capital, monetary and fiscal 
policy is placed under a great deal of strain when payment deficits are 
endemic. For one, it is a persistent contributor to growing debt, a debt 
that accrues interest and requires servicing. The loss of capital is a 
persistent drag on economic growth. Second, payment deficits place 
strains and reliance on interest rates and currency market 
manipulations and interventions in order to attract capital, prevent 
capital flight and periodically reduce payment deficits.9 Growing 
exports is a medium and long-term solution to balance of payments 
problems and increases in debt. Hence, exporter’s preferences over 
policies that affect their competitiveness and growth are given a great 
deal of store by policy-makers. 
It should be noted, that where non-export sectors face 
considerable import competition they too would place a premium on 
pay flexibility. To the extent that loss of markets to overseas 
companies increases balance of payment problems, policy-makers also 
                                                 
9 I do not discuss the open macro-economic Mundell-Fleming model in this 
dissertation. For a discussion of the monetary and exchange rate issues on which my 
basic assumptions lie, see Argy 1992, chapters 1, 7 & 8; Krugman & Obstfeld 1997, 
chapters 12 & 16)  8 
   
worry about these firms’ competitiveness. However, because the 
growth of local markets is somewhat limited, especially in smaller 
countries, and the potential effect on balance of payments and 
employment growth limited, policy-makers will pay more attention to 
the problems and preferences of exporters. 
Liberal market economy centralized wage bargaining fragments 
and decentralizes when either the freedom of exporters and import 
competitors to set wages locally is compromised by central 
agreements, or when public sector and non-export pay rises are not 
successfully restrained by the central agreements. When the latter 
occurs, input costs of goods and services to the export sector increase, 
affecting exporter’s profitability, and the going rate of labor also 
increases, necessitating exporters to raise wages in order to recruit 
and retain labor. The two roads to decentralization are characterized 
by very different dynamics. In the flexibility road, employers are the 
dominant actors and the key relationships are between employers, the 
wage bargaining institutions and the state. In the public sector wage 
drift road, public sector unions are the dominant actors and the key 
relationship is between public sector unions and umbrella 
organizations, the wage bargaining institutions and the state. When 
the relationship breaks down, the dominant actors actions become the 
determining factor in decentralizing wage bargaining. There is 
therefore a labor-inspired road to wage decentralization, and an 
employer-inspired road. In the two cases I examine in detail in this 
dissertation, the focus is on the flexibility road.  9 
   
1.2.2 Ireland: centralized wage bargaining stability 
The stability of Irish Social Partnership can be attributed to the 
pay discipline of the public, non-traded and locally traded industries 
and services combined with a hiving off or separation of pay 
movements in the export sector. This has not been complete by all 
means, but the experience of the 1980s and 1990s is in stark contrast 
with the leap-frogging claims of the 1970s where wage rises in the 
export and public sectors fed each other. The centrally negotiated pay 
discipline of the non-export sector, the enterprise-based decentralized 
bargaining of the export sector and the erosion of relativities-based 
claims are the reinforcing elements of Ireland’s centralized but 
partially coordinated wages system. As such, they are the defining 
features of what constitutes the limits of wage coordination in liberal 
market economies.  
The framing device used by policy makers in the construction of 
policy in Ireland (including pay determination) was and is to improve 
the competitiveness of the economy and through a rising tide of 
economic wealth, raise the economic fortunes of all. This orientation 
has meant that policy is oriented towards improving trade prospects 
and that exporters preferences and needs are primary when 
formulating and enacting policy. Policy is and was not primarily 
concerned with the re-distribution of income, either through taxation, 
preferential wage deals, or social policy. Instead the emphasis is and 
was on employment creation through the growth of the exporting 
sector via foreign direct investment. Because of the preference for non- 10 
   
union plants among MNCs entering Ireland, this has translated into a 
growing non-union sector in Ireland.  
Irish private sector wage setting since the 1960s been framed by 
relativities between industries (Hardiman 1988, 44-47; Kane interview 
2000; McCarthy interview 2000). Hardiman (1988) argues that wage 
leaders, usually in relatively highly skilled professions, determined 
rates of pay in other industries in the 1960s and 1970s. After the 
Priestly Commission report in the mid-1950s, public sector pay has 
been influenced by pay developments in a handful of private sector 
occupations. These observations are largely accepted common wisdom 
in Irish industrial relations research: pay movements flow from high 
skill jobs in manufacturing through other private sector industries and 
sub-sectors, to key grades in the public service and then, via internal 
relativities, throughout the public sector. 
There is no question that relativities were a driving force in Irish 
pay determination before 1987, and Social Partnership while reducing 
their effects has not completely eradicated them and imposed a new 
coordination system that flows from the SP agreements. Irish wage 
bargaining is peculiar in that tri-parte agreements are set centrally, 
while the actual bargaining takes place increasingly at the enterprise 
levels. To speak of Ireland as a centralized system, is therefore to some 
extents misleading, especially compared to systems in countries such 
as Germany where wages are actually set at higher levels. In Ireland, 
bargaining is mostly an enterprise affair, but completed by parties 
(unions and employer associations) who have made promises at the 
central level about what they will do in those enterprise bargains.  11 
   
There are other key dynamics that define the setting of wages in 
Ireland other than the flow of pay movements from high skill 
manufacturers to the rest of the economy, despite common wisdom. 
The pay determination process within the public sector is one, while 
the effects of staggered bargaining and wage expectations are another. 
At the enterprise level, which way do relativities run? The common 
wisdom explanation is unsatisfactory. Expectations are the key to 
understanding this issue, and this is where the staggering of rounds is 
vital. Say the union in a low productivity, low pay and indigenous firm 
bargains first for wages and cares about maintaining relativities with a 
pay leader. What claim level does the union choose? Any answer is a 
guess based on what happened in recent years, the expected inflation 
rate and the effect a claim may have on employment in the industry or 
firm. Expectations based on prior learning play the key role in deciding 
the level of the claim. Once early claims are laid they affect later claims 
because maintaining relativities is a preferred outcome for unions.  
When a recursive process like this begins, who can tell who the 
wage leaders are and who are not? It may well be that the guesses of 
early bargainers pay reference to high-paying and profitable firms and 
sectors when they make their guess, but late bargainers who are 
highly profitable must then pay heed, if they care about relativities, to 
pay movements in the early movers in the indigenous sector and act to 
maintain their relative pay. Who are the pay leaders in this set of 
circumstances? 
The problem is no less for non-union firms. Non-union firms, in 
order to recruit and retain labor, are affected by the game. In the case  12 
   
of non-union MNCs, given the size, capital intensity, and propensity to 
cluster in sectors with increasing returns to scale (this is why they are 
MNCs, after all10), means that, even with the absence of unions, 
management are able to pay high wages. This is the rent-sharing 
hypothesis. Indeed there are good efficiency reasons to do so.11 
However, if employees still care about relativities, and it is reasonable 
to assume they do, then the non-union firm, MNC or not, must make 
guesses about the probable pay movements in the rest of the economy.  
The key to breaking the expectations game is to impose pay 
discipline on at least one group and increase the certainty of the 
calculations of employers and labor about future wage movements. By 
increasing the completeness of the information held by all parties to 
bargaining the wage spiral effect caused by the marriage of 
expectations and poor information is minimized.  
The most important group to discipline is the public sector, since 
they are most likely to be the most unionized sector of the economy, 
and the most militant because pay rises can be easily passed onto 
taxpayers. The small cost to an individual taxpayer is such that they 
face collective action problems in organizing opposition to any specific 
pay rise (Becker 1983). In addition, there is good evidence to suggest 
control of public employment increases the economic performance of 
private sector trading firms (Alesina et al 2002). In Ireland between 
                                                 
10 Barry et al (1999) identify that the most productive sectors in Ireland are ones 
where there are increasing returns to scale, and that MNCs are more heavily 
concentrated in these sectors. 
11 The relative lack of supervision in large firms means that firms pay employees 
more in order to “buy” more responsibility (Milgrom & Roberts 1992, 250-256). Also 
the cost of turnover is probably higher in these firms due to the high levels of firm-
specific skills employees possess, encouraging higher levels of pay.  13 
   
1987 and 1997, the government strategy to limit public sector wage 
rises (and employment expansion) was largely successful and 
contrasted with the 1971-81 period of centralized wage agreements. It 
was successful because tax cuts improved real-take home income, 
which reduced the size of pay claims. Tight wages control by the 
Department of Finance was also important. In areas of the public 
sector where that control was weaker, pay rises were generally higher. 
The next most important group to discipline are the lower 
productivity indigenous firms. If pay rises from the more productive 
areas of the economy, such as from the MNCs in the exporting sector, 
flow to them, then the private sector may experience its own 
expectations game described stylistically above, with the result of 
spiralling wages and the eminent possibility of loss of control over 
public sector pay. The expectations game will lead to job losses in the 
least profitable firms. This prospect may not stop job losses if pay is 
decided at the firm or by a majority vote of union members at the 
industry level. Workers in profitable firms will not concern themselves 
with job losses in less profitable firms caused by their wage claims. 
Therefore the disciplining of this sector is consistent with the primary 
goal of policy makers: the creation and survival of employment. 
The key to the stability and ongoing survival of Social Partnership 
is and was to discipline public sector pay and expansion, and the non-
export private sector, in order to create a labor market where the going 
labor market rate for exporters was not subject to guesses and 
expectations about wage movements in the public and indigenous 
sectors. The disciplining of public sector and indigenous firm pay was  14 
   
made possible by slack labour market conditions until the late 1990s 
coupled with the promise of income tax cuts to improve real take home 
pay. In this respect, MNCs were able to, as Baccaro & Simoni (2004) 
term, “mimic” the pay behavior of the unionized sectors of the 
economy. 
Cracks have started to appear in the three reinforcing elements. 
Once labour market conditions changed and tightened after 1998 and 
the tax strategy began to exhaust itself, public pay discipline was 
eroded, signalling a possible imminent end to Social Partnership’s 
form of wage coordination. Export sector pay has risen in some firms 
quite sharply. Private sector unions are worrying more about equity 
issues: some are getting rich off the Celtic Tiger. This is feeding a 
possible new era of relativities-based bargaining. The 1970s 
expectations game where public and private sector pay rises fed each 
have re-appeared since 2000. The stable future of the centralized 
agreements looks less likely than at any time since 1987. 
1.2.3 Australia: wage bargaining decentralization 
Two major factors differentiate the Australian experience from that 
of Ireland and explain the different outcome of wage bargaining 
decentralization or lack of stability: the timing of the opening of the 
economy and the point at which the policy ramifications of the new 
economic environment became clear, and the rigidity of the centralized 
system and the way that system compromised wage flexibility.12  
                                                 
12 It should be noted that nowhere do I argue that public sector wage drift was a 
cause of Australian wage bargaining decentralization.   15 
   
On the first issue of the timing of openness: Whereas in Ireland, 
the policy model to secure economic growth in the Social Partnership 
years was and is based on openness and has been since the late 
1950s, it was not until the early years of the Labor government and 
after the centralized wage bargaining regime based on 
union/government agreements (known as the Accord) had been 
established that there emerged a firm commitment by the government 
to an open economy model of growth.  
The most vital early series of policy decisions that demonstrated 
the government’s commitment to an open economy model of growth 
was the decision to float the currency and abolish exchange controls in 
late 1983 and 1984. This policy responded to the massive speculation 
on the ‘crawling peg’ dollar. In 1983, speculators took advantage of the 
central bank’s commitment to maintaining a declared daily exchange 
rate to predict buying patterns. This caused massive pressures on the 
central bank to buy back speculatively purchased dollars that in turn 
placed an accompanying upward pressure on interest rates. The 
government responded to this problem by floating the dollar. 
The float of the dollar was the most critical policy decision of the 
Labor government but the political effects of the float did not become 
clear until 1986. Once the dollar was floated and capital controls 
lifted, the economic environment changed dramatically. The balance of 
payments and the value of the dollar became the barometers by which 
the government judged the competitiveness of the economy, and the 
likelihood of sustained economic growth in the future. Between 1984 
and 1986 in the context of open capital and financial markets, the  16 
   
balance of payments deteriorated dramatically. Capital exited Australia 
at an accelerating rate, and led to increased borrowing to fund the 
persistent deficit. As a result debt repayments and interest on debt 
repayments continued to increase to the point where policy-makers 
identified the problem as a crisis in need of a policy response. 
The government responded not by moving to re-close and to re-
regulate product and financial markets in an attempt to correct the 
problem, but by making plain its intention to introduce further policies 
designed to enhance the market competitiveness of Australian firms, 
especially export firms. Before this series of policy moves by the 
government, of which wage bargaining decentralization was one, no 
Australian government had systematically examined the policy 
implications of openness. Economic crisis forced this examination. 
This examination indicated a commitment to an open economy model 
for growth and meant that exporters, who were already expressing 
concerns over the rigidity of the centralized system, became a very 
influential lobby for wage bargaining policy change.  
This crisis changed the goals of wage bargaining policy. Whereas 
central wage agreements at their inception in 1982 and 1983 were 
conceived as a way to control inflation and boost employment, by late-
1986, wage bargaining policy was regarded as a tool to improve the 
efficiency and cost structures of exporting firms. The aim was to boost 
Australia’s export performance, not just in the traditionally strong 
areas of mining and agriculture, but also to increase labor flexibility so 
that manufacturing firms could achieve better export performance. 
This led policy makers to look more closely at what the preferences of  17 
   
exporters were with regard to wage bargaining. Before this, wage 
bargaining policy had been a result of negotiations between organized 
labor and the state. The open economy and its ramifications meant 
that the state turned away from the union movement and attended to 
the needs of exporters by enhancing their competitiveness.  
On the second major point of difference, being the problem of the 
rigidity of the centralized system in Australia (compared to Irish 
flexibility): The policy re-think on wage bargaining in 1986 and 1987 
came about because the original wage bargaining model formulated 
between organized labor and the Australian Labor Party before the 
1983 election when Labor came to power proved to be too rigid and did 
not allow exporters and potential exporters the wage flexibility they 
wanted in order to boost cost competitiveness. The existing 
institutional structure was not up to the task of providing flexibility to 
exporters while coordinating and restraining the non-export parts of 
the economy once the open economy model of growth was adopted and 
economic events tested the viability of the centralized wage bargaining 
system. Conceived around the turn of the twentieth century, the 
tribunal system was a means to deliver a decent family wage to male 
workers within the context of a closed and highly protected economy. 
The system gave trade unions an institutional base within which they 
could exercise considerable industrial relations power at multiple 
levels, from the federal level where they could influence tribunal 
decisions over national wage rises, to industry and plant levels where 
they could, via applications to vary collective agreements known as  18 
   
‘awards’, influence the pay of specific workers and through the linking 
of pay to detailed job descriptions, the labor process itself.  
The rigidity of the system and the exporter’s opposition to it was 
illustrated in two well-publicized and significant industrial disputes in 
1984 and 1986: one in mining and the other in meat-for-export. The 
disputes were rallying points for exporter employer opposition to the 
centralized system. Because the tribunal system was the means which 
delivered the centralized system and gave unions a state institutional 
basis of power, exporters desire to localize wage bargaining and to 
reduce union influence on wage bargaining became folded into a 
campaign to weaken the tribunal systems’ powers to settle disputes.  
The changing economic environment and the rigidity of the 
centralized system enabled the development of new employer groups 
committed to changing the wage bargaining system. While established 
groups still debated the open economic policy model itself, new groups 
established themselves with the aim of shaping institutional 
development within the new open economy growth model now favored 
by policy makers. These groups differed on the degree of radicalism of 
their proposals, but were successful in changing the terms of the 
debate over what wage bargaining policy should deliver (greater firm 
efficiency) and how that should be done (decentralization and limiting 
the scope of the tribunals to regulate wages and conditions of work at 
the plant level).  
Centralized wage bargaining therefore failed to be stable where the 
Irish attempt succeeded because the Australian system was designed 
for differing economic policy circumstances than the one in which it  19 
   
had to operate. Once openness became the dominant policy frame, 
policy makers became committed to ensuring that labor market and 
wage bargaining policies supported and enhanced competitiveness. 
This opened political opportunities for exporters to exploit, which they 
did by pushing for decentralized wage bargaining. Hidden within this 
campaign was a broad non-union or union avoidance agenda that 
became increasingly clear once government support for move to local 
and plant bargaining had been achieved in 1991. While the Accord 
was a biparte agreement between the unions and the government -- 
employers were excluded -- the trajectory of wage bargaining policy 
changes was dictated by export employers. This willingness of the 
government to heed the wishes of the export sector and to secure a 
more competitive-enhancing labor market was reflected in the 
government’s changing relationship with the trade union movement. 
Initially supportive of the move to plant level bargaining in order to 
remain within the inner circles of government, the trade union 
movement soon realized the pro-employer bias of the ostensibly ‘left’ 
government. The relationship became increasingly strained after 1992 
and by the 1996 election the cooperative relationship on which wage 
bargaining centralization was based with the union movement was 
gone.   20 
   
1.3 Are the cases a new breed of economy? What are the 
implications? 
On the second set of questions I posed earlier, I argue that the 
exclusion of the export sector from the Irish wage centralization regime 
suggest there are strict limits on how far liberal market economies can 
move away from a lightly regulated and non-coordinated market 
model, at least as far as wage bargaining policy is concerned. Ireland 
is perhaps more a significant variation on a theme than a genuinely 
new breed of economy. But what is striking about the institutional 
design in Ireland (and is confirmed by the Australian case) is the 
extent to which wage bargaining institutions compromise and 
accommodate open labor market forces in the most important sector, 
from an economic growth perspective, of the economy: the export 
sector. But the fact that this labor market is shaped by heavy 
institutional intervention in the non-export sector shows how loose 
institutional convergence is in practise and the possible scope for 
institutional innovation and difference among advanced capitalist 
countries. 
The challenge to the sustainability of the Irish system and its 
asymmetric distribution of wage restraint responsibility is whether 
public and sheltered sector unions will continue to be willing to bear 
most of the responsibility for restraining wages for the benefit of the 
entire economy especially as the economy continues to grow at a 
healthy rate and wages in the export sector grow. I suggest that such 
willingness must be regarded as finite. The tax cuts being used to 
sustain the system and that are lifting real take-home pay while wages  21 
   
stagnate and decline in real terms cannot go on forever. A union revolt 
is likely to be in the form of a growing irrelevance of the centralized 
agreements to actual wage setting at local and industry levels as wage 
drift spreads from the public and sheltered parts of the economy to the 
local domestic economy. This would be a repeat of the 1970s. 
That stated, in answering the third question posed above – that of 
institutional convergence - the Irish case represents a challenge to the 
neo-classical approach that suggest that growing trade flows and 
financial integration will lead to market-enhancing policy regimes and 
a retreat of institutions from markets. Clearly in the Irish case it has 
not done this in the non-export sector. Indeed the freedom of the 
export sector labor market is predicated on institutional support. This 
is hardly a retreat. Presumably there will always be parts of an 
economy relatively sheltered from trade and this offers plenty of scope 
for variation of wage bargaining institutional design and labor market 
policy regime.  
The Irish system also challenges varieties of capitalism theory in 
that Ireland is clearly not moving in the de-institutionalized liberal 
direction predicted by Soskice (1999) or to the ideal deregulated, non-
coordinated liberal state described by Hall (2001, 56). Further, the 
Irish case is a challenge to those who argue that there are two broad 
ways advanced capitalist states cope with the uncertainties of being an 
open economy: via some form of corporatism (social or liberal in some 
small states of Europe) or via a liberal market model (Katzenstein 
1985). The Irish case is corporatist in some respects, but unlike those 
cases classically described by Katzenstein (1985). The deliberative  22 
   
institutions and reach of their coordination does not extend into the 
export sector. This would suggest that increasing trade and financial 
flows and open capital and trade borders leads not to one of two 
models, but there may be at least a third (aside from the so-called 
hybrid cases such as France and perhaps Italy- see Soskice 1999, 
103): one where the non-traded sectors of liberal economies are 
coordinated via institutions, while the traded sector is liberalized. 
1.4 Case selection  
The liberal economies comprise six countries: the US, UK, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and Ireland. They are more similar with regard 
to employer organization, industrial relations, financing systems and 
education systems than another cluster of advanced capitalist 
countries, the coordinated market economies (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland and Korea) (Hall & Soskice 2001a, 19-20; Soskice 
1999, 106).13 They are also more similar with regard to social policy 
and the degree to which that social policy decommodifies the labor 
market than the groups of Christian and social democracies (Esping 
Andersen 1990, chapter 2 and 6). 
                                                 
13 The critical variable differentiating CMEs for LMEs is employer cooperation 
and associability. In short, employers in CMEs have longer-term strategic horizons, 
enabled by a greater emphasis on bank finance over equity markets than in LMEs, 
greater market and product information sharing enabled by a relational contracting 
system, mutually-funded and coordinated training and protections against hostile 
takeovers in corporate governance law (see Hall & Soskice 2001a for a full discussion 
of the differences between LMEs and CMES). The paradigmatic case is Germany. 
While there is variation within the CME cluster (for instance the Swedish government 
takes the lead on training and human capital development) these cases are more 
alike and differ less from one another than the difference with LME countries. See 
chapter 3 for a fuller discussion.  23 
   
When selecting from the sample of liberal economies we can 
therefore think of them as ‘similar cases.’ In a most similar systems 
design, the differences between the cases are meant to account for 
variation in outcomes between the cases. In real life, the differences 
between ‘most similar cases’ are obviously great and controlling for 
them is not as easy as theory suggests. Liberal economies differ on 
simple measures such as trade union membership. If the differences 
are so great as to make the teasing out of real causal differences 
difficult, then that itself is a useful result because it suggests great 
implications for the convergence set of questions posed above. 
I select observations here on the dependent variable. According to 
King, Keohane & Verba (1994, 128-137) this may lead to selection 
bias. They conclude that, “we must be aware of the biases introduced 
by such a selection on the dependent variable.” Examining the values 
of the dependent variable across liberal economies will discover 
whether this is a problem.  
The dependent variable measure is “degree of wage bargaining 
centralization.” Australia between 1983 and 1991 moved from a highly 
centralized wage bargaining system to a decentralized one, and Ireland 
maintained a moderately centralized agreement after 1987 with 
significant areas of the economy outside the centralized system. This 
dissertation, therefore does not examine a classic LME system, one 
that does not change and has virtually no degree of centralization, 
such as the US. This may lead to selection bias because the dependent 
variable has a truncated series of values. Such a selection bias means 
that causal effects will be muted; the “true causal effect will be larger  24 
   
than the qualitative researcher believes” [King, Keohane & Verba 1994, 
130].  
Iversen’s (1998) centralization scores may reify the change and the 
degree of wage bargaining centralization and focus more on the formal 
site of bargaining as opposed to actual coordination, but they are 
useful first cut efforts to illustrate the changes to and levels of 
centralization in these cases, and show the variation on my dependent 
variable.14 
In 1983, the Australian score was 0.574, while in 1992 the score 
was 0.316 denoting a marked decentralization of wage bargaining 
(Iversen 1998).15 Australian wage determination continued to evolve 
with 1996 legislation that further reduced the powers of central wage 
setting institutions. In Ireland from 1987, there are no comparable 
scores available, but the lack of institutional change would indicate 
that decentralization has been negligible. Ireland remains over the 
period a reasonably centralized system with respect to authority. I 
have therefore classified it as intermediately centralized, with a 
weighting of central, industry and plant level authority the same as 
Finland for much of the 1970s and 80s, and not unlike Japan’s from 
1983-95. This is defensible since Irish SP is characterized by a single 
                                                 
14 Iversen in constructing the index assigns a relative weight for central, 
industry and local bargaining authority that add to 1. The union membership share 
of workers covered at each level is then multiplied with each of the weights, which 
are added to create a score between 0 (no union members) and 1 (100% unionization 
in a completely centralized system). 
15 This shows a change from a system more centralized than some CMEs in 
1983 (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, and Switzerland) and more 
comparable to Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands. By 1992, Australia was 
comparable to Belgium, Germany, Japan, and Sweden, more centralized than 
Switzerland, but less centralized than the other CMEs.  25 
   
renewable central pay agreement, a high degree of public sector 
coordination, and widespread pattern and relativities-driven 
bargaining at the industry level. I estimate the centralization score to 
be in the 0.3-0.4 range.16 
An alternate measure of centralization is provided by Wallerstein & 
Golden (1999). On their 15 point scale measuring government 
involvement in wage setting, with 1 being completely uninvolved, to 15 
where governments impose wage freezes and ban supplementary 
bargaining, Australia moves from 10 (Formal tri-part agreement for 
national wage schedule with sanctions) in 1983 to 3 (government 
extends collective agreements) in 1992.17 In Ireland in the period 
between 1987 and 2005, is a 9 on the author’s scale (Formal tri-parte 
agreement for national wage schedule without sanctions).  
1.5 Structure of the dissertation 
In chapter 2, I introduce and discuss the major theoretical 
concepts that drive the causal explanation of this dissertation. In 
chapter 3, I examine the existing arguments about wage bargaining 
change, in the case of Australia, and the cause of stability in the case 
of Ireland. I situate my argument within the existing literature.  
                                                 
16 Or comparable to Japan in the 1980s and 90s, the Netherlands in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, Finland in the early and late 1980s, Denmark after 1986, 
and Sweden after 1990. In the 1970s shadow case, Ireland moved from a 
decentralized system to one after 1974 comparable to SP after 1987. A rough 
estimation would be that the dependent variable value increased from around 0.1 in 
1969 to between 0.3 and 0.4 between 1974 and 1980, before a collapse to a value of 
around 0.1 in 1981 (See Hardiman 1988, 53-56 for an outline of the central 
agreements of the 1970s.) 
17 I take the no-disadvantage test (compared to industry awards) of Australia’s 
enterprise bargaining to be the equivalent of an extension clause by the government.  26 
   
In chapters 4 through 6 I discuss the Irish case from 1987 to 
2005. In chapter 4, I present some necessary data for the argument 
and draw conclusions from that data: on trade, unemployment (a 
persistent Irish economic problem until the 1990s), other labor market 
supply issues, and on the trade union density trends and industry 
patterns. In chapter 5, following a presentation of the centralized pay 
agreements, I examine the best available data on Irish pay, industry by 
industry, in order to evaluate where pay drift is occurring. This 
provides important data for my argument in chapter 6 that explains 
the stability of Irish centralized wage bargaining. I compare the 
stability of Irish wage bargaining centralization after 1987 with the 
previous collapse in the early 1980s as a test of my argument. 
Chapters 7 though 10 constitute the Australian case between 
1983 and 1996 when wage bargaining was centralized and then 
decentralized in a series of policy moves after 1987. Chapter 7, in a 
similar vein to chapter 3, presents background information for the 
reader necessary to understand the Australian case, and introduces 
data that supports later arguments. I give some background for the 
reader in order that they may understand Australia’s distinctive 
industrial tribunal system and the effects it has had on employer and 
trade union organization. I address whether these tribunals can be 
considered independent actors. I then examine Australia’s trade 
record, the persistent problem of debt and negative balance of 
payments, and the large contribution a handful of mining concerns 
contribute to the balance of payments and exports. In chapter 7, I also 
examine trade union density trends and patterns across industries. In  27 
   
chapter 8 I examine the pay agreements of the Accord years between 
1983 and 1996, and then track wage increases for each of Australia’s 
industries in order to establish how successful various permutations 
of the Accord (with their varying reliance on central, industry and 
plant level components) were in restraining real wage growth. This 
information and that from chapter 7 is then assumed and used in 
chapters 9 and 10 where I present the main body of my causal 
argument of the decentralization of Australian wage bargaining. In 
chapter 9, I examine the key role of employers in causing wage 
bargaining policy change especially export employers. In chapter 10, I 
examine the response of policy-makers to changing economic 
circumstances and to those exporters and how decentralization was 
made. I conclude by examining and rejecting two possible alternative 
arguments: that trade unions were responsible for decentralization, 
and that public sector wage pressures were responsible for 
decentralization. 
I conclude this dissertation in chapter 11 with a discussion of the 
questions posed in chapter 1. In particular, I summarize why the Irish 
and Australian wage bargaining outcomes are different, and what 
these cases may indicate about the future of central wage bargaining. I 
conclude the chapter with a few thoughts on the issue of institutional 
convergence and whether either of these cases can be considered a 
new breed of economy. 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical perspectives 
 
In this chapter, I examine more closely the theoretical perspectives 
that have informed my argument, in particular the way in which my 
two variables work to change wage bargaining arrangements. I 
elaborate more fully on my argument and introduce a new component: 
the macro-economic policy strategy of the state. Recent evidence 
suggests that liberal economy governments especially, but all 
governments pursue a policy strategy that limits public sector wage 
bill and public sector employment growth. This has important 
implications for my argument in the form of an ironic twist. By limiting 
wage bill growth, these liberal or monetarist policies are consistent 
with wage bargaining centralization stability because they denote 
strong controls over public sector wage growth. But the irony is that 
the pursuit of the ‘small state’ equals a curb on public spending 
growth that limits the policy choices that the state can use to reward 
public sector workers for wage restraint. This has led to a reliance on 
tax cuts to reward and offset wage restraint and to boost or at least 
hold steady in real terms household income. This is a finite strategy, 
suggesting that public sector union acquiescence to small wage 
increase deals may have a ‘use by’ date, and that the ‘small state’ 
strategy adopted to pursue economic growth may be both an enabler 
of but a limit on the duration of centralized wage bargaining regimes.
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2.1 Export sector flexibility 
I first discuss the origins of the need for export sector wage 
flexibility as having its roots in the increasingly competitive product 
markets of the last 25 years. I then examine the causes and 
implications of declining union density. I argue that the decline is 
symptomatic of growing employer hostility among firms in advanced 
capitalist countries in pursuit of flexibility. This hostility is led by 
multi-national or internationalized firms, most of which are locating 
internationally for export production. Union decline is symptomatic of 
a growing mood among MNCs and exporters that third party 
interference in wage setting should be minimized, whether that 
interference is in the form of higher level wage bargaining, wage 
bargaining institutions, trade unions or some combination of all three. 
Union decline means that the monitoring of wage deals struck at 
higher levels is now more difficult at lower levels. This makes 
centralized wage bargaining problematic and wage drift more likely. I 
conclude by examining the supporting theoretical literature that 
suggests how exporters will organize against wage systems that 
impede wage flexibility.  
2.1.1 Flexibility & ‘the need for speed’ 
Iversen observes that changes in production techniques and 
technology have encouraged a greater strategic emphasis within firms 
on flexibility. The ‘need for speed’ in the modern manufacturing firm 
enabled by micro-processor technology, and made imperative by 
growing international products and financial market integration has 
encouraged firms to make greater use of variable forms of pay such as  30 
   
performance pay, profit sharing, seniority pay, contracting and 
outsourcing and the use of temporary labor (Iversen 1998a; 1999, 97). 
This has lead to pressures from employers with higher skill employees 
for a decentralized wage bargaining regime. Here he shares a view 
more widely held (see, for instance, Katz 1993; Swenson & Pontusson 
2000).  
An argument consistent with the ‘need for speed’ firm imperative 
and preferred here is to focus on the increase in market competition 
for goods and services in the last 20 years. Rather than focusing on 
production processes, a difficult thing to measure, the analysis in this 
dissertation prefers to examine how firms view their own future profit 
prospects and demand for their products, and their preferred wage 
regulatory environment in light of these views. These are far more 
tangible indicators of environmental stress on a firm and easily 
measurable. This takes the analysis down to individual firms and 
industries. By focusing on market competition, variation of managerial 
response across firms within an industry, across the economy and 
even between economies is allowed for. This focus importantly allows a 
certain amount of ‘slack’ in the argument for local variations between 
companies that otherwise appear similar, since managers 
interpretation of market results will differ and their ideological 
orientations on labor market issues will color their responses. The link 
between increased market competition, the ‘need for speed’ in order to 
keep ahead of markets, and employer response as to whether existing 
wage bargaining institutions are serving their needs will always be 
mediated to some extent by senior management.   31 
   
That said, even allowing for this local ‘slack’, increased market 
competition in the last 20 years has made the future for all firms more 
uncertain from a profit perspective. A shortening of time horizons has 
resulted meaning that firms in highly competitive markets such as 
export markets will seek to link as much of their wage bill to profit as 
possible.18 This includes not only the actual way remuneration is 
carried out (both upward and downward flexibility in wage outcomes), 
but also how labor is organized and deployed so that management can 
maximize control over the wage-setting process. This can take many 
forms: increases in temporary and contractor labor and outsourcing of 
non-core activities such as payroll, marketing and the production of 
inputs; performance-based pay (collective and individual) and profit 
and gain-sharing schemes. But in addition to these obvious forms of 
variable pay, there is another more important variant, the increase to 
ubiquitous levels of the linking of pay increases to improved 
productivity. Productivity pay rises are de-facto profit bonuses, since 
the pace and volume of output by a firm of a good or service is 
ultimately dictated by market demand and commensurate 
management production strategies. Ultimately, the decisions of 
management in response to market signals and profit and loss are the 
decisive factors in determining the productivity of a firm. Over the 
medium to long term, highly productive firms are ones with high 
product demand and healthy profits.  
This dissertation argues that any centralized coordinated wage 
bargaining regime must come to grips with the desire of firms in 
                                                 
18 Exchange rate risk only adds to this tendency.  32 
   
competitive markets, and especially export markets, to link their wage 
bill to performance in increasingly uncertain and fluctuating product 
markets.  This suggests that firms in these markets will be resist 
attempts to have their wages coordinated or influenced by wage 
bargaining at levels outside the plant and firm. 
 
Table 2.1 
Trade union density, selected OECD countries, 1970-2000. 
 
 
 
 
1970 
 
1980 
 
1990 
 
2000 
Liberal  Economies      
Australia  44 48 40 25 
Canada  32 35 33 28 
Ireland  53 57 51 38 
New  Zealand  56 69 51 23 
UK  45 51 39 31 
USA  27 22 15 13 
Average  LMEs  43 47 38 26 
      
Coordinated Market Economies: Northern Europe         
Denmark  60 79 75 74 
Finland  51 69 72 76 
Iceland …  75  88  84 
Norway  57 58 59 54 
Sweden  68 80 80 79 
Average Nth Europe CMEs  59  72  75  73 
      
Coordinated Market Economies: non Nth Europe         
Austria  63 57 47 37 
Belgium  41 54 54 56 
Germany  32 35 31 25 
Japan  35 31 25 22 
Netherlands  37 35 25 23 
Switzerland  29 31 24 18 
Average: non-Nth Europe CMEs  40  41  34  30 
Average: non-Nth Europe minus Belgium  39  38  30  25 
      
Other      
France  22 18 10 10 
Italy  37 50 39 35 
Spain …  7  11  15 
Portugal …  61  32  24 
 
Source: derived from OECD Employment Outlook 2004, table 3.3. 
2.1.2 The decline of union density 
Table 2.1 shows the unionization rates of several OECD countries 
between 1970 and 2000. It shows that union decline between 1980  33 
   
and 2000 is a secular trend except in the Northern European cases, 
Spain and Belgium.  
The decline of union density and the reasons for that decline has 
important implications for wage bargaining and my argument. The 
union decline literature concludes that much of the decline can be 
explained by a change in employer attitudes towards unions and the 
rise of widespread union avoidance strategies. There are three 
important trends accounting for and associated with union decline. 
First, MNCs everywhere, no matter their origin, have actively 
sought out lower labor market regulatory environments and have 
avoided trade unionism where possible. MNCs are more likely to invest 
in countries with low degrees of labor marker regulation that do not 
inhibit the hire and fire decisions of companies (Bognanno, Keane & 
Yang 2005; Cooke 1997, 2001a; Cooke & Noble 1998). Evidence in a 
series of studies of US FDI investment abroad in the 1980s and 1990s, 
and FDI investment into the US suggests that MNCs, no matter 
whether their home is the US or non-US, favor investment in countries 
with low union penetration (Cooke 1997; Cooke & Noble 1998, Cooke 
1997) or lower union density than their own home country (Cooke 
2001b; Bognanno, Keane & Yang 2005). US MNCs favor countries with 
decentralized bargaining structures (Cooke 1997; Cooke & Noble 1998) 
or ones with more decentralized bargaining structures and smaller 
collective bargaining coverage than their own home country (Cooke 
2001a; Bognanno, Keane & Yang 2005).  
Centralized wage bargaining is heavily reliant on trade union 
involvement. Unions bear the brunt of the organizational load for  34 
   
monitoring central deals and compliance at local levels, especially in 
countries where employer associations have low governability such as 
Ireland and Australia. Hence the presence of MNCs and centralized 
wage bargaining is likely incompatible, meaning that export sectors 
dominated by MNCs will be doubly hostile to attempts to extend 
centralized wage bargaining control to them. Any centralized wage 
bargaining arrangement must accommodate the desire of MNCs for an 
absence of third party interference in wage setting. MNCs have sought 
to maintain control over bargaining at the enterprise level. There is 
evidence that this trend is diffusing to domestic firms. This trend has 
been a very important factor in the shaping and change of wage 
bargaining institutions. The influence on labor market and wage 
bargaining institutions of MNC preferences for no unions and little 
regulation is especially obvious in the Irish case, inspection of which 
leads to the conclusion that if FDI is to be attracted, countries should 
allow their managers a great deal of freedom from restraints on how 
they set pay, and ensure that pay movements elsewhere in the 
economy do not contaminate this freedom with high wage 
expectations. 
Second, MNCs are becoming more protective of their asset-specific 
rents, and less likely to share them with employees in the form of 
higher wages. While most studies have not found any relationship 
between overall wage levels and FDI, and have argued that results 
indicate that MNCs seek high productivity countries where the skill 
level of workers is high and don’t pay too much attention to pay (Cooke 
1997; Cooke & Noble 1998), recent studies have found that among  35 
   
high productivity and wage countries, MNCs (no matter the home 
country) favor those with lowest wage levels (Cooke 2001a; Bognanno, 
Keane & Yang 2005; Konings & Murphy 2005).19 This is an important 
finding, especially in light of the Australian case in the 1980s where 
highly profitable mining companies sought to decentralize wage 
bargaining in Australia and impose new forms of employment 
(especially contractors and casual or “at will” employees without leave 
entitlements) in order to minimize their wage bills. 
Third, increasing international trade is associated with lower trade 
union density suggesting export activity and trade unionism are 
increasingly incompatible. Western (1997) demonstrates that the 
decline in density is less due to structural changes of the economy (the 
post-industrialisation thesis) and has more to do with the changes of 
unionization within industries (1997, 150-155).20 Western associates 
this sudden decline of union density in the 1980s with the 
decentralization of wage bargaining, the loss of government by left 
parties, recession and increasing international competition in product 
                                                 
19 Traxler & Woitech (2000) argue that labor regimes have an incoherent effect 
on FDI. The results in the study appear to be a function of the construction of their 
model as a cross sectional regression where the dependent variable is two periods, 
1981-85 and 1988-92. They offer no reasons for this periodization. Given the 
somewhat random manner in which signs and magnitudes of coefficients change 
from the early to latter period, this ad hoc construction of the dependent variable 
appears, inter alia, to be driving the result. In this regard the careful construction 
and testing of alternative of the models in Bognanno, Keane & Yang 2005 and Cooke 
2001a are superior. 
20 In his analysis of post-war unionization rates until 1990, Western (1997) 
identifies three major factors boosting union density rates: the Ghent system of 
trade-union controlled unemployment benef i t s  i n  B e l g i u m ,  F i n l a n d ,  S w e d e n  a n d  
Denmark, persistent left government and centralized labor market institutions and 
wage bargaining (1997, 93-96, 133). The concentration of these three factors in the 
Northern European cases explains the stability and growth of union density after 
1970.  36 
   
markets (measured as trade openness) (1997, 188-191). Western’s 
results are consistent with findings that since the early 1980s US 
firms have sought to avoid unions in their operations. This has been 
achieved via a number of union replacement and busting strategies 
involving the closing down of unionized plants and the opening of non-
union greenfield plants (Kochan, Katz & McKersie 1994, 55-62, 70-76). 
This non-union trend is observed in the Australian and Ireland cases 
in the 1980s and 1990s (see chapters 4 and 7).  
From this discussion, we can conclude that just as the ‘need for 
speed’ has induced a preference among exporters and firms in highly 
competitive product markets against higher level wage bargaining, 
increasing trade and FDI are inconsistent with trade union influence 
over wage bargaining, and especially higher level wage bargaining 
where unions are usually important actors. 
2.1.3 The effectiveness of small lobby groups 
A core part of my argument is that small, even temporary or 
informally connected groups of export employers are capable of 
wielding sufficient political power to effect changes in the wage 
bargaining system towards one that suits their need for flexibility. In 
this section I briefly discuss prior theoretical work on employer 
associative behavior that places this part of my argument in context.  
The power of the few or the temporary small employer group is, in 
part, enabled by the predilection of policy-makers to prefer 
competitiveness-enhancing policies within an open economy context. 
This means that massive organization is not entirely necessary in 
order for exporters to get their point successfully across to government  37 
   
and to achieve their basic aims. But small size and transience is also a 
result of necessity. Employers, especially ones in liberal economies, 
find it difficult to stay in formal employer groupings once a political 
campaign has begun. They find it far easier to join and remain in trade 
associations that provide non-political or uncontroversial lobbying 
services (such as markets information, public relations and marketing) 
than umbrella associations that are attempting to change regulation of 
their industry or industries. The problem stems from the inherent self-
interest of liberal economy firms, and the absence of collective 
incentives. 
Traxler argues that employer self-interest with regard to the price, 
securing and retaining of labor supply suggests that employers find it 
easy to join trade and employer associations in many northern 
European economies,21 but are less governable than members in a 
trade union (1995, 31-33). Employers have their own product market 
interests and this drives a tendency for them to defect from collective 
agreements. This tendency to a fragmentation of interests is reflected 
in the far higher density of trade and employer associations than trade 
unions.22 
Employer association governability is difficult, according to 
Traxler, because: 
“In comparison with employee organizations, employers 
have not only more of the same power resources but also a 
broader and more exclusive range of measures to advance 
interests. Whereas certain management prerogatives (e.g. 
                                                 
21 I distinguish, after Streek (1988) trade associations that are industry and 
sector-based from umbrella employer associations. 
22 I use the term ‘employer associations’ to distinguish umbrella organizations 
from their industry ‘trade’ counterparts.  38 
   
investment) are beyond associational command, employer 
associations can only deploy collectively those measures (e.g 
wage policies, lobbying) usually at the individual disposal of 
employers too. Business’ greatest power resources are 
mobilized outside its associations. This has two 
consequences…First, any form of collective action is 
subordinate and subsidiary to non-associational market 
strategies from an employer’s point of view. Second, for the 
sake of their self interest, individual employers can easily 
thwart and bypass associational efforts, by either evoking 
power resources lent to the association or using resources 
exclusively under their individual control” (Traxler 1999, 345-
346).23 
Governability is the most compromised in countries such as 
Ireland and Australia where there are few if any selective incentives for 
employers to remain within an association.24 The most important of 
these incentives is access to strike funds (Traxler 1999, 348).25 There 
are an absence of incentives to deter politically active firms from 
breaking off and forming new associations because little is lost when 
they do so and procedural and administrative brakes in old 
                                                 
23 Traxler concludes that employers rely on trade union organization on labor 
market issues because these issues are the number one priority of union members 
and member defection from union agreements is easily punished by expulsion or 
suspension. Unions can provide some of the wage discipline employers lack. 
24 The term ‘selective incentive’ comes from Olson (1982, 26). 
25 Governability is measured by Traxler as the ability to conclude collective 
agreements for lower levels; receive portion of the dues from lower levels; association 
has own anti-strike fund; can veto collective agreements and lockouts at lower levels; 
can formulate demands for lower levels in bargaining; and member firms under 
obligation to submit ratification of collective agreement to employer association 
ballot. Formal powers are measured by: ability of members to be named as non-
conforming members not subject to collective agreements made by the association; 
ability to conduct separate collective agreements when association agreement not in 
firm interest (right of local bargaining); organize own industrial action (lockouts); and 
pay employees more than agreed by association collective agreement (right to wage 
drift) (Traxler 1999, 348-349). Finland and Austria follow in a second grouping, with 
France, Netherlands and Portugal in a third (Traxler 1999, 348 - 349). If the ability 
to bargain on behalf of members is excluded from calculation, the UK and Ireland 
have the weakest employer associations in Europe. Ireland is unique in Europe in 
that its peak employer association has considerable bargaining powers but little 
control over member firms (Traxler 1999, 350). 
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associations on lobbying can be shed. There are no strike funds, 
member access to training, or access to ‘the circle of product market 
collusion’ as in some northern European employer associations, to 
motivate continuing membership and compliance by firms in liberal 
economies such as Ireland and Australia. The result is that in times of 
change, we should expect splintering and organizational fragmentation 
in employer associations in these countries.26 As essentially fee-for-
service providers, employer associations in these countries command a 
similar amount of loyalty as a consulting or accounting firm 
commands: comparatively little.  
What will the pattern of employer organization be in countries 
where employer association governability is low? Some reasonably 
straightforward insights into group cohesion and collective action are 
relevant here. Olson argues that, in general, small groups outperform 
larger ones because resources and benefits from action are 
concentrated, free riding is constrained and consensus is easier to 
obtain (1965, 22-28; 1982, 29-34). Small groups are also quicker to 
action, leading Olson to observe that in unstable societies or ones 
newly stable, they will be able to exploit their quickness for political 
advantage (1982, 41). Extending this argument, it can be argued that 
                                                 
26 By contrast the landscape of employer associations in countries with highly 
governable employer associations will remain comparatively stable and lobbying and 
changes will take place inside and between existing organizations. This kind of 
pattern is resonant with the experiences of employer associations in Sweden and 
Australia in the 1980s and 1990s. In Australia in the 1980s, new employer 
organizations emerged, became politically strong and were powerful agents of 
change, but in Sweden employers battled it out within the existing organization 
landscape (Swenson & Pontusson 1996; 2000; Sheldon & Thornwaite 1999e). 
Similarly, despite massive strains, German employers are remaining loyal to existing 
employer associations, although there is more evidence of internal divisions than in 
the Swedish case (Thelan 2000).  40 
   
small groups are quicker and more efficient political actors than larger 
ones in times of political change.  
Olson argues that groups are driven to form by economic 
circumstances when, “if at any level of purchase of the collective good, 
the gain to the group exceeds the total cost by more than it exceeds 
the gain to any individual” (1965, 33). Groups form because they are 
more efficient than individual action in the provision of collective goods 
and there is ‘market failure’ in the provision of collective goods absent 
group formation. Olson also argues that any group with a leading 
member with large resources and potentially large gains from acting in 
the collective interest will outperform a similar size group with a 
leading member with smaller resources and lesser benefits accruing 
from the same action (1965, 28, 34-35). Finally, Olson argues that 
because of the cost/benefit calculus favoring small groups seeking 
large gains that are borne by the rest of society, small groups have the 
capacity to win, as Olson so graphically terms it, the ‘wrestle in the 
china shop’ and to displace these losses, even though there may be a 
huge social cost (Olson 1982, 44). This leads Olson to conclude that 
there is a, “systematic tendency for ‘exploitation’ of the great by the 
small!” (1965, 29).27 28 
                                                 
27 This leads Olson to conclude that encompassing organizations are best for 
the entire society because they are unable to externalise their losses. This 
fundamental insight drives the literature on the relationship between encompassing 
unions, centralization of wage bargaining and good macro-economic outcomes. 
28 Becker (1983) generates a similar result in a discussion of taxation and 
subsidies lobbying from competing pressure groups. Becker argues that when the 
benefits of a collectively provided good are diffuse, such that benefit to each member 
of that group is comparatively small, small groups with much to gain and who can 
control free-riding by members who contribute nothing to the lobbying cause but 
extract the benefits from that lobbying, can exploit the comparative collective action 
weakness of the large group and win large gains. This is because the gains to action  41 
   
Small groups with much to gain are very efficient in advancing 
their claims and, all policy preferences of policy makers equal, are 
more likely to be successful than larger groups with less to lose. This 
has implications when accounting for wage bargaining institutional 
change. As I argue below, it is exporters and MNCs who have sought 
freedom from centralized wage bargaining arrangements. These 
numerically small, resource-rich but comparatively unorganized 
groups have been successful in pressing their claims to be ‘let alone.’ 
This desire to be freed from wage regulation has been a most 
important factor in shaping wage bargaining institutions in liberal 
market economies. 
2.2 Controlling the public sector 
I argue that public sector wage drift is a second cause of wage 
bargaining decentralization. This argument is based on the 
implications of studies examining the negative effect of strong public 
sector unions on the macro-economy. These studies support the 
argument that the absence of product market discipline on public 
                                                                                                                                              
for the small group are such that any one member of that group is prepared to take 
on the costs of organization and lobbying themselves, because the benefits outweigh 
the costs. Becker’s big proviso is that smaller groups are better and will win if and 
only if they control free riding better than a larger group (i.e. are comparatively more 
efficient). Becker adds a key (unmodeled) discussion of the problem of ignorance of 
the large group that is facing a potential loss because of the small group action, of 
those potential losses. Ignorance of losses and gains within large groups is a further 
contributor to the likelihood that small groups will win, and large groups will lose 
(391-394).This conclusion is a function of the way Becker models his argument such 
that wins for some (tax reductions or subsidies) necessarily mean losses for others 
(loss of subsidies or increased taxation) (1983, 372). Becker’s tax/subsidy model is a 
zero-sum game. But in cases where policy is not a zero-sum game, Olson’s argument 
about inclusive and exclusive groups is pertinent. Olson argues that where free–
riding in a group -- leaving others to do the work, but partaking of the benefits of 
that work -- does not reduce the gains that those who do the work receive (i.e. the 
benefits are a true public good), then the rule is that inclusive groups will encourage 
as wide a membership as possible (1965, 40). This, in part, explains the tendency of 
employers associations to encourage as wide a membership as possible.  42 
   
sector unions means there is no job-loss threat brake on their wage 
demands. Wage leadership results. Public sector wage rises lead to 
increases in private sector wages via relativity-based claims by private 
sector unions. But while public sector unions are not wage restrained 
by product market competition, they are mindful of wage relativities, 
just like private sector unions. This means that where the export 
sector has highly profitable firms and shares the profits with workers 
in the form of higher wages and higher pay rises, public sector unions 
will pursue similar pay rises in the interest of ‘keeping up’ with the 
private sector. The combination of these two dynamics results in 
losses of competitiveness and jobs in the traded but not exported 
sector (so-called ‘Dutch disease’), potentially in less competitive and 
profitable export firms, and in wage-push inflation. This would 
indicate that the control of public sector pay should be a priority in 
any central wage bargaining regime.29 
Public sector wage militancy is of increasing concern for policy 
makers in OECD countries. The likelihood of strong public sector 
unions, despite union decline across most OECD countries, is still 
strong. Because of the relative stability of public sector union density 
many of these unions are becoming comparatively stronger within the 
                                                 
29 The classic example of failure to control this potentially fatal problem for 
centralized bargaining of growing non-traded sector union power is the case of 
Sweden. The Swedish expansion of the welfare state and the growing power of public 
sector unions realized itself when, first, white-collar public and then white-collar 
private sector unions pushed for inter-occupational wage levelling and wage drift 
compensation pay rises in the 1970s. This led to significant wage compression 
(Hibbs & Locking 2000). By the 1980s, this growing trend, which prompted 
relativities-driven demands in the engineering sector, collided with a growing need 
for production flexibility among exporting manufacturers and prompted a pull-out of 
central bargaining by the Swedish Employers Confederation (SAF) in 1990 (Swenson 
& Pontusson 2000).  43 
   
union movements of most OECD countries. Union decline in many 
countries caused by anti-union sentiment in MNCs and in firms with 
‘the need for speed’ that regard unionization as slowing change means 
that firms in the exporting and traded sector are less likely to be 
unionized now than 10 or 20 years ago. Low union density is 
associated in the 1990s with a high ratio of public sector members to 
private sector members (Ebbinghaus 2002, 468). In 1970, for all 
OECD countries, the public sector share of membership was just 
below 26%. In 1990 it was just below 35% (Visser 1991, 113).  
All things equal, unions prefer higher pay rises to lower ones. 
However, where the cost of those rises cannot be externalized, they 
may prefer a strategy that restrains wage growth (Olson 1982, 47-53; 
Lange 1984). Public and sheltered sector unions, all things equal, are 
more likely to be militant and seek high pay increases because they 
know that any costs can be passed onto consumers and that any effect 
of their claims on inflation will not in all likelihood threaten their jobs. 
When public and sheltered sector unions dominate trade unions as 
they are increasingly likely to do, growth, low inflation and 
unemployment may be compromised. Franzese (2001) demonstrates 
that with an independent central bank regulating money supply with 
sole reference to inflation targets and centralized wage bargaining, 
when public sector employment dominates the share of all 
employment, higher inflation and unemployment arises than when 
traded employment dominates public sector employment, no matter 
what the actual size of the public sector. Hence, the benefits from  44 
   
central coordination of wages only accrue when employment in the 
traded sector dominates total employment. 
Garrett & Way (1999) argue that the important modifying variable 
is public sector union strength not the relative size of the public 
sector. In the 1980s, a series of studies found a relationship between 
left government and centralized wage bargaining, and right 
government and decentralized bargaining with low unemployment, low 
inflation and high rates of growth (Alvarez, Garrett & Lange 1991; 
Lange & Garrett 1985). However, in the 1990s, many highly unionized 
economies experienced high levels of industrial unrest, and growing 
unemployment and inflation (observed by Iversen 1996, Pontusson & 
Swenson 1996). Garrett & Way argue that where public sector unions 
are very strong: 
“[P]owerful labor confederations cannot stop public sector 
workers from using their organizational power to bid up wages 
to levels that have deleterious consequences for the private 
sector, especially those sectors that are exposed to 
international trade” (Garrett & Way 1999, 412). 
‘Public sector unionism’ appears to be a far more satisfactory 
explanatory variable than Franzese’s ‘public sector employment’ 
measure because it suggests a clear political logic at work: relatively 
strong public sector unions bid up wages.30  
It should be noted that Garrett and Way’s argument about public 
sector unions is a subset of a larger argument they make that it is the 
relative organizational strength of traded and non-traded unions that 
                                                 
30 Garrett & Way also find in related research that there existed a positive 
relationship between the size of pay increases in the public sector and the density of 
public sector unionisation with real wages between 1970 and 1990 increasing 
around 2% per annum when public sector union density was in the mid to low 30 
percent range, rising to around 3 ½ percent when it was around 90% (2000, 288).  45 
   
are critical in determining whether corporatist arrangements deliver 
low unemployment and inflation, and growth. For ease of argument 
and difficulty in accurately defining which parts of the private sector 
are traded and which are not, they use public sector unions as an, 
“approximation for organized labor in the non-tradable sector” (Garrett 
& Way 1999, 416).  
Garrett & Way and Franzese’ arguments confirm earlier arguments 
made by Crouch (1994) that the stability of corporatist regimes 
(centralized bargaining) having low inflation, unemployment and strike 
activity is correlated with countries where union membership is 
dominated by unions in the export sector. Export unions have 
incentives to restrain their pay claims because rising labor costs may 
result in their product or services becoming too expensive for the 
market leading to profit and probable job loss. In the 1960s, 70s and 
first half of the 80s, the largest unions in the exposed sector in 
Western and Northern European states were in the engineering and 
metalworking industry. Crouch argues that the bigger the share of 
exposed sector union membership, the more prominent the metal 
unions, and the healthier the macro-economy (Crouch 1990, 71-77).31  
But as previously observed, trade union density in the private 
sector has declined and public sector unions dominate union 
movements in the non-Scandinavian countries. In order for centralized 
wage bargaining to be stable and long-lasting, public sector wages and 
                                                 
31 In a similar vein, Swenson (1991) argues that it was Swedish employers and 
their workers in the export sector who allied to establish wage bargaining 
centralization in an attempt to control the wage movements in the non-traded sector, 
especially in construction.  46 
   
employment expansion must be controlled as well as the wage 
movements of the non-traded or sheltered sector. Failure to do either 
will spark a round of industrial unrest and catch-up claims in the 
traded sector, leading to a loss of profit in the traded sector, and 
ultimately job loss and higher inflation.  
This brings the review to the second dynamic summarized at the 
outset of this section: that of high export sector pay raises feeding 
public sector wage militancy. There will be instances where export 
firms and unions will not be wage constrained and it should be 
expected that pockets of export sectors will have very high pay firms 
who frequently give very high pay rises. This will drive an imperative 
that centralized wage bargaining institutions restrain public and 
sheltered sector pay, a task to be achieved while allowing export wages 
to be set at the plant and firm level.  
The export sector is likely to be far more productive than the non-
export sector. Export firms, via their firm-specific assets, have a 
market advantage that enables them to be especially profitable. 
Notwithstanding the overall decline in union density in the private 
sector in liberal economies, the high profitability of some exporting 
firms will attract labor organization that should lead these firms to pay 
more and to give, on average, higher pay rises than the rest of the 
labor force in comparable jobs (the rent-sharing thesis, see Caves 
1996, 125). Crouch acknowledges this possibility in his argument, but 
argues that everything else equal, export sector unions will be more 
willing to discipline their pay movements. This is because the costs to 
job creation and sustainability when export sector wage rises exceed  47 
   
productivity and profits cannot be externalised for export workers, 
whereas they can for sheltered (and public) sector workers (Crouch 
1990, 70). But the possibility of asset-derived rents (for instance, 
classically, in the mining industry, or among R and D oriented firms 
with new products and temporary market-induced monopoly rents) 
driving unions to seek a share of the high profits via high wages 
should not be overlooked. In addition, the economies of scale achieved 
by many exporters suggest larger plants than elsewhere in the 
economy will characterize the exposed sector. Managerial employee 
monitoring problems will be endemic and lead to incentives for 
managers in these plants to pay higher efficiency wages (Caves 1996, 
126; Milgrom & Roberts 1992, 250-259).  
While we should expect some degree of wage restraint in the 
export sector, there will be pressures for wage leadership that rivals 
that of the public and sheltered sector. Export firms may attempt to 
minimize income maximizing by employees by using variable and 
flexible pay strategies. This tendency will compound the ‘need for 
speed’ inspired preference among exporters for wage bargaining 
regimes that allow them to set pay at the plant or firm level. 
The dynamic behind Crouch, Franzese and Garrett & Way’s 
arguments and the explanation of wage bargaining decentralization in 
Sweden given by Swenson & Pontusson (2000) suggests that pay 
movements flow in a circular motion, from the traded or exposed to the 
non-traded and back again. The tendency of both the public and very 
sheltered parts of the economy and some firms in the export sector to 
give higher pay-rises than the rest of the economy will, if unchecked,  48 
   
drive wage growth throughout the economy. Whether it is called 
solidarity wage policy or one driven by relativities, unions, and in 
particular craft unions, pay close attention to the income disparities 
between their member’s occupations and jobs compared to those of 
members in other unions and other sectors (Soskice 1990a). 
In between these two high pay poles lies a spectrum of non-
exporting firms, who face varying degrees of market competition either 
locally or from imports. At one extreme of this spectrum are sheltered 
firms, for instance construction, local services and tobacco. These 
firms can be considered, as Garrett & Way do, as behaving, wage-wise, 
like the public sector. Then there are manufacturing and service firms 
with varying market competition. In general, private sector 
manufacturing firms and some service industries, such as banking, 
insurance and finance face higher degrees of market competition, are 
likely to avoid high wage rises and/or wage drift because at some point 
it will cost jobs and lead to wage-push inflation. However, if they are 
surrounded by a public sector pay boom on one side and portions of 
the export sector paying very high wages with high rises on the other, 
then unions will find it difficult to quell calls from their members for 
higher claims.  
Expectations about the future are a major force in shaping the pay 
claims of employees and unions and embed the recursive relationship 
described above. The sectors with the greatest capacity to be wage 
leaders are the public and export sectors. If rounds and bargaining are 
staggered and some export wage rounds lag behind public and 
sheltered sector wage rounds, expectations of future pay movements  49 
   
and guesses about the inflation rate will dictate what non-traded 
unions demand. A similar guessing game will be played when the 
situation is reversed and export unions will attempt to factor in what 
they anticipate the public and sheltered sector will claim. The result 
will not be a simple case of rises flowing from the traded sector to the 
non-traded sector, or vice versa, but of persistent catch-up and 
speculative claims: a game of wage setting leapfrog, where the wage 
leader will not be clear but will come from one of two groups: either the 
public and highly sheltered sector unions, or rent or profit sharing and 
efficiency wage paying employers in the export sector. 
At some point the chain must be broken if wage restraint is to be 
achieved. The export sector is not a candidate: employers oppose 
outside inference with their pay setting. Union density is also 
becoming too low for them to be effective monitors of coordinated and 
higher level agreements in the export sector. This leaves the public and 
sheltered sectors as the prime candidate for targeting by wage 
bargaining institutions seeking to restrain wage growth, a task that 
must be achieved while the export sector is ‘cut loose’ from 
coordinated bargaining.  
2.3 Macro-economic policy & the limits to central wage 
bargaining regimes 
The birth of centralized wage bargaining in the liberal economy 
cases examined in this dissertation came about as part of a 
macroeconomic stabilization that aimed to improve the 
competitiveness of the economy, lower inflation and boost employment 
growth. In Australia, unemployment in 1982 was 7.1% (the highest it  50 
   
had been since WW2), inflation 10.4%, the current account was minus 
5% of GDP making it a table leader in the OECD, and the terms of 
trade based on IMF data had been in decline since 1974 (OECD and 
IMF data in Argy 1992, 186). In Ireland in 1985, unemployment stood 
at 17% (up from 7.3% in 1980)32, inflation was comparatively low at 
5.4% (although it approached 20% in the early 1980s), the balance of 
payments was around zero, but the terms of trade had improved 
markedly since the early 1980s (Tansey 1998, 52, 155; CSO 2004, 
281). In Australia, the macro-economic problems were historically high 
unemployment rates and a persistent balance of payments problem 
that dragged capital out of the country and lowered growth. In Ireland, 
the problems were persistent and very high unemployment coupled 
with inflationary episodes and crises such as the one in the early 
1980s. 
I argue that once the decision has been made to open capital and 
goods and services markets, governments orient labor market policy 
towards improving the international competitiveness of the economy. 
This leads to a policy priority to lower unit wage costs, and explains 
the policy shift towards centralized wage bargaining as part of a 
macroeconomic stabilization. The pay-off for unions is the possibility 
of higher job growth. Whether this choice or emphasis by policy 
makers is wise or ignores the role of innovation, business strategy and 
efficient capital allocation is moot. Lowering unit wage costs by 
                                                 
32 Ireland had around 120 000 fewer jobs in 1987 than at the time of 
independence in 1920 (Tansey 1998, 34).  51 
   
controlling wage growth is regarded as a central plank of a competitive 
growing economy.  
How is improved wage competitiveness achieved? Recent studies 
suggest that controlling the public sector wage bill is the policy place 
to start. In OECD countries since 1960 when governments curb public 
sector and public sector employment spending, and cut taxes on 
business and labor, profits and business investment increase. This 
increase in business investment accounts for the growth during and 
immediately after the macro-economic stabilization (Ardagna 2004; 
Alesina et al 2002; Alesina, Perotti & Tavares 1998; Alesina & Ardagna 
1998; Alesina & Perotti 1997). Of the three major causal variables 
used in these studies -- public sector spending, taxation and public 
sector wages -- controlling public sector wages is the most significant 
variable affecting profit and investment in the period during and 
following macroeconomic stabilization (Alesina et al 2002). The 
economic rationale is that by limiting public sector wage and 
employment expansion, employers in the traded sector will not be 
subject to a public sector-inspired bidding up of wages. Lower wages 
mean greater profits, business expansion and economic growth. 
Presumably, this leads to a growth in job creation. This line of 
research demonstrates that a contractionary (i.e. non Keynesian) fiscal 
approach to macroeconomic stabilization outperforms an expansionary 
Keynesian one. The expansionary fiscal contraction macroeconomics 
literature supports the Franzese/Garrett & Way strain of research 
about the deleterious effect on employment and inflation of labor 
markets dominated by public sector unions and employment.  52 
   
As previously stated, the only road to liberal economy centralized 
wage regime stability would appear to be to impose pay discipline on 
the public and sheltered sectors, and let exporters alone lest they 
organize for institutional change. The finding of a relationship between 
certain kinds of policies and improved macro- economic outcomes 
does not make the enactment of those policies a functional imperative 
however. However, Iversen & Wren (1998) find that fiscal restraint is 
associated with liberal economies (US, UK, Australia, Canada) and 
Christian democratic economies (Germany, Austria, Netherlands, 
Switzerland), but not social democratic economies (Sweden, Denmark, 
Norway, Finland). Therefore, in liberal economies it is plausible to 
expect monetarist macroeconomic stabilization characterized by cuts 
and curbs on public spending and employment.33 This is what the 
liberal market governments examined in this dissertation have tended 
to do.34  
Curbing the public sector wage bill has the advantage in that it 
suggests that governments in liberal economies who look to centralize 
                                                 
33  This conclusion is supported by the findings of Pontusson & Kwon (2003, 
tables 1, 2 & 3) that trade openness in LMEs but not CMEs is associated with a 
negative growth of social spending per capital between 1962 and 1998.  
34 This argument must be weighed against findings supporting the 
compensation thesis that governments in open economies compensate the lack of job 
security in its citizens by expanding the welfare state, and presumably public sector 
employment. In a wide sample of countries including developing nations, trade 
openness is correlated with the size of public expenditure and increasing openness is 
associated with increased public sector size in democracies. No such compensation 
effect is found in non-democracies (Adsera & Boix 2002). Earlier studies found the 
compensation effect was limited to left power and high union density in very open 
economies (Garrett 1995). 
These two arguments are reconcilable when it is considered that the size of the 
state in the OECD set of countries is larger than that in the non-OECD countries. 
Hence, the expansionary fiscal contraction set of research suggests that in (OECD) 
states, a set of states with a comparably large public sector spend, contraction of 
fiscal spending by the government will lead to a reverse of the ‘crowding out’ effect on 
private investment and profits caused by an expanding public sector.  53 
   
wage bargaining will be strong on the issue of public sector wage 
restraint. Their desire to limit public spending in the pursuit of growth 
is consistent with a stability condition of centralized wage bargaining 
regimes. But because of the macroeconomic constraints of the 
monetarist stabilization program, governments are limited in the 
inducements they can offer (public and sheltered sector) unions as 
reward or bribe for centrally bargained pay restraint. The big welfare 
state policies that compensate losers from economic change described 
by Katzenstein (1985) and identified by Esping-Andersen (1990) in the 
social democratic and Christian democratic states are not possible. 
Instead the policy carrot for compliance with central deals is the 
reduction of personal income taxation. This achieves a dual purpose: it 
lifts take-home or net pay without the need for a pay rise, and it 
imposes a need for fiscal rectitude and strong controls on public 
spending. 
The problem with this strategy is that it cannot go on forever. 
Taxes can only be cut so low until budgets go into deficits and add to 
debt. Governments who therefore pursue a ‘small state’ strategy but 
who use centralized wage deals as a means to control wage growth are 
therefore using a set of potentially contradictory policies with a finite 
time horizon. In addition, the use of tax cuts is a very blunt 
instrument to reward public sector workers. While public sector 
workers are on the average higher paid than private sector workers, 
and tax cuts can therefore be skewed such that they benefit 
disproportionately from them (the ‘middle class tax cut’), there is 
always the potential problem that public sector workers may feel that  54 
   
they are bearing the greater load of wage restraint without receiving 
the greater policy benefits to maintain and increase household income. 
2.4 The form of centralized wage bargaining in liberal 
economies 
From the discussion in this chapter, wage bargaining 
centralization and coordination is possible in liberal market economies 
but it is a peculiar brand of centralization. The export sector cannot be 
included because firms there place a premium on wage flexibility and 
are likely to have a non-union plant or workplace preference. Public 
and sheltered sector unions bear the brunt of the responsibility for 
wage discipline because they are the most likely to be able to 
successfully pursue larger pay rises than those centrally agreed. The 
welfare state is not expanded but is reduced. Tax cuts are therefore 
used as side-payments for workers.35 This suggests a finite life to 
liberal market wage centralization regimes when public sector workers 
find themselves no longer satisfied with the policy compensation 
packages they receive in exchange for their promises of wage restraint. 
From this, we can conclude that far from being a move in the direction 
of the CMEs, this wage bargaining solution typified by the Irish case 
after 1987 appears to be a market-oriented solution to the problem of 
public and sheltered sector wage pushfulness.
                                                 
35 The use of tax cuts in order to lift real take home pay while maintaining pay 
discipline has been identified as a key component of what has been termed 
‘competitive corporatism’ (Rhodes 1998; 2001). But the exclusion of a relatively large 
portion of the economy in LME wage bargaining centralization regimes from collective 
bargaining means that this LME variant cannot be called corporatist. A better 
description is that it is a partially coordinated centralized wage bargaining system.     
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Chapter 3 
Discussion of existing literature  
 
I turn now to a discussion of the literature on the two cases 
following a brief description and critique of the shortcomings of the 
standard varieties of capitalism predictions regarding the trends in 
institutional design in liberal market economies and a brief discussion 
of two important explanations of wage bargaining decentralization 
based on larger n samples. I find both of these explanations 
unsatisfactory. 
What is striking about the case literature is the absence of 
comparative studies. This has meant that the literature has tended to 
emphasize unique factors to each case: individuals and groups of 
individuals, ideas or specific trade union strategies. There is a notable 
absence of interest-based accounts and the effect of the international 
economy on outcomes is in many cases marginalized or ignored. My 
argument therefore fills a gap in the literature by taking an interest-
based argument informed by a broad international political economy 
perspective and applying it in a two cases comparison that is testable 
by reference to other cases. 
3.1 The predictions of the ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
The variety of capitalism approach to comparative political 
economy posits that there are two main clusters or varieties of 
capitalism: organized or coordinated market economies (hereafter 
CMEs) and liberal or non-coordinated market economies (LMEs). 56 
   
Coordination means non-market cooperation of economic activity 
between actors.36 
The key concept in the approach is the idea of institutional 
complementarity. Institutions create incentives and rewards that 
cause complementing institutional design elsewhere in the economy. 
Soskice (1994) describes four such complementing sets of institutions: 
finance, training, corporate governance and wage bargaining. Liberal 
market economies (LMEs) have tended to be defined by what they lack 
compared to coordinated market economies (CMEs). LMEs do not have 
coordinated wage bargaining or centralized wage bargaining. They do 
not have guaranteed trade union recognition or a role for unions in the 
workplace. They have very weak and non-coordinated post-secondary 
vocational education and training systems. They do not allow collusion 
between companies over prices and markets. They do not have a legal 
framework that accommodates loose and ongoing ‘relational’ 
contracting. They do not have non-market coordination of standards 
setting, leaving that to the market instead (Soskice 1999, 111). LME 
companies do not innovate in the incremental manner of CME 
companies. This incremental manner is enabled by a smaller reliance 
on equity finance and interlocking corporate governance structures in 
CMEs that creates long-term business strategic horizons. In 
                                                 
36 This varieties of capitalism theoretical paradigm has informed the 
understanding of the sources of variation of many core political-economy variables: 
wage distribution (Pontusson, Rueda & Way 2002; Rueda & Pontusson 2000; Rueda 
2003); corporate governance (Vitols 2001; Casper 2001); welfare state differences 
(Estevez-Abe, Iversen & Soskice 2001; Mares 2001); employer militancy (Briggs, 
forthcoming); public expenditure (Pontusson & Kwon 2003); wage bargaining 
institutional change (Iversen 1996; 1999; 2000); inflation and unemployment (Hall & 
Franzese 1998; Franzese & Hall 2000; Iversen 1998); innovation (Casper 1999; 
Taylor, M 2004) and the provision of training (Soskice 1994). 57 
   
comparison, a short-term managerial perspective rules LME firms 
(Soskice 1990b, 180-182). 
LME firms are prevented from moving in a CME-like cooperative 
direction because of the complementarities of CME institutions. Each 
institution within the complex increases the pay-offs and motivates 
certain types of reinforcing behavior in the others that guarantees 
institutional equilibrium. Bank financing reinforces relational 
contracting. Relational contracting reinforces the sharing of 
information about competencies, skill needs and the collective 
provision of training (Soskice 1994). The collective provision of training 
reinforces the incremental method of innovation, which increases 
returns from investments in co-assets across companies. This further 
encourages relational contracting, and encourages banks to remain as 
long-term financiers and underwriters. Short of putting all of them in 
place at once, LMEs would be on a fruitless endeavour if they 
attempted to replicate parts of the system with the intention of ‘doing 
what the Germans do better.’ 
But despite the argument that LMEs will find it difficult to 
coordinate their economies, the identification by Soskice (1990a; 
1990b) of the weaknesses of an non-coordinated wage determination 
system in obtaining wage restraint across the economy, and the 
argument by Lange (1984) that under repeated interaction self-
interested groups of workers preferring higher wages may be able to 
cooperate and restrain wage growth, provides a motivation and a 
strategy for LMEs to centralize wage bargaining. Of all the elements 
that define a variety of capitalism (labor market institutions, inter-58 
   
company relations and links, finance and training and education), 
changes to labor market institutions in a coordinated and centralized 
direction in the 1980s and 1990s appear the easiest for LMEs, 
perhaps a necessity.37 The instability of centralized wage bargaining in 
Ireland and the UK in the 1970s has led to unnecessary pessimism 
about the capacity of LMEs to coordinate their wage bargaining. This 
dissertation is a corrective to the view that liberal economies such as 
Ireland are driven to a non-coordinated US model.38 
                                                 
37 A major concept that holds the argument together in the primary VOC 
explanation of wage bargaining decentralization in coordinated market economies 
(CMEs) in the last 30 years, that of Iversen (1999), is strategic capacity (1999, 94). 
The concept of strategic capacity enables Iversen to argue that institutional change is 
caused by grand cross-class coalitions of groups of workers, whose interests are 
defined by their skills, the sector in which they work and the monetary regime, and 
employers, whose interests are defined by the kinds of goods and services they 
provide, where they sell them and the monetary regime. The great strategic capacity 
of CME employers enables these cross-class coalitions. In this his argument is 
congruent with that of Soskice (1999). 
Iversen argues that no coalition of workers and employers, whether it be for a 
decentralized regime through an alliance with high skill, sheltered employers and 
workers, or for a centralized regime with the low skill, low wage sector of the 
economy, can be made absent a group of exposed producers with highly skilled 
workers. The win of the exposed high skill sector preference over wage bargaining 
and macroeconomic regime is dependent on the adoption by politicians of a 
preference for monetarist policies over Keynesian policies (1999, 101-102). 
The absence of CME employer coordinating capacity in LMEs means that the 
kind of coalitions that Iversen sees in CMEs as arising from common product 
strategies and responses to monetary regimes are unlikely to be found in LMEs 
including my cases, Ireland and Australia. Collective action problems in LMEs mean 
that monetary policies are unlikely to have much influence on preferences for wage 
bargaining regimes because real income outcomes will be muted (Iversen 1999, 94). 
CMEs have trade associations that serve member individual interests in a manner 
that encourages compliance with associational authority to a far greater extent than 
their counterparts in LMEs. 
38 This is one of dual institutional convergences predicted by VOC theory -- 
convergences caused by the recent growth in international trade and capital 
movements and the rise of new technologies that have shortened product cycles. 
While liberal orthodoxy tends to predict an institutional convergence on a lightly 
regulated free market US-style model of capitalism (Frieden 1991; Frieden & 
Rogowski 1996), the VOC approach predicts an alternate path for coordinated 
market economies. CME economies include the Scandinavian states, Germany, 
Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Japan and Finland. France is an example of a 
statist/elite coordinated market economy and is more similar to the CME than the 
LME model (Soskice 1990b; 1999, 103). CMEs under the pressures of increasing 59 
   
3.2 Larger n studies 
Western (1997, 172) finds an association between increasing 
unemployment and inflation with wage bargaining decentralization. 
Does this mean that higher unemployment and inflation cause 
decentralization? Such an explanation does appear somewhat 
unsatisfactory. While causal explanations in comparative political-
economy should seek to explain political outcomes as due to variations 
in economic independent variables, and vice versa (the economic 
effects of politics and the political effects of economics, see Pontusson 
1995), this kind of argument appears to eradicate interests from the 
causal story altogether, and reduces policy to a technocratic process 
divorced from economic interests in civil society. It tends to beg the 
questions of: Why does inflation increase? How does unemployment 
rise? Which interests are pushing for decentralization? A complete 
explanation would require an analysis of what led to the higher 
unemployment and inflation. Western’s analysis indeed suggests that 
the underlying factor may be public sector wage militancy, one of the 
two factors I regard as causing wage bargaining decentralization. 
Katz (1993) argues consistent with Iversen (1999) and my 
argument about ‘the need for speed’ among exporters, that wage 
bargaining decentralization has been caused by the implementation of 
new flexible forms of work organisation which is in turn caused by new 
                                                                                                                                             
international trade and capital movements are moving towards what is termed 
”flexibly coordinated” systems. Previously centralized wage bargaining regimes have 
moved to the industry level and unions have remained strong and intimately involved 
with training and participation in management (Soskice 1999, 124). 
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technology and more competitive product markets (1993, 14).39 Where 
I differ from Katz is whereas he essentially see decentralization as a 
cooperative process between labor and capital, I would stress the 
resistance of unions to change and the imposition of new production 
methods and flexibility by management. While highly skilled 
employees that are at the core of the enterprise may be beneficiaries of 
flexibility-increasing changes in labor processes and work 
organization, I am less sanguine about the effect on the workforce of 
these firms as a whole. Flexibility is all too often a by-word for mass 
redundancy, outsourcing, the cutting of hours, the introduction of less 
employee friendly hours (evenings, weekends), the stripping of benefits 
such as pension, sickness and leave entitlements, and the re-
negotiation of pay in favour of management’s goal of lower wage costs.  
In addition to these problems with his argument, Katz makes no 
mention of public sector wage creep as a factor causing 
decentralization. There is no mention of the dynamic relationship 
between public sector unionism, public sector pay militancy and the 
influence on public sector pay of wage increases in highly profitable 
export sector firms. Given the changing landscape of trade unionism 
throughout most of the OECD, and the effects discussed in the 
previous chapter of strong public sector unions on wages, this is an 
oversight and the author omits an important cause of wage bargaining 
decentralization. 
                                                 
39 Katz examines Germany, Australia, West Germany, the UK, USA and Sweden. 61 
   
3.3 Ireland 
The literature on Irish Social Partnership tends to fall into camps 
of thought: those who believe that it is a sham (including wage 
bargaining centralization) and those who believe that Social 
Partnership represents some form of social corporatism or has 
changed Ireland from a liberal to a coordinated market economy. 
Of those who say SP is a sham, Teague’s (1995) is typical. Based 
on five criteria typical of European corporatism -- competitive, 
stabilization, employment, and equity functions, plus supply-side peak 
consensus on vocational training and apprenticeship standards, 
Teague argued that the Irish “corporatist” experiment was little more 
an exercise in macro-economic stabilization achieved by disciplining 
the wage demands of exposed sector high skill workers (1995, 261-
264). Based on interview data, Teague argued that while public sector 
wages had not been altered by the pay agreements, exposed sector 
workers undoubtedly had.  
Teague argued that pay dispersion had increased, mostly due to 
higher increases amongst managers in the public sector (1995, 268-
269), that Irish competitiveness was mostly driven by a small recovery 
in the UK economy and not by the agreements, that employment 
generation was minimal due to the poor linkages between the profit 
healthy multi-national corporations (MNCs), and indigenous firms and 
the state sector. Finally, Teague argued little effort had been expended 
on the relationship between wages and productivity. Supply-side 
productivity enhancing policies were minimal, leading Teague to 
conclude: 62 
   
“With little assessment of the interaction between the 
macro and micro aspects of the labor market, claims that the 
present round of centralized agreements are social corporatist 
in character appear shallow” (Teague 1995, 270-271). 
This dissertation disagrees some of Teague’s conclusions. The 
evidence suggests that over the entire 1987-2004 period it was the 
exposed sector who behaved as though SP was non-existent, because 
of the lack of institutional links and non-market mechanisms to 
discipline it, and it has been the behavior of public sector pay 
movements that has altered.  
A more nuanced naysayer approach comes from Roche (1998), 
who focuses more closely on the supply-side question. Roche 
distinguishes between four types of industrial relations currently being 
carried on in Ireland: the non-union human resource model, known in 
American industrial relations circles as “new HRM”, the partnership 
model, managerial unilateralism and deregulation, and traditional 
adversarialism.40  
                                                 
40 The non-union resource model dominates in recent comers to the high-skill, 
high tech sector, usually US-based MNCs such as Microsoft, Intel, Hewlett Packard, 
Motorola, IBM and ABB. These firms value continuous innovation in production 
processes and place a premium on flexibility. Profit sharing, performance-related 
pay, emphasis on teamwork and well-managed grievance and communication 
systems are the norm. These firms spend a great deal on training on an already well-
educated, young workforce. Some banks also are beginning to use this model (AIB 
and Bank of Ireland) (Roche 1998, 114). 
The partnership model, touted in the 1997 social partnership agreement, 
Partnership 2000, attempts to promote joint gains between unions and management 
in the workplace. This model emphasizes product strategies that compete on quality 
and innovation rather than price alone in highly unionized workplaces owned mostly 
by Irish firms, but also some MNCs. These firms include Waterford Crystal, Merck, 
Apple, Shannon Aerospace, Aughinish Alumina, and Bord na Mona. This model is 
regarded by Roche as the “guiding image” (1998, 115) for many Irish enterprises, 
particularly in the state sector or high-skill services, for their attempts to re-build 
their industrial relations on place of the existing traditional adversarial model. These 
organizations and firms include, in the late 1990s, the state electricity board, ESB, 
Telecom Eireann, the public airports authority, Aer Rianta, the state transport 
utility, CIE, Aer Lingus and the unionized portions of the banking industry. 63 
   
Roche argues that the co-existence of these four models in Ireland 
makes it difficult for a coordinated economy project to be successful 
(approximating what Teague calls “social corporatism”), frustrating 
inter-regime continuity within the EU and regime coherence within 
Ireland. Regime incoherence is reflected in the weakness of what 
Roche terms, an institutionalized productivity coalition. Here he is 
referring to sector-based business associations capable of establishing 
the kind of coalitions Iversen describes as critical in implementing 
institutional change (1999). Roche’s analysis is therefore pessimistic 
about the chances for sustained and real labor market coordination on 
both the demand and supply side (wages and training). 
Whether the differences between traditional adversarial, 
managerial unilateralist and the partnership approach genuinely 
matter for wage coordination is debatable. It matters if unilateralist 
tendencies in the economy provoke a union backlash and wage 
militancy, or are so widespread as to lower union density to the point 
where wage coordination (notwithstanding the Japanese case again) 
would be nigh impossible. But in the absence of these, it is difficult to 
                                                                                                                                             
Managerial unilateralism is characterized by the continuous search by 
employers for labor market deregulation- the unencumbered right to hire and fire, 
with low or non-existent training of the work force. Confined mostly to small service 
firms, the practice is increasing in the large retail sector (Dunnes Stores) and among 
the peripheral and temporary low skill workforce in many enterprises from the state-
owned postal service, An Post, to MNCs in the semi-conductor industry (Intel) and 
some banks. 
The final model, that of traditional adversarialism is common in firms facing 
weak product competition. Piecemeal and opportunistic industrial relations 
innovation, more often lip service to trends in other parts of the economy, prevails in 
the food and beverage, tobacco, paper and printing, metal fabrication, wood and 
furniture manufacture industries. Management and unions face little incentives to 
innovate production processes, upgrade worker skills or alter existing shop floor 
relationships. 64 
   
see how the co-existence of these three regimes matters. As for the 
fourth, that of the non-union sector, this dissertation argues, that far 
from rendering SP problematic, it and the unilateralist regime shape 
the policy project of liberal economy wage coordination, by freeing 
those firms to do essentially as they please with respect to pay and 
hire and fire. If the export sector is forced into an adversarial or 
partnership system of industrial relations it will either leave or fight 
(as they did in Australia). In addition, prospective exporters will not 
come into the market. 
Of those who believe that Irish wage coordination is an illusion 
and that SP has had little or no effect on the formation of Irish pay, 
John Fitzgerald is typical.41 In a working paper explaining Irish growth 
in the 1990s, Social Partnership is not mentioned. On the effects of 
Social Partnership, he concludes: 
“While helping to bring about a more orderly labour 
market, with fewer industrial disputes than in the 1970s, the 
partnership approach served more to validate the results 
which market forces had made inevitable. The significant 
differences in the growth in wage rates in individual industrial 
sectors in recent years reflect the importance of market forces 
in determining wage rates” (Fitzgerald 1998, 23). 
Fitzgerald (1998) finds, using the CSO wage data and all its 
limitations presented in chapter 4, that Irish movements are 
influenced by UK pay. He explains this as a result of the porous 
nature of the Irish labor market: Irish people come and go as jobs and 
pay ebbs and flows. Like many neo-classical economists, he makes 
some fairly limited assumptions about how the labor market works, 
                                                 
41 Also see Bradley et al 1999; Durkan 1992; Walsh 1999 65 
   
and is suspicious of institutional effects. His models therefore have a 
limited range of variables and certainly no institutional ones and it is 
therefore likely that they are incompletely specified. His main finding 
of the high elasticity of Irish labor supply is well known. 
Those who argue that Social Partnership has had real effects on 
pay determination included individuals actively involved in the process 
at the peak level of the national Economic and Social Council (NESC) 
(O’Donnell 1998), recent studies that have observed some of the macro 
and microeconomic changes since 1997 (Hardiman 2000a, 2000b) and 
a recent ILO paper by Baccaro & Simoni (2004). None are comparative 
studies. 
Of these, Hardiman’s (2000a) is the most sanguine about the 
future of Irish wage bargaining centralization. Observing the 
spectacular macro-economic success of Ireland in the 1990s that 
Hardiman, like Barry (1999), associates with Irish Social Partnership, 
the author argues that there are several sources of strain on Irish 
Social Partnership. Of these, three stand out: sector-based conflicts 
associated with skill shortage induced wage drift, public sector pay 
claims, and employee input into workplace operations.42  43 There is 
                                                 
42 Wage drift, rare in the early 1990s has become a noticeable trend in Ireland 
since the 1994 upturn (see chapter 5). 
43 Hardiman’s (2000a) identification of the pressure points on the central wage 
bargaining regime is valid. However, the author’s belief that Ireland is developing a 
form of ‘coordinated market economy’ (2000a, 31) is based on a questionable reading 
of export sector pay restraint. In this regard Hardiman’s argument is similar to that 
of Baccaro & Simoni (2004) reviewed below. It is difficult to argue that Ireland is 
moving in a coordinated direction when that coordination is paradoxically designed 
to liberalize the export sector of the economy via the disciplining of wages in, and 
input costs from, the unionized sector. In this sense, Ireland is a new breed of 
economy; partly liberal, partly coordinated. 66 
   
nothing systematic about Hardiman’s analysis, however44, and these 
three strains appear as historically specific problems. Hardiman does 
not place SP into a comparative context or attempt to describe the 
strains on SP in analytical terms. 
Rory O’Donnell (1998; 1999; 2001; also O’Donnell & O’Reardon 
1995) is perhaps the most unashamed booster for the changes 
wrought by Irish social partnership. O’Donnell places great store on 
identity and ideas being formed via the bargaining process: the 
outcomes being, in a sense, less important than the process: 
“Bargaining describes a process in which each party 
comes with definite preferences and seeks to maximise its 
gains. While this is a definite part of Irish social partnership, 
the overall process…would seem to involve something more. 
Partnership involves the players in a process of deliberation 
that has the potential to shape and reshape their 
understanding, identity and preferences…identity can be 
shaped in interaction” (O’Donnell 1998, 19). 
While O’Donnell argues that the process of deliberation can 
overcome any institutional shortcomings (also see O’Donnell 2001, 4-
5) it cannot compensate for a complete lack of institutionalization. 
There must still be a mechanism by which the changed identities of 
actors can transmit their new sets of preferences to those not directly 
involved in the deliberative process. The argument advanced in this 
dissertation is far more plausible: that is the coordination process only 
takes in part of the economy and not the export sector. 
Baccaro & Simoni (2004) argue, similarly to Hardiman (2000a) 
that Irish Social Partnership has had an effect by quelling what 
Hardiman (1988, 44ff) describes as “Irish disease” - Dutch disease 
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moved west. ‘Irish disease’ is defined by labour markets where high 
pay settlements in the high productivity MNC sector spread to other 
sectors as well, producing job losses in these less productive sectors.45  
SP is new and different, according to Baccaro and Simoni, because 
it has had the effect of controlling pay movements in the export sector 
but they do not explain the institutional mechanism by which the 
export sector exercises and monitors pay discipline. Given the low level 
of unionization and the absence of employer association activity in the 
export sector, it is difficult to argue that the export sector has 
‘disciplined itself’ or indeed can. There is no collective effort apparent 
for that purpose. Rather, export sector wage restraint seems to be 
market-driven: a market favourable to exporters because of the 
institutionalised wage restraint elsewhere in the economy, in 
particular, the public sector. These issues are further explored in 
chapter 6.  
While it is difficult to gain perspective on a process or an 
institutional regime when it is still in existence, and subsequent 
events to analysis may prove it wrong, existing arguments about the 
dynamics behind SP tend to be either the product of policy makers too 
close to the process to be sufficiently objective, improperly specified, or 
suffer from a lack of a comparative or analytic perspective.  
3.3 Australia 
There is surprisingly little direct scholarship on the 
decentralization of Australian wage bargaining and virtually no 
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comparative work. Most of the work on wage bargaining treats it as 
one in a packet of policies in the 1980s and 1990s that aimed to open 
and de-regulate the economy. The process of wage bargaining 
decentralization is therefore regarded as part of a wider trend, and 
explanations for that trend suffice as an explanation for wage 
decentralization. In what follows, I examine the small literature on 
wage bargaining decentralization as well as some work on Australian 
employers that has some relevance to this dissertation.  
One of the very few major economic interest-based accounts of 
wage policy change, Briggs (2001) argues that wage decentralization 
was due to the action of the trade union movement, especially the 
metals sector, pursuing short-term wage gains at the plant level. Since 
I address this argument directly in chapter 10, I leave it for the 
moment except to note the significance of the argument, and to note 
my counter-argument: the union movement would never had 
contemplated decentralized wage bargaining if it had not been for the 
offensive on central wage bargaining led by export employers. Their’ 
acquiescence to decentralization was a necessary reaction to the 
causal actions of export employers and were intended to maintain 
close and cooperative relations with the Labor government. 
O’Brien (1994) and Sheldon & Thonthwaite (1993) argue that the 
Business Council of Australia, an employer association dominated by 
mining interests that was formed following the establishment of the 
Accord in 1983, was fundamental in altering wage bargaining policy. 
O’Brien concludes that, “the Council was able to take a leading role in 
establishing the hegemony of the enterprise discourse” (O’Brien 1994, 69 
   
468). This was primarily achieved through a research program and a 
series of well-publicized reports that purported to show that 
Australia’s largest firms, among which are many of that dominate the 
export sector, were in favor of a shift to enterprise bargaining and were 
finding workplace change difficult under the centralized regime. 
This dissertation agrees with O’Brien’s analysis. Where it differs 
and adds to O’Brien is to stress the importance of the choice of policy-
makers in opening the economy, and how this drove wage bargaining 
regime policy towards the preferences of exporters. Rather than remain 
at the level of discourse, I provide an economic logic to the explanation 
of how the BCA came to dominate and turn the wage bargaining 
debate in their favor. 
Of the other interest-based accounts, McEachern (1986) is 
representative. McEachern’s account of the Accord was published 
before the decentralization of wage bargaining began. However, it is 
significant because it recognized the absence of employers from the 
Accord and identified this as a source of potential conflict. 
McEachern’s early article, expanded upon in a later book (1991) 
argued that this absence was fine as long as economic growth was 
delivered and real wages increases were not forthcoming, but the 
political loss by employers in the Accord caused by the close 
relationship between the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) 
and the Labor government meant that: 
“A change in either of these circumstances, that is 
renewed recession, or a revived Liberal [conservative] Party, 
would change the assessment of the Labor government and 
increase their political activism” (1986, 26). 70 
   
McEachern places great weight in arriving at this conclusion to the 
employer opposition at the Tax Summit in mid- 1985 to the 
government proposal to introduce a consumption, sales or VAT-like 
tax on goods and services. This was done primarily to oppose the 
political relationship between unions and the government, with the 
political point being to deliver a defeat for the government. In this it 
was successful (1986, 22).  
Dabscheck (1989; 1995) is typical of accounts that stress the 
importance of state institutions in shaping wage bargaining regime 
outcomes. Dabscheck argues that while unions, business and policy-
makers had an effect on determining the decentralized wage outcome, 
also of prime importance was the role of the Commission (1995, 80). I 
deal with the issue of whether the tribunal system can be considered 
an independent actor in chapter 7, but it is suffice to say here that 
Dabscheck’s tendency to argue that everything matters -- the 
preferences and actions of business, unions, politicians, even the 
media, and the tribunals themselves – stems from his apparent desire 
to explain every last event and detail of every tribunal decision. His is 
an historical narrative where the dependent variable is not always 
clear, rather than a causal explanation of one dependent variable as is 
the case here. 
3.4 Concluding remarks on the country literature 
What is striking about the literature on Australia and Ireland is 
the absence of comparative study, especially in the Australian case. 
This has meant that the Australian literature has tended to emphasize 
unique country-specific and historically unique factors: individuals, 71 
   
elites and unique state institutions. I stress, by comparison, the role of 
economic interests and the effects on policy-makers of international 
economic forces, and of past decisions to open the economy to those 
forces.  
The Irish literature has had more exposure to comparisons with 
other examples of wage bargaining centralization. Where it has tended 
to be deficient is that there has been a desire to show that Ireland has 
done something completely new: a ‘Celtic Tiger’ economic miracle 
created by institutional innovation.46 The irony is, as I discuss in some 
length in chapter 4 and 6, that this miracle has been achieved thanks 
largely to foreign direct investment in plants that lie largely outside the 
centralized system. There has been, therefore, a tendency to 
overestimate the coordinating capacity and centralization of Irish pay 
determination, as well as perhaps some misplaced optimism among 
some that Ireland represents a new ‘third way’. 
I argue in this dissertation that the institutional innovation in 
Ireland in the last 20 years has been limited and that Ireland is still 
largely a variation on the liberal economy theme. In many respects this 
is highlighted by the Australian case. The Accord in Australia was far 
more ambitious than Irish Social Partnership in terms of the shared 
desire by unions and the then opposition left party to install a 
northern European-like regime complete with centralized wage 
bargaining, a growing social welfare state, and an active interventionist 
industrial policy. That it failed so completely demonstrates the 
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considerable restraints on policy-makers in liberal economies. I now 
examine the Irish and Australian cases in turn.  
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Chapter 4 
The context of Social Partnership:  
Industrial relations institutions, trade unions, trade 
& unemployment 
 
The aim of this chapter is to establish the economic and union 
context of Social Partnership. I begin with a brief overview of the 
relevant industrial relations institutions in Ireland that monitor and 
help resolve industrial disputes. I then present data on trade union 
density across the economy and discuss the mechanism by which 
unions ratify the SP wage bargains and monitor them. I then present 
data so as to determine which industries are export-oriented and 
which are not, the labor force working in the export sector, and the 
size of the endemic Irish problem of unemployment during the Social 
Partnership years. This information is then used to structure the 
analysis of wage movements in Ireland after 1987 in chapter 5, and is 
further used in the causal argument in chapter 6 where I answer the 
research questions asked in chapter 1. 
4.1 Irish industrial relations institutions 
There are two broad streams of dispute resolution within the Irish 
system. The first is a legal system designed to resolve individual 
grievances and cases that may involve breaches of the law. This 
includes matters such as redundancy and minimum notice, vacation 
time, unfair dismissal and improper deductions of wages. Equality 
Officers deal with gender and race discrimination under the Anti- 74 
   
Discrimination (Pay) Act, 1974, and the Employment Equality Act, 
1977. Officers carry Roman Law-like investigative powers to carry out 
an investigation and make recommendations that are legally binding. 
Appeal is to the Labor Court within 6 weeks. Decisions of the Labor 
Court are legally binding, but appeal can be made to the High Court 
on points of law. Rights Commissioners deal with issues around unfair 
dismissal, procedural issues regarding the payment of wages and 
dangerous conditions for pregnant women (under the Unfair 
Dismissals Act, 1977, Maternity (Protection of Employee) Act, 1981, 
and the Payment of Wages Act, 1991). They too have investigative 
powers, albeit slightly more circumscribed than Equality Officers (who 
can charge employers with an offence if their investigations are 
impeded). Their decisions tend not be are binding, but legally binding 
appeals to the Labor Court or the Employment Appeals Tribunal are 
possible (depending on the Act which sanctions the intervention of the 
rights commissioner). Rights Commissioners decisions are generally 
adopted by unions and employers and the individual concerned. In 
1990, 14.7% of the recommendations of the Rights Commissioners 
were appealed to the Labor Court. The major legal body of appeal in 
this legal stream of dispute resolution is the Employment Appeals 
Tribunal. It hears appeals from Rights Commissioners cases as well as 
cases involving the rights of Part-time workers and the employees of 
insolvent companies (Gunnigle, Heraty & Morley 1997, 221 – 223). 
The second stream of dispute resolution covers mostly disputes 
around collective bargaining and relies upon non-legal avenues. The 
Labour Relations Commission (LRC) is charged with the responsibility  75 
   
to conciliate disputes referred to it by the parties in dispute. Under the 
1990 Industrial Relations Act, the LRC adopted the Labor Court’s 
conciliation service. Decisions are not legally binding, but the 
successful resolution of dispute record is reasonably impressive, with 
between two-thirds and three-quarters of disputes settled between 
1987 and 1992, compared to the pre-Social Partnership years success 
record of around 50%. The LRC also provides an advisory service, 
codes of practice, and is responsible for the appointment of Equality 
Officers and Rights Commissioners. It also provides a key role for two 
industry-level institutional initiatives: Joint Industrial Councils (JICs) 
and Joint Labour Committees (JLCs). JICs are permanent voluntary 
bi-parte industry bodies regulating wages and conditions in an 
industry. They are however, massively under utilized: just two small 
domestic market industries and one major industry in 1997 are 
registered with the Labor Court: footwear, wholesale fruit and trade in 
the Dublin area, and construction. Registration means that the Labor 
Court may enforce decisions. There are several unregistered JICs 
including a number of small food preparation and processing sub-
industries, banking, printing, public sector industrial employees and 
telecommunications. JLCs are statutory tri-parte bodies designed to 
cover parts of the economy where union representation is poor. In 
practice, this has meant it has covered industries with a large 
contractor and piece-rate employee population (cleaners, hairdressing) 
as local service firms (catering) and small manufacturers selling for the 
local market (clothing apparel, aerated waters). JLCs determine 
minimum wages and conditions of employment that are legally binding  76 
   
upon registration with the Labor Court. (Gunnigle, Heraty & Morley 
(1997, 215 – 220) 
Except where already noted, the Labor Court, founded in 1946, 
does not have legally binding powers. This has been its traditional role: 
it is in fact not a judicial court at all. It is essentially a body where 
parties go when the LRC has failed to resolve a dispute, or where the 
Minster decides to intervene in a dispute and request Labor Court 
conciliation. In recent years, appeals from Equality Officer decisions 
have meant it has adopted some genuinely judicial functions. 
The most noticeable aspect of the Irish industrial relations 
institutions is their reliance on non-legal means to resolve collective 
disputes. This is a critical difference between Ireland and Australia, 
which has an institutional mechanism that relies far more on legally 
binding orders from state dispute resolution bodies. 
4.2 Trade union membership 
The Irish umbrella union organization is the Irish Congress of 
Trade Unions (ICTU). Congress meets every year and member unions 
vote on ratification of part or all of any wage bargain struck with the 
government and IBEC (Irish Business and Employers Council, the 
peak employer association). While the ICTU may bargain on behalf of 
unions, it does not possess other governability powers such as the 
right to veto agreements struck by member unions. Instead, the ICTU 
relies on formal democratic procedures of discussion and majority vote 
(based on membership numbers of member unions) at Congress to 
ratify and maintain adherence to SP wage deals (Rigney interview 
2000). In practice, this allows unions considerable degrees of freedom  77 
   
to pursue over-SP wage increases. However, the largest Irish trade 
union, SIPTU (Services, Industrial, Professional and Technical Union 
with over 220 000 members in 2000 or over half of Ireland’s trade 
union membership, (Kane interview 2000) has been loyal to the SP 
deliberative process and to the deal outcomes. There have been 
instances since 1999 of unions declaring that they are ‘pulling out’ of 
the Social Partnership to pursue higher wage claims. These are 
discussed in chapter 6. 
Trade unions in Ireland are mostly confined to the public and 
indigenously owned private sectors. Density has fallen markedly in 
recent years coinciding with the growth of the export sector that is 
largely non-unionized. In general, data on Irish trade union 
membership is extremely poor in quality and quantity. The Central 
Statistics Office of Ireland and Irish government departments do not 
gather statistics on trade union membership (with the exception of the 
Census), and the OECD does not publish trade union membership or 
density statistics for Ireland. Data for trade union density and 
membership in specific industries must come from other sources. 
Outside of the census data, the best source of trade union 
membership data is from the Irish Congress of Trade Unions that 
periodically publishes membership of member unions, and from 
various surveys conducted by research organizations and university 
researchers. Raw data sets are generally unavailable and secondary 
literature must be relied upon. From the Census data, published data 
from the UCD dues project, University of Limerick survey data and 
ICTU membership data, we can ascertain that membership of the work  78 
   
force was about 43% at the start of the 1990s and fell to just under 
37% by 2000 and 35.6% in 2002 (table 4.1). The most startling drop 
was between 1985 and 1987, which even allowing for sampling errors 
clearly shows the effect of the start of greenfield US MNC practice of 
not recognising trade unions. 
 
Table 4.1 
Trade union membership, Ireland 1980-2002 
 
Year 
 
Percent of  
work force 
 
1980 55.2 
1985 55.3 
1987 43.1 
1990 43.2 
1995 41.1 
2000 36.7 
2002 
 
35.6 
Source: Gunnigle, Morley and Turner 1994, 13; Census 2002. 
 
The best research giving insights into the distribution of members 
by industry classification is in the union recognition literature. This 
literature is based on two competing sets of surveys (one run by Price 
Waterhouse, the other by the Business School at the UCD,) and 
interview and other anecdotal evidence.  The Price Waterhouse data is 
problematic in some respects because it is skewed by an 
overrepresentation of large workplaces and the data is not weighted to 
correct for this (Geary & Roche 2001). However, I use both sets of 
survey data to round out the anecdotal and interview evidence given 
below, with the caveat that the Price Waterhouse data should be 
regarded as indicative.  79 
   
In short, the data suggests that a large non-union MNC enclave 
has emerged in Ireland since the mid-1980s.47 Present estimates are 
that the unionization rate of the private sector workforce in Ireland is 
around 25% (Begg 2002). Among actual employees it is less. The non-
union workplace, previously the preserve of US MNCs, has spread to 
other country-of-origin MNCs in the last decade.48  
Gunnigle, Morley and Turner (1994) show that that the 
overwhelming majority of banking and finance workplaces were not 
unionized in 1992, while a significant proportion of advanced 
manufacturing (covering the electronic and computing industries), 
professional workplaces (doctors, lawyers) and construction and 
engineering were non-union (see table 4.2). The significant comparison 
                                                 
47 This is consistent with the literature that has found MNCs since the 1980s 
partly base their FDI decisions on the host country’s industrial relations landscape 
and prefer countries with smaller union densities and wage bargaining regimes 
where they are not subject to centralised wage deals struck by employer associations 
and unions. 
48 There would appear to be three distinct phases of union recognition among 
MNCs. First, Irish government policy of encouraging union recognition promoted a 
host country effect that spurred MNCs to recognize unions until the 1980s. Second, 
the influx of US MNCs in the 1980s coupled with the establishment of the ‘union 
neutral’ IDA in 1985, saw a convergence of US country of origin effects (union 
avoidance) with a change in country of origin policy that allowed and tacitly 
encouraged non-recognition. Finally, host country effects (non-recognition) in recent 
years are beginning to change non-US MNC behavior with respect to recognition. 
Firms that would have recognized trade unions in the 1970s are now opting for non-
recognition. Overall, the pattern of union recognition at first glance suggests that 
host country effects have a large influence on union recognition behavior. This 
conclusion however ignores the issue of to what degree Ireland has accommodated 
itself to the growing prevalence of preferences for non-union establishments among 
US firms (Kochan, Katz & McKersie 1994, 47-80). The conclusion also ignores 
endogeneity problem of MNCs self-selecting themselves into countries that have 
agreeable industrial relations regimes. Such a conclusion is open to question when 
considered in the absence of interview data of executives making FDI decisions. This 
interview data, in the case of Ireland, suggests that country-of-origin effects are still 
strong, and that firms move to Ireland because of the non-union option, rather than 
make the decision to move and then decide whether they will be unionized or not 
(Spring interview 2000; Gunnigle, Collings & Morley 2005; Gunnigle, MacCurtain & 
Morley 2001; Gunnigle & McGuire 2001).  80 
   
from the data is the difference between advanced manufacturing and 
other or traditional manufacturing, with the latter being 
overwhelmingly unionized. Also and curiously, a plurality of health 
and education, state protective services and semi-state workplaces 
were also non-union. 
Geary & Roche (2001) have found that after 1985 US firms were 
much less likely to recognize trade unions than Irish-owned firms. 
This relationship held when controlling for human resource 
management practices (HRM). This constituted a remarkable turn 
around. Before 1985, US firms were more likely than Irish firms to 
recognize trade unions. It is also in stark contrast to non-US MNCs 
who, after 1985, were more likely to recognize trade unions compared 
to Irish firms or US MNCs. 
 
Table 4.2 
Union recognition by sector, Ireland 1992. 
 
 
Sector 
 
Non-union 
% 
 
 
Union 
% 
Agriculture 37.5  62.5 
Non-energy, minerals  16.7  83.3 
Advanced manufacturing  43.0  57.0 
Other manufacturing  8.5  91.5 
Building and Civil engineering  33.3  66.7 
Distributive trades  10.0  90.0 
Transport and Communication  25.0  75.0 
Banking and Finance  81.8  18.2 
Professional and other services  50.0  50.0 
Health and Education  40.0  60.0 
Fire, Police and QUANGOs  38.0  62.0 
 
Total (264 firms) 
 
77.0 
 
21.0 
 
 
Source: Gunnigle, Morley and Turner 1994, tables 2.3 & 2.4 from Price Waterhouse Cranfield Project and 
University of Limerick data. 
Notes: Advanced manufacturing is metal manufacturing including mainly the electronic and computing 
industry. 
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Roche (2001) concluded that the change in the mid-1980s was 
“dramatic” when re-testing this proposition using the same data and 
slightly different control variables. Clearly, American FDI created a 
non-union enclave within the Irish economy in the SP era. But it 
should be noted that where US firms did recognize trade unions either 
before or after 1985, they were far more likely than Irish firms to insist 
on a single union recognition agreement (Geary and Roche 2001, table 
2). 
 
Table 4.3 
Trends in union non-recognition by workplace ownership 
 
 
Period 
operations 
began 
 
Irish-
owned 
workplace 
% 
 
US-owned 
workplaces 
% 
 
Other 
foreign-
owned 
workplaces 
% 
 
 
All 
workplaces 
% 
Pre-1960 41.7  0.0  32.3  37.9 
1960-69 68.4  62.5  14.3  59.1 
1970-1979 57.4  35.3  32.5  48.2 
1980-84 57.0  9.1  10.0  45.8 
1985-1989 70.4  81.3  10.0  67.7 
1990-97 56.5  90.9  40.0  57.6 
 
Pre-1980 
 
55.7 
 
35.4 
 
27.5 
 
48.2 
1980-97 62.5  63.2  22.4  56.9 
 
Pre-1985 
 
56.2 
 
30.5 
 
24.3 
 
47.5 
1985-1997 65.7  85.2  31.0  63.6 
 
Entire period 
 
58.6 
 
47.7 
 
25.2 
 
51.6 
Sample 
(unweighted)  248 52  88  388 
 
Source: Roche 2001, table 1. 
 
The trend identified in the 1996-97 survey is reported descriptively 
in table 4.3. Between 1985 and 1989 81.3% of US workplaces 
established in that four-year period refused to recognize trade unions.  82 
   
Between 1990 and 1997 that figure ran at around 91%. While 30.5% 
of US MNCs established before 1985 refused to recognize trade unions, 
after 1985 that figure lifted dramatically to over 85%. Irish and non-
US MNC non-recognition rates seem very stable in comparison. 
Roche (2001) using the same set of survey data found that 
compared to traditional manufacturing (using a similar definition to 
the University of Limerick studies) advanced manufacturing sites were 
far more likely to not recognize trade unions irrespective of union 
replacement and other high employee involvement HRM strategies,. 
Financial and professional (business) services were also far more likely 
to not recognize unions.  
Industrial Relations News (IRN) survey data from 2003 confirms 
that the trend beginning in the mid-1980s is spreading from US MNCs 
to previously union-recognizing MNCs. Of the 45 firms surveyed from 
lists of clients supplied by the Irish Development Agency, just 5 
recognized unions, and only one of 17 greenfield sites in the 2000-
2003 period recognized unions. While the greenfield trend is a 
continuation of 1985-1997 trends reported by Roche (2001), 
expanding unionized MNCs opening new plants or service centres 
between 2000 and 2003 were opting for non-union operations. Just 4 
out of 22 of expanding union companies recognized unions in their 
new operations (EIRO 2003a). This indicates a spread of US MNC non-
recognition practice to non-US MNCs. 
Anecdotal evidence from interviews with union leaders, journalists 
and politicians in late 2000 confirms the 2003 IRN survey data 
picture. With the exception of a small membership in the  83 
   
pharmaceutical industry who established operations before the mid-
1990s when European companies tended to recognize trade unions, 
the aggressive growth export sectors of Ireland are not unionized 
(Harbour interview 2000; Kane interview 2000; Spring interview 2000; 
Carey interview 2000). Recent interview data with US senior 
management of US MNCs with operations in Ireland, suggests that the 
non-union recognition was a key reason for location in Ireland 
(Gunnigle, MacCurtain & Morley 2001; Gunnigle & McGuire 2001). A 
typical comment from a pharmaceutical HR director was, “the 
decisions to locate…was made on the premise that there would be no 
unions” (Gunnigle, MacCurtain & Morley 2001, 270). 
Insights into the trend of non-union expansion are given by a 
recent study of two US MNC pharmaceuticals and health-related 
product manufacturers with multiple plants in Ireland. Older plants of 
these firms are unionized, while new ones are not.  The reason for this 
appears to lie with two factors: a change in general attitudes of 
management, both in the US and in Ireland, and the promotion of 
Ireland by the IDA and the central government as a ‘union neutral’ FDI 
destination: MNCs have the option of unionizing or not. This 
represents a change for the 1960s and 70s where agencies encouraged 
union recognition (Gunnigle, Collings & Morley 2004, 16-19).  
The public sector, on the other hand, is highly unionized.49 A 
common figure mentioned by union officials in interviews was that the 
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as around 50 smaller unions such as ASTI and TUI (teachers) and the ATGWU 
(transport workers) (McGinley 1997, 243; Fitzpatrick & Associates 1999, 14). SIPTU 
(Services, Industrial, Professional and Technical Union), Ireland’s largest union, is 
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public sector had as high a union density as 80% in 2000. More 
careful estimates for 1996 agree with this figure. Around 53.2% of the 
ICTU affiliated members in 1996 were public sector workers (McGinley 
1997, 234). 
Interview anecdotal evidence on the distribution of union 
membership throughout the economy tended to confirm the picture 
given by the survey data reported above. The non-union areas of the 
economy included office equipment manufacture, the US arm of the 
pharmaceutical and chemical industries, and much of business and 
financial services (McNaughton interview 2000, Spring interview 
2000). The only unionized export sectors appear to be the non-US 
chemical and pharmaceutical manufacture, beverages and food for 
export. There are exceptions such as Apple, but the rule of thumb is 
that the export sectors save these two areas of activity are union-free. 
This contrasts with the sheltered sector, which is heavily unionized. 
MANDATE is a major union in this broad sector, and organizes heavily 
in retail and wholesale trade. 
4.3 Trade 
In comparison with the rest of the OECD, Ireland is an extremely 
open economy, has been for the over 30 plus years it has been a 
member of the EU, and is becoming exponentially more so. In 1970, 
                                                                                                                                              
health sector and in local government authorities, 30 000 in Quangos or semi-state 
boards and commercial enterprises, 30 000 civil servant members and 8 000 private 
sector members mostly in two sectors, pharmaceuticals and dairy and food 
production (Kane interview 2000). With the exception of the non-US pharmaceuticals 
sector, SIPTU is overwhelmingly a public sector and domestic/sheltered trade union. 
IMPACT, which in 2000 was not affiliated with the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, 
mostly represents blue collar and municipal public sector workers and had around 
30 000 members in 2000.  85 
   
just prior to Ireland becoming an EU member, exports of goods and 
services were the equivalent of 34.5% of GDP, with imports worth 43%. 
This compared with the EU 1550 average of 21% and 20.9% 
respectively, and the OECD average of 13.6% and 13.3% respectively. 
By 1989 in the early stages of social partnership, exports were the 
equivalent of 61.4% of GDP (EU15 average, 27.7%; OECD average 
17.8%, while imports were equivalent to 55.7% of GDP (EU15 27.7%; 
OECD 18.2%). By 2000, Irish exports were equivalent to 94.9% of GDP 
(EU15 35.8%, OECD 24.2%), while imports were equivalent to 80.7% 
of GDP (EU15 35.3%; OECD 25.2%) (OECD 2001, tables 6.11, 6.12).  
The state body that has husbanded this massive growth in trade is 
the Irish Development Agency (IDA). The IDA is the primary point of 
contact between the Irish state and MNCs. MNCs are not active in 
IBEC, preferring the client-host relationship with the IDA that 
maximizes and aggregates their political voice. As a semi-state 
institution designed to generate employment by attracting and keeping 
the MNC presence in the economy, the IDA is an extremely effective de 
facto lobbyist throughout the rest of the Irish state for the MNC cause, 
and negates any need for them to organize further.  
The IDA was established in 1949, when the Irish economy sat 
behind large tariff barriers. 1956 and 1957 saw the first major tax 
incentive for exporters enacted due to the lobbying of the agency: 
100% relief on profits from sales for 15 years. Tax became the single 
largest policy device used by the IDA to lure clients (MacSharry & 
                                                 
50 Being the Euro zone countries of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, plus 
Denmark, Sweden and the UK.  86 
   
White 2000, 252-254, 276). Today, Irish corporate tax is a flat 12.5% 
after the EU made objections to the tax break afforded manufacturing. 
Services paid 40% in the mid-1990s and 28% in 1998, but from 1978 
until 2003, manufacturing paid just 10%, the lowest rate in Europe.51 
Irish corporate tax is now the lowest in the OECD.  
During the 1940s and 50s, UK investment dominated FDI, as UK 
companies set up subsidiaries behind the tariff walls. By 1970, the US 
was the largest investor in Ireland. In 2003, 46% of IDA’s clients were 
of US origin, 14% were German, 11% are from the UK, 20% were non-
German European and Japan Pacific and the rest of the world 
accounted for 8% (Forfas 2004).  
Early MNC exporters into Ireland included Pfizer (1969) and 
General Electric (1963 & 1966) (MacSharry & White 2000, 183-188). 
By 1972, 450 companies had used IDAs services, with employment 
from US companies a accounting for around 1/3rd of the new jobs 
created. In response to complaints about slow-moving bureaucracy, 
the IDA was made a semi-state entity in 1969, and was given power to 
make payments in the form of grants to clients, annex and develop 
land for industrial development and take equity stakes in companies. 
The IDA was now an autonomous body within the Irish state. Its new 
powers, especially its new grant powers, were vital for attracting new 
MNCs to Ireland. Advertisements in the 1970s in international 
newspapers said that IDA, “Will organize the whole thing. Will give you 
the details. Will see you get the biggest benefit of Ireland’s industrial 
advantages and incentives” (quoted in MacSharry & White 2000, 240). 
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The entry of Ireland into the EU in 1973 became a major selling 
point for potential foreign investors (MacSharry & White 2000, 200). 
During the 1970s, Asahi Chemical (Japan), Merck, Sharpe & Dohme, 
Syntex, Warner Lambert and Gillette Braun all established plants in 
Ireland. The chemicals industry by the end of the decade was firmly 
established. In 2000, 16 of the top 20 pharmaceutical companies in 
the world had plants in Ireland (MacSharry & White 2000, 279). At the 
end of the 1970s, Wang Laboratories, Verbatim, Apple and Mostek 
moved in establishing the Irish software and computer hardware 
industry. The 1980s saw an increased emphasis on service 
employment with the establishment of the International Services 
Programme. This resulted in IBM, Lotus and Microsoft all establishing 
Irish software centres between 1983 and 1985. The 1990s saw major 
FDI wins such as Intel (1992), further service centres for IBM (1996), 
Dell, Gateway and Compaq (1994-1999), and Hewlett Packard (1995). 
The IDA strategy of targeting individual companies (2600 in 1973 
alone), of using created jobs as the primary criteria for success, and 
the willingness to build infrastructure and grant employment 
subsidies is reflected in the cost per job data reported by Forfas. For 
the jobs created in 1988 and surviving until 1994, the IDA spent E21, 
306. Jobs created in 1997 and surviving until 2003 cost the 
government E16 173 each. These are large subsidies, in anyone’s 
language, and are an important lure for MNCs. While Ireland’s 
expenditure on training is comparatively modest, its 2001 expenditure 
on direct employment subsidies as a percentage of GDP is among the  88 
   
highest in the OECD at 5%, with only Hungary and Spain being 
marginally greater (OECD 2004, table H). 
The resultant exponential increase in Ireland’s import and export 
volume in real wholesale cost terms is shown in figure 4.1 and 
demonstrates the export path to economic development and wealth 
taken by Ireland since the mid- to late-1980s. This path and a 
generous tax regime (the corporate tax rate until the end of 2002 was 
10% and is now 12.5%) have resulted in many MNC firms pursuing an 
aggressive transfer pricing policy. This has resulted in a growing gap 
between GDP and GNP as MNCs exaggerate profits from their Irish 
operations in order to minimize tax.  In response to this, the CSO 
revised its GDP figures in 1995 for the previous 6 years, in accordance 
with a revised approach to measuring national income (Sweeney 1999, 
53-55). To give some indication of the outflow of income from Ireland, 
in 1999, repatriated profits and royalties amounted to 7.7 million 
punts or 7.7% of GNP. Added to this were 2 billion punts of ‘reinvested 
earnings.’ Murphy (1994) identifies three main sectors responsible for 
the outflow in the late-1980s and early 1990s: pharmaceuticals, 
organic chemicals (in particular cola concentrates) and computer 
manufacture. 
When examining the export data, the bias from transfer pricing 
must be kept in mind. Figures 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 demonstrate that the 
engines of manufacturing export growth since 1980 have been in three 
industries: chemicals (especially organic chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
and health and beauty care consumer goods), machinery and 
transport equipment (especially office equipment, consumer  89 
   
appliances, optical, medical and communication equipment, and 
software as part of electrical machinery and appliances n.e.c. 
classification), and food and beverages (in particular alcoholic 
beverages and cola concentrate). Ignoring the effects of transfer 
pricing, the nominal value of export growth in machinery and 
transport manufacture grew around 650% in the 1990s, mainly fuelled 
by a huge export sales growth in office equipment and computers, and 
software (see figure 4.4). Chemical exports, fuelled by a massive 
growth in organic chemicals and pharmaceuticals (see figure 4.3) grew 
a staggering 2500% by 2001 from their 1980 value. 
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Figure 4.1: Volume of exports & imports, Ireland 1961-1997. 
Notes: 1990 = 100. Index based on real wholesale costs of imports and exports. 
Source: Central Statistics Office 1999, Table 6.1 
 
  90 
   
0
5000000
10000000
15000000
20000000
25000000
30000000
35000000
40000000
45000000
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
'
0
0
0
 
o
f
 
E
u
r
o
s
Total Food and Live Animals Chiefly for Food (0)
Beverages and Tobacco (1)
Crude Materials, Inedible, Except Fuels (2)
Mineral Fuels, Lubricants and Related Materials (3)
Animal and Vegetable Oils, Fats and Waxes (4)
Chemicals and Related Products, N.E.C. (5)
Manufactured Goods Classified Chiefly by Material (6)
Machinery and Transport Equipment (7)
Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles (8)
Commodities and Transactions N.E.C. (9)
 
Figure 4.2: Export sales at current prices of merchandise trade, 
Ireland 1980-2004. 
Source: www.cso.ie, Value of Merchandise Trade, last modified 4/05.   91 
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Figure 4.3: Export sales at current prices of chemicals sub-groups, 
Ireland 1980-2004. 
Source: www.cso.ie, Value of Merchandise Trade last modified 04/05.  92 
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Figure 4.4: Export sales at current prices of machinery & 
transport sub-groups, Ireland 1980-2004. 
Source: Source: www.cso.ie, Value of Merchandise Trade last modified 04/05. 
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4.4 MNCs & the export sector 
MNCs have been instrumental in the recovery and boom of the 
Irish economy in the 1990s and 2000s. Table 4.4 shows that foreign-
owned firms dominate employment in the leading export sectors in 
Ireland. Employees in industries that export less are more likely to be 
Irish-owned. The exceptions to this rule are paper and printing and 
food and drink, which have high employment by foreign-owned 
companies.  
 
Table 4.4 
Employment share by foreign-owned firms, Ireland, 2000. 
 
 
Total 
employment 
Employment in  
foreign-owned 
firms 
 
Employment in 
foreign-owned  
firms as % of sector 
total 
 
High foreign share of employment 
 
    
Office & data processing equipment  20 723  18 303  88.3 
Radio, tv & communications  14 993  12 785  85.3 
Medical & optical equipment  18 110  15 335  84.7 
Chemicals  23 198  17 874  77.0 
Electrical machinery & apparatus 
 
15 141  9 438  62.3 
Significant foreign share of 
employment 
 
    
Transport equipment  9 610  5 365  55.8 
Machinery & equipment nec  14 396  6 436  44.7 
Rubber & plastics 
 
10 486  3 951  36.4 
Low foreign share of employment 
 
    
Textiles, clothing & footwear  10 989  3 703  33.7 
Paper & printing  23 816  7 457  31.3 
Food, drink & tobacco  48 102  13 170  27.4 
Metal products  16 884  3 554  21.0 
Wood & wood products  6 249  1 111  17.8 
Non-metallic minerals  11 166  1 584  14.2 
Miscellaneous 
 
11 241  2 912  25.5 
 
Source: Irish Census of Industrial Production 2000, in Barry 2004, table 3. 
  94 
   
According to Forfas data based on IDA Ireland, Shannon 
Development and Udaras na Gaeltacha client data reported in table 
4.5,52 employment in industries characterized by high foreign firm 
employment increased 30% between 1994 and 2003, while it declined 
24% in low foreign employment industry. The most dramatic increase 
was in services, where foreign employment increased 404%. 
 
Table 4.5 
Employees in foreign-owned Forfas client firms, Ireland, 1994-
2003 
 
  
1994 
 
1998 
 
2003 
 
Change 
%, 94-03 
Industries 
 
    
High foreign share of employment      
Office machinery and computers  7435  16484  15591  +110 
Medical & precision equipment  8917  12976  16798  +88 
Electrical  machinery  &  equipment  7218 8772 6586 -9 
Chemicals  13848 16517 19981 +44 
Electronic  equipment  5680 7847 3921 -31 
Total  –  high  foreign  share  48403 62416 62877 +30 
      
Significant foreign share of employment         
Machinery and equipment nec  5305  5597  5069  -4 
Transport  equipment  9527 8986 8401 -12 
Rubber  &  plastics  3853 4419 3905 +1 
      
Low foreign share of employment         
Food, drink & tobacco  12495  11823  12867  +3 
Textile and textile products  6212  4506  1493  +24 
Clothing, footwear & leather  3254  2035  358  -89 
Wood & wood products  271  747  692  +255 
Paper  &  paper  products  2224 1882 1513 +68 
Metal  products  4826 5804 4523 -6 
Non-metallic minerals  2277 1812 1844 -19 
Total  –  low  foreign  share  31559 28609 23290 -24 
      
Services 
 
    
International  financial  services  1597 3895 8263 +517 
Other international services (call centres  etc) 9231  23421 35386 +383 
Total-  services  10825 27316 43689 +404 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Forfas 2004b, appendix 2 
                                                 
52 Forfas clients receive large employment subsidies, and it is therefore likely 
that any foreign firm wanting to set up a subsidiary in Ireland will become a client of 
Forfas.  95 
   
4.5 Unemployment 
Ireland until the 1990s was characterized by periods of very high 
unemployment. Job creation and solving the unemployment problem 
was the major aim of the social partners in 1987 and is further 
discussed in the next chapter. In the 1970s, the average 
unemployment rate averaged 7.2% (derived from data in Hardiman 
1988, 104). By 1988, unemployment (ILO definition) stood at 16.3% 
(CSO 2004, xiv). In 2003, it was just 4.4%. Figure 4.5 shows that the 
number of people registering for unemployment support roughly 
halved between 1996 and 2001 (the ‘Celtic Tiger’ years). As the next 
chapter will demonstrate, high unemployment acted to depress wage 
demands throughout the economy until the mid-1990s. 
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Figure 4.5: Numbers of persons on live register, Ireland 1989- 
2004. 
Source: www.cso.ie, Live Register Selected Annual Series (last modified 4/05).  
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Figure 4.6 further demonstrates the tightening of the Irish labor 
market in the mid-to-late 1990s. After 1998, there was the virtual 
eradication of the underemployed part-time worker. This population 
was estimated to be between 1.1 and 1.6% of the labor force plus 
marginally attached workers and those not in education and wanting 
work. After 1998, this population shrank to 0.2%. 
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Figure 4.6: Indicators of potential labor supply, Ireland 1988 - 
2003 
Source: CSO 2004, table 2.8 
Notes: S1 = unemployed + discouraged workers as a percentage of, Labor Force + discouraged workers; S2 
= unemployed + marginally attached + others not in education who want work as a percentage of, Labor 
Force + marginally attached + others not in education who want work; S3 = unemployed + marginally 
attached + others not in education who want work + underemployed part-time workers as a percentage of, 
labor force + marginally attached + others not in education who want work. 
 
Irish unemployment rates are lower than they might otherwise be 
thanks to the relatively low female participation rate and the tendency 
of Irish citizens to emigrate when economic times are bad. In 1970,  97 
   
Ireland’s female participation rate53 was 34.3% compared to the euro 
zone average of 40%. By 2000 there had been some convergence 
(Ireland 56.2%, euro zone 58%) thanks to a persistent increase since 
1990 when the rate was 43.8% (euro zone 52%) (OECD 2001, table 
2.8). 
4.6 Summary of the main points 
The major points from this chapter relevant for argument 
developed in chapter 6 are: 
•  Irish industrial relations are characterized by voluntarism: 
conciliation institutions are responsible for the resolution of 
collective disputes. Legal avenues tend to be confined to 
issues of individual employment rights, especially with 
regard to discrimination. 
•  Trade union density has dropped around 8% since the 
beginning of Social Partnership. This has largely been due 
to the growth of non-union plants in Ireland, a trend 
initiated by US firms establishing plants since 1985. The 
export sector of Ireland has a far lower union density than 
the rest of the economy as a result of the non-union trend 
led by US MNCs. The public sector, by contrast, is about 
80% unionized.  
•  The ICTU relies on formal democratic procedures at annual 
meetings of member unions in order to ratify and ensure 
compliance with SP wage deals struck with the government 
                                                 
53 Defined as females in the labor force as a percentage of all females aged 15-
64.  98 
   
and IBEC. The ICTI possesses no power to veto collective 
agreements made by member unions. 
•  Irish exports have increased sharply in recent years largely 
due to three broad industries: pharmaceuticals and 
chemicals, machinery and food and beverages. 
•  MNCs have a very high share of employment in these 
sectors, especially in machinery and chemicals. 
•  The Irish export boom has resulted in a dramatic drop in 
the number of people claiming unemployment benefits. As a 
result, labor supply in tightened quickly after the mid-
1990s. 
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Chapter 5 
Irish pay, 1987-2004. 
 
In this chapter I present data on the pay movements of the public, 
export and non-export private sectors during the Social Partnership 
(SP) years. The purpose of this data is to show the relative adherence 
of the public and non-traded sector pay movements to the SP 
guidelines, compared to the flexibility both above and below the 
guidelines afforded and exploited by the export sector. 
If the argument advanced in chapter 1 is correct then we should 
expect to see broad adherence to the SP central agreements in pay 
movements in the public and non-export sectors. The trend of pay 
movements should follow the trend of central agreement increases. 
Export sector pay trends should be relatively chaotic by comparison, 
with any observable similarities explicable by export firms free-riding 
on the public and non-traded sectors wage discipline. 
In addition, if there is any breakdown in pay discipline in the 
public sector, we should see a similar breakdown and trend in the 
non-export sector, but not in the export sector. This is because a 
fundamental condition of centralized wage bargaining stability in the 
last thirty years in free trade and open states is that wages in the 
export sector remain flexible, that is, largely free of coordination with 
the rest of the economy.  
The evidence presented here conforms to these expectations. Pay 
movements in the public and non-export sectors broadly adhere to the 
central agreements until the late 1990s. By comparison, there is  100 
   
substantial variation in wage growth in the export sector industries, 
suggesting pay is being adjusted with regard to firm profitability, 
product and service demand and labor supply, rather than central 
agreements. This evidence broadly supports my argument advanced in 
chapter 1.  
Since 1999 there is evidence to suggest that public sector pay 
discipline has been severely eroded. The pay data shows a secular 
trend towards very high pay drift suggesting that since around the 
turn of the century the SP agreements have lost a great deal of their 
ability to shape actual wage outcomes. This trend is not as easily 
observed in the export sector, supporting my argument and suggesting 
that this sector is outside SP wage coordination. The significance of 
the erosion of public sector pay discipline and the government 
response to it is further discussed in chapter 6. 
I also present data for a select number of domestic market 
industries (both manufacturing and service) that shows broad support 
for the propositions that public pay discipline is shaping a labor 
market that enables similar pay discipline in local industries and 
services, and that the erosion of that discipline in the late 1990s has 
generated a similar erosion in the domestic or indigenous industries. 
Given the poor nature of the wage data on services (until recently 
only collected every four years), I am unable to present comprehensive 
wage data for this part of the economy. However, there is evidence of 
pay drift in the distribution trades after 2000, an event that supports 
my argument. I present data on this drift.  101 
   
This chapter begins with a discussion of data sources and issues. I 
then outline the centralized pay agreements. Following this, I compare 
the level of nominal average hourly increases for the public sector, 
export and non-export private sectors.  
5.1 Data quality  
Data on Irish remuneration is problematic in many respects. The 
major problem is the lack of comprehensive coverage of the economy. 
While the remuneration of employees in the manufacturing and public 
sectors is documented on a regular basis (most time series are 
quarterly), data for the private service sectors is scant and limited to 
data collected every four years until June 1998. After June 1998, 
service sector pay data has been collected but only average gross 
weekly earnings of employees working over 30 hours per week. No 
hourly data is available.  
A second problem is the alteration in the NACE classification of 
industrial sectors system in the mid-1990s. This means that data 
collected up to and including 1997 under the NACE70 classification is 
not necessarily directly comparable to data collected after 1995 under 
the NACE Rev. 1 classification. I therefore am forced to present two 
series on pay movements for each industrial sector; one using the 
NACE70 classification for the period 1987-1997, and one using the 
NACE Rev.1 classification for the period 1995-2004. 
Of equal concern to these problems is that the data collected in 
the quarterly inquiries in the manufacturing and industrial, banking 
and finance and public sectors tend to focus on average weekly 
earnings. For the data presented for the period after 1995 for the  102 
   
industrial sectors this is not a problem, since the indices are weighted 
by the CSO to allow for changes in average hours, as well as 
occupational changes.  
But for the data reported for the 1987- 1997 periods calculated by 
myself, I rely on published CSO data. Where reported, hourly earnings 
are calculated from average weekly earnings and therefore include the 
pay earned and any penalty rates derived from overtime hours. Hence 
any reading of changes in the average hourly pay must be read in 
conjunction with changes in the average hours of work in order to 
check whether any increase in average hourly pay is due to an 
increase in hours worked and hence the influence of overtime rates on 
the average hourly rate.  I report average hours worked each week 
where changes in hours appear to be significant and may be causing 
movement in average hourly pay. Fortunately, the Irish working week 
has been fairly stable in the decade after 1987 (see table 5.1). In 1987, 
the PNR agreement reduced the normal working week from 40 to 39 
hours per week. In 2003, this was still regarded as the normal or 
ordinary working time week: “collectively agreed normal working time 
generally stands at 39 hours” (EIRO 2004). The amount of average 
overtime worked by males in manufacturing has been reduced 
between 1987 and 1997 by 24 minutes. Overtime is not a factor for the 
average female manufacturing or industrial employee. From this, it 
can be concluded that the pay indices I derive from CSO data are 
probably robust with respect to the overtime issue. 
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Table 5.1 
Average hours worked by males & females in industry & 
manufacturing, Ireland 1987-2004. 
 
  
1987 
 
1992 
 
1997 
 
1999 
 
2004 
 
Male manufacturing 
 
43.0 
 
42.4 
 
42.6 
 
42.6 
 
41.2 
Female manufacturing   38.5  37.5  37.7  37.3  36.4 
 
 
Sources: CSO (dates various) (‘Quarterly Series, Wages & Incomes’). 
Notes: Data is for the December quarter of each year. 
 
5.2 Social Partnership pay agreements. 
Irish social partnership has been based around six agreements to 
date, all with appropriately bureaucratic titles: the Programme for 
National Recovery (PNR) 1987, 1990, the Programme for Economic and 
Social Progress (PESP), 1991-1993, the Programme for 
Competitiveness and Work (PCW) 1994-1997, Partnership 2000 for 
Inclusion, Employment and Competitiveness (P 2000), 1997-2000, the 
Programme for Participation and Fairness (PPF), 2000-2003, and 
Sustaining Progress (SP), 2003-2005.  The terms of the social 
partnership pay agreements are summarised in table 5.2. The most 
notable features of the agreement are its non-binding nature on the 
parties and their affiliates, and the slight differences in treatment of 
the public sector. Firms are able to opt out from the agreement on an 
ability-to-pay basis, while the timing and, in a couple of instances, the 
rate of pay increase in the public sector differs from that of the private 
sector. In addition PESP and P 2000 explicitly allow for limited local 
bargaining for extra pay rises in the private sector (3% and 2% 
respectively), while the PCW, PESP and P2000 allow for limited local  104 
   
bargaining for extra pay rises in the public sector (3%, 3% and 2% 
respectively). The key characteristic of Irish pay setting after 1987 is 
that the central agreements are promises of future behavior by 
employers and unions, and that bargaining is largely conducted at the 
enterprise level. There are a handful of multi-employer bargains, but 
these are a very small minority. 
In the analysis of changes in remuneration that follows, unless 
otherwise explicitly to the contrary, when I compare rises in average 
earnings in various industries and sectors to the SP trend of 
centralized pay agreements I include these local ‘extras’ in the PCW, 
PESP and P2000 agreements in the estimation of the SP pay 
agreement trend. In other words, I fold locally negotiated increases 
mandated under the various SP agreements into the central pay 
agreement. I do not attempt to estimate the effect on the SP public 
sector pay trend caused by the grade re-structuring clause in PESP 
(1991-1993). 
5.3 Pay movements 1987-2004 
The pay data I present is in the form of indices and is compared to 
a SP pay increase index in each figure, an index calculated using table 
5.2.54 When assessing the degree of wage drift from the SP pay 
agreement norms, I allow for some degree of drift from the norm to be 
classified as a conforming trend. That is, I err on the side of 
conservatism when judging whether a pay trend is drifting above or 
below the norm. I do this in order to allow for the changing gender 
                                                 
54 More details on the construction of the SP and industry indices are available 
in the note for each figure.  105 
   
composition of the work force, to allow for the assumption that 
seniority increments will tend to push pay indices upward, and that 
jobs, over time will become more rather than less skilled, and that pay 
will increase as a result of this change. 
 
Table 5.2 
Terms of National Pay Agreements- Ireland 1987-2001 
 
 
Programme for National Recovery (PNR), 1987-1990 
Private and public sector: 3% on first 120 punts of basic weekly income, 2% on balance. Minimum 4 
punts/week.  
 
Programme for Economic and Social Progress (PESP), 1991-1993. 
Private & public sector: 10.75% over 3 years: 4% in 1st year, 3% in second, 3.75% in last. Minimum of 5 
punts in 1991, 4.25 in ’92, 5.75 in ’93. 
Local bargaining allowed under exceptional circumstances of up to 3%, not earlier than 1992.  
Local bargaining in public service negotiable with regard to grade restructure or to “special” claim, not 
earlier than 1993.  
 
Programme for Competitiveness and Work (PCW), 1994-1997. 
Private sector: 8% over 39 months: delay three months, then 2% first year, 2.5% second year, 2.5% + 1% 
final 12 months. 
Public sector: 8% in total over 42 months. Delay 5 months, then 2% first year, 2% second, 1.5% + 1.5% + 
1% final 13 months. 3% PCW local bargaining clause implemented in public sector, 1% automatic, rest 
subject to local negotiation. 
 
Partnership 2000 for Inclusion, Employment, and Competitiveness (P 2000), 1997-2000. 
Private sector: 7.25% over 3 years: 2.5% in first year, 2.25% in second, 1.5% +1.0% over last 15 months. 
Public sector: First year, 2.5% of first 220 punts in first 9 months, then 2.5% on balance. Second and third 
years as per private sector. 
Minimum 3.50 punts/week in second year, 2.40 + 1.60 last 15 months. 
Local bargaining of up to 2% increase, not before mid-1998 (private) or 1999 (public). 
 
Programme for Participation and Fairness (PPF), 2000-2003. 
Private & public sector: 5.5% first year, 5.5% second, 4% last 9 months. Amended December 2000, second 
year 7.5%. 
Minimum increase of 12, 11 and 9 punts respectively. Minimum wage from 4/2000 of 4.40 punts/hr, 4.70 
in 7/2001, 5.00 in 10/2002. 
 
Sustaining Progress (SP) 2003-2005 
Private sector: 7% over 18 months: 3% first nine months, 2% second 6 months and 2% final three months. 
Public sector: As per benchmarking process. 
 
Minimum wage adjusted to 7 euros/hour on Feb 1, 2004. 
 
 
Sources: Government of Ireland (1987; 1991; 1994; 1997; 2000; 2003).  106 
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Figure 5.1: Average nominal hourly pay indices of 
pharmaceuticals & office equipment manufacturing, Ireland 1987-
1997. 
 
Sources: Based on CSO (dates various) (‘Quarterly Series, Wages & Incomes’). 
Notes: Index base, 1987 = 100. Figures calculated by averaging quarterly figures. Social Partnership pay 
agreement is represented by a two-factor polynomial trend line based on pay agreements announced in 
Social Partnership statements in Government of Ireland 1987; 1990; 1993; and 1996 and summarized in 
Hardiman 2000, 41. 
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Figure 5.2: Nominal pay indices in the export sector, Ireland 
1995-2004. 
 
Source: www.cso.ie, ‘Indices of Earnings and Hours Worked’, last modified 03/05. 
Notes: 1995, Q3 = 100. Sectors classified according to NACE Rev. 1. Social partnership pay agreement is 
represented by a multi-factor polynomial trend line based on pay agreements announced in Social 
Partnership statements in Government of Ireland 1987; 1990; 1993; 1996; 2000; and 2003 and 
summarized in Hardiman 2000b, 41 and Government of Ireland 2003, 66-67. 
  108 
   
5.3.1 The export sector 
In 1999, at the height of the Irish economic boom in the 1990s, 
the two lead sectors of chemicals and office and data processing 
equipment manufacture employed near 85 000 people, yet their 
combined export sales amounted to 75 billion euros. Clearly, even 
allowing for transfer pricing, firms in these sectors were more than 
able to pay their employees well above Irish norms and share the 
spoils of their profits. The evidence in figure 5.1 and 5.2 suggests that 
the more densely unionized chemicals and pharmaceuticals sector 
largely adhered to the norms until the late 1990s, and in-line with the 
trend observed in data presented below, saw pay drift in the new 
millennium. 
By contrast, the non-union office equipment sector wage data 
shows support for the flexibility thesis in the pre-1997 era. Compare 
this figure with figure 5.6 that shows broad conformity to the SP wage 
norms for the indigenous and non-export sector, and with figures 5.3, 
5.4 and 5.5 that show a similar conformity for the public sector until 
the late 1990s. 
Within the export sector, there does not appear to be a discernible 
secular trend towards pay drift after 1999 (figure 5.2). Rather, the 
evidence supports the argument that wages in the export sector are 
allowed to flex upwards or downwards with small or no regard for the 
SP norms, suggesting that these export industries are outside the SP 
wage coordination process. Compare this to the secular high pay drift 
trend in the public sector after 1999 (see figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5) and  109 
   
in the indigenous non-exported sector, also after 1999 or 2000 (see 
figure 5.7). 
On balance, the data supports my argument that a key element in 
the stability of centralized wage bargaining in Ireland is due to the pay 
flexibility afforded the export sector. The pay behavior of the chemicals 
industry, a more unionized portion of the export sector also reflects 
well on my observations that a key part of pay flexibility for employers 
is freedom from third party intervention in the pay-setting process. 
The adherence of the chemicals sector to the SP agreements, and the 
following of the public sector towards pay drift after 1999, suggests, 
not unsurprisingly, that full pay flexibility can only be achieved in the 
absence of trade unions in the workplace. 
5.3.2 The public sector 
For the purpose of this analysis, I split the public sector into three 
areas: the civil service and public security, education, and non-central 
state authorities and semi-state bodies.55 Within the public sector as a 
whole, there appears to be a secular pay trend  (see figures 5.3 - 5.6).  
                                                 
55 It should be noted that these analyses are based upon indices constructed 
from average weekly earnings. While the CSO controls for compositional changes of 
the work force in the calculation of the indices, it does not control for the amount of 
hours worked since some agencies and divisions within the public sector are unable 
to divide full-time employees from temporary and part-time employees (CSO 2005, p. 
8). While it can be safely assumed that full-time workers have not tended over the 
1988-2004 period to work more or less overtime55 (unfortunately there is no way to 
check this assumption satisfactorily), there is a lack of readily available data on the 
break down of employment between part-time and full-time workers. It should be 
noted that prison officers and police officers work high levels of overtime on a regular 
basis, so the trends for these series exclude overtime as published by the CSO. 
Changes in the index need to be treated carefully, and should be treated as generally 
indicative, that is accurate over the medium to long term.  110 
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Figure 5.3: Average nominal gross weekly pay indices for civil 
servants & public security, Ireland 1988 – 2003. 
 
Source: www.cso.ie, Quarterly Services Inquiry (“Employment and Earnings in Public Sector”), (last 
modified 08/04).   
Note: Data is based on average weekly earnings except for the gardai (police) and prison officers. Social 
Partnership pay agreement is a two factor polynomial trend line based on pay agreements announced in 
Social Partnership statements in Government of Ireland 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000, and 2003 and 
summarized in Hardiman 2000b, 41 and Government of Ireland 2003, 66-67. 
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Figure 5.4: Average nominal weekly earnings indices for 
education, Ireland 1988 – 2003. 
 
Source: www.cso.ie, Quarterly Services Inquiry (“Employment and Earnings in Public Sector”), (last 
modified 08/04).   
Note: Data is based on average weekly earnings except for the gardai (police) and prison officers. Social 
Partnership pay agreement is a two factor polynomial trend line based on pay agreements announced in 
Social Partnership statements in Government of Ireland 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000, and 2003 and 
summarized in Hardiman 2000b, 41 and Government of Ireland 2003, 66-67. 
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Figure 5.5: Average nominal weekly earnings indices for non-
central state authorities & semi-states, Ireland 1988 – 2003. 
 
Source: www.cso.ie, Quarterly Services Inquiry (“Employment and Earnings in Public Sector”), (last 
modified 08/04).   
Note: Data is based on average weekly earnings except for the gardai (police) and prison officers. Social 
Partnership pay agreement is a two factor polynomial trend line based on pay agreements announced in 
Social Partnership statements in 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000, and 2003 and summarised in Hardiman 
2000b,41 and Government of Ireland 2003, 66-67. 
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In all three areas, pay movement is relatively restrained and 
conforms to SP agreements until the period from the end of 1999 until 
the end of 2000. Until this point, the public sector is clearly strongly 
incorporated into the SP wage coordination process. While there is 
some suggestions of small pay drift in some areas (At that point, wage 
behaviour changes, and pay increases diverge upwards from the SP 
pay agreement norms. The change is very pronounced within the 
education and civil servants divisions, less so for security and the 
boards and semi-states. 
After 1999 or 2000, depending on the exact sub-sector, there is a 
secular change in wages and pay drift appears in a dramatic fashion, 
with large above-the-norm pay increases in most, if not all areas of the 
public sector. 
5.3.2.1 Civil Servants & public security 
Until the late-1990s, there is the suggestion of a very small pay 
drift in the civil service that may be due to skill upgrades and seniority 
pay increments. But after 1999, and beginning in a period of industrial 
action, pay increases in the civil service and for police trend upwards, 
and appear to break with the SP agreement until the beginning of the 
adoption of benchmarking in 2002. Benchmarking and the public 
sector industrial unrest between 1999 and 2002 are described and 
analysed in the next chapter. This data is broadly consistent with the 
expectation of my argument. An exception is prison officers who 
appeared to be successful in obtaining over the norm pay raises since 
the mid-1990s. This exception to the adherence to the SP norms is  114 
   
probably attributable to their unusual bargaining power – strikes 
would be disastrous, and their jobs are highly risky. 
5.3.2.2 Education  
Secondary school teachers and support staffs were among the 
most disciplined groups with respect to the SP pay agreements from 
1987 through 1997 until the end of 2000 (see figure 5.4). A widespread 
and persistent industrial action by the secondary teachers union, 
ASTI, in the last quarter of 2000 won teachers some gains, and it 
appears that these gains translated to increases in the tertiary and 
vocational sector. Primary teachers, if anything, fared worse following 
the ASTI strike. Whereas before 1997, primary teachers received pay 
rises in percentage terms that showed a significant amount of 
deviation above the SP pay norms, in the period 1995-2004 they were 
strict adherents to SP norms.  
In this regard, they swapped places with secondary teachers, who 
until 1997 were strict conformers, and after 1995, received 
significantly above-the-norm percentage pay increases. Secondary 
educators percentage pay increases over the period 1988-2003 were 
comparable to prison officers and non-commercial semi-state boards 
(see below), but fared worse than police, regional and local authorities, 
commercial semi-state (see below) and tertiary educators, who fared 
best in the public service. By contrast, primary school teachers fared 
worst in the public sector over the 1988-2004 period.  
Throughout the 1988-2003 period, tertiary and vocational and IT 
educators received significantly above-the-norm increases, with these 
groups faring even better after the teacher’s strike than before.  115 
   
5.3.2.3 Boards, authorities & semi-states 
This division experienced the change in pay behaviour observed in 
the other divisions (see figure 5.5). Non-commercial boards, like 
secondary school teachers, adhered strictly to the terms of the SP pay 
agreements until the middle of 2000. Until 2000, the authorities and 
the commercial semi-state sectors saw pay increases on a percentage 
basis comparable to civil servants, prison officers and police, but 
below tertiary and vocational educators. After the first quarter of 2000, 
all sectors within this division saw an upward trend in pay increases, 
with regional and commercial entities faring better than local 
authorities. Over the 1988-2004 period, all sectors in this division 
fared better all other sectors and divisions of the public service except 
for tertiary educators. 
5.3.3 The non-exported (indigenous) private sector 
I present data for some selected domestic industries to show 
evidence supporting a basic premise of my argument that movement in 
public sector wages flow to movements in the non-export private 
sector. This means that in the period until 1999 there is, as expected 
by my argument, a broad adherence to the SP pay guidelines in the 
largely non-exported industries (see figures 5.6 and 5.7). This flow also 
means that after 1999, the erosion of pay discipline and adherence to 
the norms of the SP wage deals in the public sector had a similar effect 
in the private non-exported sector, also as anticipated by my argument 
(see figure 5.7).  116 
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Figure 5.6: Average nominal hourly pay indices of firms of the 
largely non-exported sector, Ireland 1987-1997. 
 
Sources: Derived from CSO (dates various) (‘Quarterly Series, Wages & Incomes’). 
Notes: Sectors classified according to NACE 70. Index base, 1987 = 100. Figures calculated by averaging 
quarterly figures. Social Partnership pay agreement is represented by a two-factor polynomial trend line 
based on pay agreements announced in Social Partnership statements in Government of Ireland 1987; 
1990; 1993; and 1996 and summarized in Hardiman 2000b, 41. 
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Figure 5.7: Average nominal hourly pay indices of firms in the 
largely non-exported sector, Ireland 1995-2004. 
 
Source: www.cso.ie, ‘Indices of Earnings and Hours Worked’, last modified 03/05. 
Notes: Sectors classified according to NACE Rev 1. Social Partnership private sector pay agreement trend 
is a two-factor polynomial trend line based on pay agreement data in Hardiman 2000b, 41, and 
Government of Ireland 2003, 66-67.  118 
   
5.3.4 The services sector 
Income data for the services sector is poor for the 1987-2004 
period. With the exception of banking and finance, data for the 
services sector before 1998 was only collected once every four years in 
the Labour Costs survey. After 1998, quarterly data has been 
collected, inter alia, of the weekly earnings of employees working over 
30 hours a week. Detailed ‘hours worked’ data is not collected and 
cannot be linked to pay movements, and therefore analysis of pay 
movements must use average weekly earnings data. More than any 
other sector, the prevalence of shift work, and changes in hours 
worked from week to week throughout the services means that wage 
data must be interpreted with extreme caution. Business services data 
includes commissions and bonuses and is therefore an unreliable data 
source for the analytic task here. 
The change in wage behavior in the distributive services after 1999 
is worth noting, however, and illustrates the dynamic of how public 
sector wage movements lead and cause wage developments in the non-
exported private sector, even in the low skill industries and services.  
5.3.4.1 Distribution services 
Pay data prior to 1998 can be assembled, albeit in less-than-
comprehensive way, through the use of the quadrennial Labour Costs 
Survey.56 Notwithstanding the caveat of the affect of overtime and 
                                                 
56 Use of this survey data is limited by a break in the classification method of 
industries and services. Beginning with the 1996 survey, service sectors are 
classified using NACE Rev.1. Prior to this NACE 70 was used, although 1991 results 
are published using both classifications. Hence, the series is only used for the 1988-
1996 period for retail and wholesale trade since these classifications are largely 
unaffected by the changes between NACE 70 and NACE Rev.1.  119 
   
penalty rates on the data, this limited time-series shows that retail, 
and wholesale trade pay movements through 1996 broadly conformed 
to SP norms (see table 5.3). 
 
Table 5.3 
Average nominal hourly pay indices for retail & wholesale trade, 
Ireland 1988-1996. 
 
   
1988 
 
 
1991 
 
1996 
Retail trade   100  117.6  142.4 
Wholesale trade  100 123.9  147.0 
 
Social partnership pay increase index 
 
100 
 
107.1 
 
126.5 
 
 
Source: CSO, (“Labour Costs Survey,” 1988, 1992, and 1996.)  
Notes: Indices are for all full-time employees. Figures based on average hourly wage calculated by dividing 
average gross weekly wage by actual hours worked. Classifications are according to NACE 70 (1988) and 
reconciled to the NACE Rev 1 classifications (used in 1991 and 1996). 
 
While the data in figure 5.8 includes commission and is therefore 
difficult to interpret with regard to motor trades and wholesale, retail 
trades pay moves well above the SP guidelines after 1999 increases. 
Whether this is due to an increase in hours worked due to labour 
shortages from 2000 is a matter that can be resolved empirically.  
MANDATE, the shop workers union is a vocal opponent of social 
partnership and voted against the 2003 Sustaining Progress 
agreement at the ICTU ratification Congress in March 2003 (Harbour 
interview 2000). Under the PPF (2000-2003), MANDATE secured 
‘increases well in excess of the basic PPF terms,’ (IRN 2000 (Number 
48, 20/12/2000)) in the Argos and Dunnes Stores chains, two of 
Ireland’s largest retail conglomerates. The agreement with Argos for a 
19.2% pay increase for 2001 alone (roughly equal to the PPF terms 
over three years), stated that the company was pulling out of the PPF:  120 
   
“Future increases to be subject to annual negotiations and not the PPF 
agreement” (IRN 2000 (No. 48, 20/12/2000)). 
This kind of evidence suggests that the retail sector saw an 
abandoning of SP pay norms in 2000.57 
5.4 Overview of Irish pay movements, 1987-2004. 
As expected by my argument, Irish wage data shows broad 
conformity to the SP pay guidelines in the public and non-exported 
sector, while the export sector pay data shows a relatively chaotic 
pattern. This is consistent with my argument that the stability of 
centralized wage bargaining is predicated on the disciplining of public 
sector pay movements (a discipline that puts a brake on pay drift in 
the non-export private sector) and the pay flexibility afforded the 
export sector.  
As public sector pay discipline appears to break down in the late 
1990s and into the new century, as expected by my argument we see a 
similar trend emerge in the non-export private sector, to the extent 
that even in low skill service jobs such as in retail we observe sizeable 
pay drift after 1999. As expected by my argument, however, pay 
flexibility in the export sector means that a similar upward trend in 
pay after in 1999 is muted in the export sector. It should be noted in 
drawing this conclusion that the relatively high turnover (creation and 
demise) of firms and workplaces in the export sector in comparison to 
                                                 
57 Shops opening late in the morning in Dublin in the last quarter of 2000 were 
a regular occurrence, with the late opening being explained by notes in windows 
citing labour shortages and interview periods for new staff. The author observed that 
Marks and Spencers in central Dublin closed two mornings in October and November 
for these reasons. Help wanted signs in shop windows were a regular occurrence, as 
was the use of recent migrant Eastern European labour in many smaller 
convenience stores.  121 
   
the non-export private and public sector adds some degree of noise to 
the export sector wage data. Hence while the data cannot be expected 
to be conclusive in the absence of micro-data form individual firms, 
the results presented here are at the least consistent with my 
argument. In the next chapter, I bring additional evidence and 
argument to show that the stability of centralized wage bargaining in 
Ireland is partly predicated, as expected by my argument in chapter 1, 
on the pay flexibility afforded the export sector. 
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Figure 5.8: Average nominal weekly earnings indices for 
distribution services, Ireland 1998-2004. 
 
Source: www.cso.ie, (‘Earnings in Distribution and Business Services,’) last modified 04/05.   
Notes: Annual data is a weighted seasonal average of quarterly figures. Includes commissions, regular 
bonuses and overtime payments. SP pay agreement change calculated from pay agreements announced in 
social partnership statements in Government of Ireland 1996 and 2000 and summarized in Hardiman 
2000b, 41. In constructing the index, the assumption is made that the entire pay rises under P2000 
(1997-3/2000) takes place after Jan 1, 1998. 
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Chapter 6 
Explaining the stability of Irish Social Partnership 
 
6.1 The origins & guiding policy frame of Social Partnership 
Social Partnership arose as a result of a deep and persistent fiscal 
crisis in Ireland. In 1986, debt stood at £22 billion and the current 
account had been in deficit since the late 1970s. Total employment 
had declined at the rate of 10 000 full-time jobs per year throughout 
the 1980s and unemployment had increased from 7.3% in 1980 to 
17.4% in 1985. While the punt had depreciated 30% against the US 
dollar in the first half of the 1980s, it had appreciated 18% against the 
EMS and about 10% against sterling in this period causing economic 
competitiveness problems and job loss. CPI in the early 1980s had hit 
20% per annum (NESC 1986, 10, 11, 18, 19, 25).  
Deliberative policy institutions within the public sector were at the 
vanguard of a re-appraisal of Ireland’s macro-economic policy mix. The 
Keynesian strategy of high public expenditure and accommodating 
interest rates was no longer working. The National Economic and 
Social Council, established in 1973, was in the mid-1980s an 
independent economic advisor to government comprising mostly ICTU, 
Confederation of Irish Industry (later IBEC), and senior government 
bureaucrats. Its place in the creation and development of Social 
Partnership cannot be underestimated. NESC was, and is, the tri-parte 
body of consultation, that body of “voluntary, informal and 
continuous” bargaining (Katzenstein 1985, 33) that is at the heart of  123 
   
democratic corporatism.58 In 1987, the Irish Minister for Finance Ray 
Macsharry, concluded that: 
“The NESC conclusions were far-reaching in their 
implications…[T]he social partners had accepted the need for 
tough remedial measures as part of an integrated strategy, set 
in a medium term context….The NESC report…boldly 
challenged politicians to follow the lead taken by the social 
partners…[I]n the short-term implementing an austerity 
programme would involve considerable pain and sacrifice, not 
least for the trade unions and their members…The 
compensating benefit on offer was tax reform, with the 
essential trade-off being pay restraint via moderate wage 
increases in return for tax cuts by the government to boost the 
real, after-tax income of workers” (MacSharry & White 2000, 
125). 
In its 1986 report, “A Strategy for Development 1986-1990,” 
NESC, continued the thrust of the 1982 report (“The Way Forward”) 
and argued for austere economic reforms in order to resurrect the Irish 
economy. The report argued that public sector pay restraint was 
crucial since it both eased the burden on the fisc, and would prevent a 
return to the 1970s scenario where private sector and public sector 
pay rises fed each other.  
In a statement that sums up the aims and philosophy of the pay 
policy strategy of SP, the 1986 NESC report concluded that: 
                                                 
58 The ICTU and SIPTU claim that it was the 1985 ICTU document, Confronting 
the Jobs Crisis, which laid the foundation for the first SP agreement (Carey interview 
2000; Naughton interview 2000). While that document advocated a role for NESC in 
coordinating tri-parte policy deliberations (3), supported wage moderation (3) and 
recognized a need for changes in public expenditure (15) and a cut of income taxes 
(16), it advocated a far more activist role for the state in “the planning of production 
in all sector of the economy” (2), the “democratic control by workers over the 
allocation and utilisation of investment” (3), and “the development of a bigger, 
dynamic and more varied public enterprise sector” (10). These preferences have not 
been part of the Social Partnership agenda. The desire for a “highly productive, 
export-oriented, high-wage economy” (3) has, however, been incorporated into the 
policy framework by NESC, albeit accompanied by a far more conservative approach 
to fiscal and industrial policy.  124 
   
“Improving the cost competitiveness of the internationally 
traded sectors is not simply a question of limiting wage and 
salary increases to what is sustainable. It extends to 
controlling the costs of goods and services bought in from the 
sheltered sector of the economy and also the sort of goods and 
services provided by the public sector. The sheltered sector are 
not subject to the same discipline on costs as the exposed 
sectors, because cost increases there can be more readily 
passed, onto consumers in higher prices, or to taxpayers as 
higher taxes. This is especially the case when it is possible to 
exercise monopoly power. If a situation prevails whereby 
excessive cost increases are passed by enterprises in the 
sheltered sectors to those engaged in international trade, the 
competitiveness of the latter is impaired. Policy in relation to 
the evolution of incomes in particular, and the improvement of 
competitiveness, must acknowledge the fact” (NESC 1986, 
181). 
While the social partners had already agreed on an economic 
policy agenda in late-1986 at NESC, the political road to Social 
Partnership was not as smooth. Only following Fine Gael leader Alan 
Dukes’ September 2 1987 address to the Tallaght Chamber of 
Commerce where he vowed to support Fianna Fail in the Dail (and 
therefore stave off the need for a snap election in order to get a 
government with a clear majority) did Social Partnership become a 
possibility (MacSharry & White 2000, 75-100).  
At stake was the budget and the tax cuts for wage moderation 
deal. The Labour Party, a potential governing partner, had rejected a 
Fine Gael budget that cut public expenditure and lowered taxes in 
January 1987. This left the door open for Fine Gael to embrace their 
long-time political opponents in what has become known as the 
Tallaght Strategy. There appeared to be no political alternative to the 
strategy. Union and business confederations had already signed off on 
the NESC report that promoted cost cutting throughout the economy  125 
   
as the way forward to recovery. Fine Gael were languishing in the 
polls, and suffering from their previous association with the tax and 
spend Labour Party.  
The budget, informed by an expenditure review committee that 
met throughout the summer of 1987, passed and cut public 
expenditure by £485 million for the 1988 calendar year (MacSharry & 
White 2000, 70, 79). The first SP agreement, the PNR, ratified by ICTU 
officials and employer representatives on October 9, 1987, had 
secured its funding. 
The 1986 NESC report laid out the guiding principles of social 
partnership: keep labour costs as low as possible, discipline public 
and sheltered sector unions, decrease public spending and promote 
cost competition as the guiding light of economic and social policy.59  
These principles re-appear in later reports, albeit linked to the 
necessity for continuing a bargained wage consensus. The binding 
concept throughout was competitiveness. 
Wage policy goals are summed in the 1990 NESC report that 
guided PESP (1991-1993) as being, “an evolution in income which 
ensures continued improvements in competitiveness” (NESC 1990, 
415). This was to be achieved through a “bargained consensus.” In the 
1993 NESC report that guided the PCW (1994-97), wage policy is 
included in a chapter entitled “Competitiveness,” and concludes that, 
“income levels must be shaped by the need to preserve and deepen 
competitiveness against our main trading partners” (NESC 1993, 140). 
The 1996 report that informed Partnership 2000 (1997-2000) 
                                                 
59 Also see MacSharry & White 2000, 131 for a similar argument.  126 
   
concluded that a negotiated consensus within a non-accommodating 
exchange rate regime would ensure labor cost competitiveness. The 
report allowed for an SP agreement that was operationalized at the, 
“level of the individual enterprise” (NESC 1996, 124) but coordinated 
nationally and reiterated previous reports’ basic argument that 
centralized coordination or a bargained consensus was key to 
maintaining Irish competitiveness. In the 1999 report that informed 
PPF (2000-2003), the 1996 report is referred to as demonstrating the 
key link between wages, wage coordination and competitiveness (NESC 
1999, 232-233) and concludes:  
“The Council’s view is that the basic objectives in relation to 
pay determination are best met through coordinated pay 
bargaining…The continuation of a satisfactory pay 
determination system is most likely to be achieved through a 
negotiated consensus that includes agreement on pay, tax 
reform, the public finances, infrastructure, housing and 
policies to address social exclusion” (NESC 1999, 260). 
This almost dogmatic adherence to centralized bargaining 
(continued in the 2003 report) amidst various discussions of exchange 
rate regimes and the coordination versus centralisation debate is a far 
cry from the initial report in 1986. In the 1986 report what was 
missing was a clear recommendation for a return to centralized wage 
deals. Instead, the NESC report states: 
“The mechanisms available to Government to directly 
influence private sector settlements are limited…Aside from 
education and a public education function…the main policy 
instruments available to government to influence private 
sector wage settlements are those which shape the 
background against which wage negotiations are carried out.” 
(NESC 1986, 185)  127 
   
Clearly, the original NESC intent was that incomes policy should 
control public sector wages, since they, “have implications for wages 
and salary increases in the private sector” (NESC 1986, 185). In the 
original PNR document in 1987, incomes policy receives very little 
attention. It appears in an appendix. It was only in later agreements 
that the pay bargain came to be central so that by 2000, the most 
senior civil servant in Ireland, the Secretary to the Taoiseach, stated 
that, “pay bargaining is the glue that holds everything together” 
(McCarthy interview 2000). While pay may be now the item that brings 
unions, employers and non-profit organizations to the table,60 the 
Secretary is perhaps over stating the case when he describes it as the 
glue. A more likely candidate for this status is a promise of growth and 
more jobs, trade union access to the policy-making process or access 
to tax reduction in exchange for pay discipline.61 
The promise of tax breaks and a real increase in take-home pay, 
coupled with the promise of economic growth and more jobs, 
sweetened by social welfare initiatives persuaded unions to stick to the 
pay deals. On the role of tax, The Minister for Finance in 1987 wrote in 
2000 that: 
“Tax reform was seen as a vital part both of the Programme for 
National Recovery and of all the subsequent social-partnership 
agreements. In fact, the whole tax agenda became one of the 
most important features in securing trade union support for 
                                                 
60  It also guarantees NESC considerable influence over economic and social 
policy. 
61 In the 1986 NESC report, the findings of the Taxation Commission are 
presented favourably. They recommended that Ireland move over time to a single low 
flat rate of tax for all sources of income (NESC 1986, 245). While any political party 
save for some in the far-right party the Progressive Democrats has never adopted 
this, it clearly shows that in 1986, bureaucrats and union and employer federation 
leaders were serious about lowering income tax.  128 
   
this and the subsequent series of agreements” (MacSharry & 
White 2000, 91). 
Right from the start of SP, therefore, there existed two key 
dynamics that have ensured its continuing survival: the focus on 
control of public sector pay and expenditure and the use of tax cuts as 
an inducement for pay discipline. As Social Partnership evolved after 
the wage discipline success of PNR, wage bargaining centralization and 
later, coordination, became the third plank of pay determination policy 
in Ireland.  
6.2 Tax cuts & public sector spending restraint 
While there are other features of Social Partnership that have 
emerged as the partnership process has matured - the entry of the 
third or community sector in the 2000 agreement and the promotion of 
partnership in regional development and in individual firms - the 
pay/social and economic policy trade-off remains the core element.62  
At the heart of the trade-off is tax policy (Leddin & Walsh 1997). 
Tax cuts for wage restraint as the core trade-off of SP separates 
Irish wage coordination from that in more coordinated economies 
where pay restraint for competitiveness are traded for state policies 
designed to ease the burden of the transition from employment to 
unemployment and into new jobs. In these economies, the emphasis is 
on active labour market policies, public sector employment, welfare 
transfers and entitlements as insurance against economic adjustment 
at the macro and micro-levels (Katzenstein 1985, 48; also see Hall & 
                                                 
62 The regional development or community partnerships lauded by Sabel in a 
19 9 6 O E CD  r ep or t ,  a r e  us u a l l y  a r g u e d by  m o s t  Ir i s h  c o m m en t a t or s  t o b e m os t l y  
cosmetic arrangements or ones where partners are co-opted into an existing process 
of development. See, for instance, the arguments of Kirby 2002, 40.  129 
   
Soskice 2001, 50-51. Also note Esping-Andersen’s (1983, chapter 2) 
distinction between liberal, and corporatist and social-democratic 
welfare states).  
There is no expansion of a re-distributive welfare state during the 
Social Partnership period. The Irish welfare state remains resolutely 
liberal and policy has protected the operation of the market economy. 
Tax cuts and public sector spending restraint has been the guiding 
frame of policy makers from all parties but Sinn Fein from 1987. The 
policy emphasis has been on improving the take-home pay of 
employees. With the exception of the usual expenditure on health, 
education and unemployment transfers, the most significant element 
of the welfare state is the use of extensive employment subsidies to 
clients of the IDA: corporate welfare. Irish spending on training is 
comparatively low but there were signs in 2000 and 2001 of a growing 
awareness of the importance of training in order to aid workers laid off 
from ailing industries and to help their transition into new ones (Carey 
interview 2000; Rigney interview 2000).  
A 1982 Commission has in general, guided tax policy on Taxation 
report (NESC 1999, 202). The framework of the achievement of a single 
flat rate of income tax achieved by slowing flattening out and 
simplifying the number of marginal rate bands, an end policy regarded 
as the preserve of the libertarian right in the US, has been advocated 
by NESC since 1986 (NESC 1986, 251-254; NESC 1990, 157-186; 
NESC 1993, 229-231; NESC 1999, 202ff). 
Changes to tax codes have tended to favour high and average over 
low-income earners (Hardiman 2000c). As such, tax cuts tend to  130 
   
slightly favor public sector workers, who on average are both more 
highly skilled and more highly paid than private sector workers (Boyle 
et al 2001, 58-64). The average tax, including social insurance levies 
and contributions, paid on the entire gross income of the average 
income of single production workers decreased between 1987 and 
1998 from 35.5% to 24.6%. The marginal rate decreased from 55.75% 
to 52.75%. For those singles on twice the mean production worker’s 
pay, the average tax fell from 48.8% to 38.6% with the marginal rate 
decreasing from 59% to 48.25%. Those on half the mean saw their 
average tax rate fall from 22% to 12.8% and the marginal rate 
decreased from 42.75% to 28.5%. Married people have fared better, as 
to be expected from a country where divorce is extremely difficult to 
obtain, and the right of women to work in the home is guaranteed in 
the constitution. The average tax, including social insurance levies and 
contributions, of the average income of a married production worker 
decreased from 25.5% to 17.8% between 1987 and 1998. Married 
production workers with twice the average income saw tax decrease 
from 36.3% to 26.4%, while those on half the average saw tax cut from 
an average of 7.75% to 2.8% (Hardiman 2000c, 42). 
The striking aspect of these tax cuts is the degree to which they 
favour decreasing the marginal tax rate of those at or above the 
average income, compared to providing more complete tax relief for the 
working poor. The second striking feature is how they compare with 
the 1970-1987 period. In this period, the average incidence of tax rose 
for singles and for married persons at or above the average production 
worker income. Single average earners saw average tax rise from 20%  131 
   
to 35.5%, single twice average earners saw average tax rise from 23.1% 
to 48.8%. Those on half the average income saw tax increase from an 
average of 8.6% to 2.8%. For married persons, the trends for average 
and twice average incomes are similar (average, 11.1% to 17.8%, twice 
average 19.8% to 36.3%), but the tax on half average income for 
married persons decreased from an average of 8.6% to 7.75% 
(Hardiman 2000c). 
Tax cuts under Social Partnership maintained the gross income 
dispersion status quo. This has been achieved though re-adjustment 
of the income thresholds for each marginal rate, and through the 
rollback of the progressivism of the band structure. In 1987, three 
standard rates applied: 35, 48 and 58%. By 2002, this was down to 
two: 20 and 42% (Hardiman 2000c, table 7). These changes decreased 
pressure on higher income workers to seek larger pay rises in order to 
maintain relativities with lower income workers; especially those 
affected by the minimum increase provisions of the SP agreements. 
Tax cuts also eased pressure on average income and above income 
workers from seeking ever higher pay rises in order to offset tax 
increases. Reductions in tax rates were responsible for around 1/3rd of 
the real increase in take-home pay between 1987 and 1997 (Leddins & 
Walsh 1997). Between 1980 and 1987, nominal manufacturing 
earnings increased by 101% but real income decreased by over 7% due 
to tax increases and inflation (NESC 1999, 236). Between 1987 and 
1999, real take home pay for the average non-married earner in 
manufacturing increased by an average of 2.6% per year for single  132 
   
people, and by 2.4% for the average married earner (Department of 
Finance figures in NESC 1999, 237).  
Despite the easing of the tax burden on the working middle-class, 
by OECD standards taxation on income earners remains high, leading 
the OECD to conclude in 1997 that, “Ireland is marked by very high 
marginal rates at the low-income levels” (OECD 1997, quoted in 
Tansey 1998, 187; also see NESC 1990, 157-160;). This has provided 
a further political motivation for deepening the tax cut process with 
each successive agreement. This has placed the ICTU in a political 
catch 22 situation. In the 1985 document Confronting the Job Crisis 
which signalled an intent that the union movement would be willing to 
become willing partners in a social partnership aimed at generating 
jobs, the need to reduce the PAYE burden was discussed as the 
number one taxation priority (ICTU 1985, 16). But by 2004, the ICTU 
was on the defensive over the role of taxation reform in generating 
jobs, simultaneously arguing that job creation preceded tax reform 
and that the government had not done enough to lift the PAYE burden 
on the low paid (Sweeney 2004, 7-12). The ICTU is and was in the 
difficult position of arguing that tax cuts are not vital for jobs (and that 
corporate taxes are too low) but taxes should be cut for lower income 
earners for equity reasons. While seeking a more equitable tax system, 
the ICTU is effectively advocating a position that the tax-cut-creates-
jobs supporters in the government, NESC and employer bodies can 
readily agree. This has led to a simple and less progressive tax system. 
The ICTU (and SIPTU) preference for tax cuts and employment creation 
has meant that tax cuts rather than compensatory policies have been  133 
   
favored in Ireland as the bait or side payment for pay discipline. This 
has resulted in a continuing rumble in some unions about the lack of 
concrete policies designed to alleviate poverty (Harbour interview 2000; 
Kane interview 2000).63 
6.3 Controlling the public sector 
To remind the reader of the three reinforcing elements of Irish 
wage centralization stability summarized in the first chapter: public 
sector employment and centralized wage control, export sector wage 
flexibility and localized bargaining, and the erosion or minimization of 
relativities-driven bargaining. In sections 6.3.1, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3, I 
examine the operation of the first and third of these: the control over 
public sector employment and wage growth, and the erosion of 
relativities-driven bargaining (in the public sector).  
There are two public sector imperatives if Social Partnership is to 
work and re-produce itself successfully: the control and minimization 
of public sector wage and employment growth. Control is necessary to 
bringing predictability to the wage movement of the sector, while 
minimization is necessary to avoid bidding up wages in the private 
sector.  
Employment expansion has the effect of increasing private sector 
competition for labor and bids up the cost of labor in the private sector 
(the Alesina thesis); especially if the public sector pay rate is higher 
than the private sector, as they were in Ireland in the 1990s. 
Controlling public sector pay increases is important in order to bring 
                                                 
63 See Allen 2000, chapter 2, for a more strident argument that social 
partnership has done nothing for the poor.  134 
   
certainty to the expectations game, so that non public sector wage 
setters moving first will know what pay claims will be struck in the 
public sector. This modifies claims. Of equal importance is that public 
sector wage restraint eases pay jealousies and relativities claims in the 
private sector. Ireland has an established practice of using relativities 
to guide wage claims throughout the economy in the public sector. 
While there are elements of this in any OECD economy, it is especially 
pronounced in Ireland, making public sector pay restraint doubly 
important if wages are to be controlled across the economy. 
6.3.1 Expenditure & employment 
The flip side of the decrease in income taxes (and low corporate tax 
rates which are discussed below) is the control of public expenditure 
and on increases in public employment. By 2000, Ireland had a 
comparatively small government enabled by reductions in state 
spending and on public employment. 
Between 1989 and 2000, total outlays (excluding the consumption 
of fixed capital) of the Irish government fell from 40.5% to 29.3% of 
GDP, well below the 2000 EU15 average of 44.1% or the euro zone 
average of 44.1%. The final consumption expenditure of the Irish 
government as a percentage of GDP fell from 16 to 13.4% of GDP. 
Social security transfers fell from 14.2% to 8.2% of GDP in the same 
period (OECD 2000, tables 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5,).  
This was not a retrenchment in the size of the government, but a 
fall in the expenditure relative to the size of the economy. In absolute 
terms, after a three year period when real spending fell between 1987 
and 1990, spending in real terms increased, doing so most rapidly  135 
   
after the mid 1990s when the economic boom began (ESRI data 
reported in Hardiman 2004, figure 14). But the fall in the relative 
spend of the government was achieved by falling government transfers, 
and a rapidly growing economy offset by only a slowly declining GDP 
share of government receipts. In 1989 receipts equalled 38.2% of GDP. 
By 2000 the share was down to 33.9% (OECD 2000, table 6.6).  
In 1987, the openness measure of the Irish economy (defined as 
the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP) was 117.1% of 
GDP; in 2000, it was 175.6% of GDP. After 1987, as the Irish economy 
has become more open, public expenditure declined as a percentage of 
GDP, contra the findings of Adsera & Boix (2002) and arguments 
advanced by Katzenstein (1985) that public expenditure increases with 
the openness of an economy. 
The holding of the line in government expenditure is reflected in 
the comparative decline in public sector employment. Figure 6.1 shows 
that between 1989, public sector employment, including the health 
sector as a share of the overall labor force, declined a couple of 
percentage points between 1989 and 2004 (increasing in absolute 
terms from 268 700 to 345 000). This was despite an increase in the 
number of employees in the government health sector from 38 300 to 
98 700 in the same period. The non-health government sector 
increased just under 35 000 in the same period from 211 400 to 246 
300. Private sector services by way of comparison increased from 618 
000 to 1.21 million between 1989 and 2004. 
Most of the increase of employment in the non-health public sector 
came from education, with around 30 000 extra teachers being  136 
   
employed between 1988 and 2003 (see figure 4.11). Civil service 
employment remained steady at around 30 000 from 1988 until 1997, 
before an increase of around 8000 between 1997 and 2003. As 
expected, and due to privatization, semi-states lost around 40 000 jobs 
between 1988 and 2003 (see figure 4.11). Defense also saw cutbacks 
in personnel. 
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Figure 6.1: Share of labor force by broad economic sector, Ireland 
1989-2004 
 
Source: derived from annual Labour Force surveys, 1988-1997, and the Quarterly 
Household Survey 1998-2004 (www.cso.ie). 
 
In absolute terms, in the decade from 1988 to 1998 public 
employment growth was minimal when health employees are excluded 
(table 6.1), while growth after 1998 was fuelled by expanding  137 
   
employment in health and education. The relative expansion in public 
employment after 1998 coincided with the rapid rise in public sector 
pay observed above in chapter 5. 
It can be concluded from this data that the effect of the trends in 
public sector employment was to reduce the competition from the 
public sector for labor. Once the health sector is excluded, public 
sector employment grew by just 2.3% or 26 800 jobs between 1988 
and 2003, while private sector employment grew 70% or around 749 
000 jobs.64 The absence of competition from the public sector for labor 
and the pay discipline imposed on the public sector were reinforcing 
policy strategies that were vital in limiting private sector wage claims 
and eroding the relativities-driven expectations game in the 1990s. 
 
Table 6.1 
Public sector employment, Ireland 1988-2003 
 
  
1988 
 
1998 
 
2003 
 
% increase 
1988-98 
 
% increase 
1998-03 
 
Public sector  270 300  289 700  338 300  7.1  16.8 
Public sector  
less health 
215 000  220 000  241 800  2.3  9.9 
Public sector  
less semi-state 
196 900  226 000  280 600  14.8  24.2 
Health  55 300  69 700  96 500  26.0  38.5 
Education  54 400  69 200  86 700  25.1  25.2 
Civil service  31 600  32 200  37 400  1.9  18.4 
 
 
Source: www.cso.ie, last modified .4/05. 
                                                 
64 Derived from CSO data, www.cso.ie, ‘Labour Force Survey’ (1988-1997), 
‘Quarterly Household Survey’ (1998-2004.) last modified 08/04. This data also 
shows that service employment doubled between 1989 and 2004 from around 610 
000 to around 1.21 million, while industrial employment increased from just under 
310 000 to just under 510 000. At the same time agrarian employment dropped from 
around 160 000 to around 117 000.  138 
   
6.3.2 Pay 
This section examines the institutions that set pay in the public 
sector since the 1950s and their effects on pay increases during SP, 
the difficulties (and successes) that SP encountered with altering the 
relativities-based system for making pay claims in the public sector 
and the recent changes brought by introduction of the benchmarking 
process during the PPF (2000-2003) in response to persistent 
relativities problems.  
6.3.2.1 Institutional features & their effects on pay 
Unions organizing the public sector tend to have just public sector 
members. While SIPTU has many public sector members, the 
unwritten rule enforced by the Department of Finance when 
recognizing trade unions is that unions be specific to not only the 
public sector but to the specific group they are organizing. Craft 
unionism dominates, but there are some exceptions in health and in 
local authorities (McGinley 1997, 246). 
The public sector procedures for resolving pay disputes are 
emblematic of the voluntarist nature of Irish industrial relations. With 
rare exceptions (where discrimination law is involved or parties agree 
to be bound), decisions made at all levels, including the Labour Court, 
are not legally enforceable.  
Arbitration Boards and Conciliation Councils were introduced 
permanently in 1955 for the civil service, teachers in 1954 and 55, 
police in 1962, and for local authorities in 1963. Direct control by the 
government over negotiations before these boards varies. Civil service 
claims are most tightly monitored with the Department of Finance  139 
   
taking a direct role in negotiations. In negotiations with teachers, 
police and defense, Finance works with the relevant department 
officials. In the semi-state authorities, influence is more diffused and 
comes through informal channels and personal contacts (McGinley 
1997, 239-240; Scanlan interview 2000). Agreements made in 
conciliation and in arbitration are not legally enforceable, but non-
compliance of arbitration findings is “extremely rare” (McGinley 1997, 
246). Appeals are made to an Arbitration Board unlike in the private 
sector where appeals go directly to the Labour Court. 
In the commercial semi-states, conciliation appeals go directly to 
the Labour Court, as in the private sector with the exception of three 
bodies, An Post (postal), Telecom Eirann (telecommunications) and the 
Electricity Supply Board (ESB). An Post and Eirann still use the public 
arbitration boards, while the ESB has its own Joint Industrial Council 
(McGinley 1997, 250).  
Six groups, industrial civil servants, education support staff, 
health, voluntary hospitals, health boards, local authorities so-called 
‘servants’ (cleaners, road workers etc) and non-commercial semi-states 
are covered by a myriad of conciliation arrangements, each ultimately 
with the Labour Court as institution of last resort. 
During the 1987-2002 period, before benchmarking (discussed 
below), the pay discipline of various areas of the public sector seems to 
wane the further from the Department of Finance’s control 
negotiations take place (see figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5; also observed by 
Department of Finance and IMPACT union officials: Scanlan 2000; 
Harbour interview 2000), and the higher the average skill level of the  140 
   
area. While a recent consultant’s report for the Departments of 
Finance and the Taoiseach has characterized Ireland’s public sector as 
fairly centralized in comparison to the UK (Fitzpatrick & Associates 
1999), the examination of the pattern of wage determination 
institutions outlined above supports the notion that some areas, such 
as the civil service, are closely controlled from the centre while others, 
such as health and the utilities, are not. The myriad of schemes also 
explains the differing pay outcomes within the public sector as a 
whole. 
The Finance control thesis does not always appear to be in effect, 
but it certainly helps explain the discipline of administrative and civil 
servants as against the local and regional authorities between 1987 
and 2002 for instance. There are outliers, such as the non-commercial 
semi-state authorities, but looking at 1987-2004 data presented in 
chapter 5, the influence of the Department of Finance appears strong 
and responsible for the relative discipline of industrial and civil 
servants until benchmarking in 2002 (see figure 5.3). Security 
personnel pay, being less directly influenced by the Department of 
Finance, is less disciplined until benchmarking, as are tertiary, 
vocational and IT training educators.  
There also appears to be a skill effect on public sector pay 
determination between 1988 and 2004, with police and tertiary 
educators being the beneficiaries of significant pay drift before 2000 
suggesting that market forces were even more influential in these 
areas. The skill effect is most dramatic in the utilities, where the 
workforce has a high proportion of skilled tradespeople. This sector  141 
   
saw some of the highest pay drift during the SP era, and it is evident 
in both the pre- boom and boom eras. The April 2001 deal in the state-
owned electricity utility, ESB, is typical, where unions gained a 21% 
pay rise on top of the PPF agreement in exchange with an agreement to 
re-structure the 7500 employee workforce. The agreement amounted 
to just under a 40% wage rise during the PPF, and was largely secured 
due to a threat of industrial action from network technicians at power 
stations (EIRO 2001b). 
 
Table 6.2 
Private and public sector pay indices, Ireland 1987-1996 
 
   
Public Sector,  
excluding health* 
 
 
Private industry  
Clerical employees 
 
Private industry 
Industrial employees 
1987  100 100  100 
1991  125.4 120.8  118.1 
1996  162.2 149.2  139.6 
 
 
Source: Tansey 1987, 172. 
Notes: Public sector data includes overtime 
 
The report card on wage discipline in the public sector between 
1987 and 1998 appears to be a good one on the whole, and certainly 
compares favourably with the late 1970s and early 1980s (see below). 
When aggregated, it appears public sector wages rose higher than 
private sector wages in the 1987-1997 period (see table 6,2) and data 
like this has led many commentators to deplore the lack of public 
sector wage restraint (for instance, Tansey 1997). But as was 
demonstrated in chapter 5, many areas of the public sector were 
strong conformers to SP pay norms, especially the civil service. Weaker  142 
   
conformers tended to be have special and comparatively rare skills 
(tertiary and vocational education, security) or to work in areas where 
wage setting was conducted away from the immediate influence of the 
Department of Finance (commercial semi-states, local and regional 
bodies). Inflation averaged 2.7% between 1987 and 1996 and helped to 
moderate wage claims (data in Tansey 1997, 155). Obviously 
significant were the already discussed increases in real-take home 
income from tax cuts. All in all, for the first decade, wages were 
successfully coordinated and their growth controlled in the public 
sector. 
6.3.2.2 Relativities 
In the late 1990s, industrial action from public sector 
professionals (nurses, secondary teachers) exposed the tension 
between the centralized agreements and the institutional mechanisms 
used to implement the agreements in the public sector. That system 
relied on a relativities system used since the Priestly Commission in 
the 1950s. In the late 1990s concerns surfaced from NESC and the 
Department of Finance about the system and pay rises in the civil 
service and local and regional authorities. The emergence of public 
sector wage creep in the late 1990s exposed the key weakness of the 
system and demonstrated the point at which the system could fall 
apart. The key weakness of the system was that it relies on an 
asymmetric distribution of responsibility for generating and 
maintaining wage restraint. The public sector shoulders much of that 
burden. The strains on the system reflect that burden and the 
problems associated with the design of the Irish centralized system.  143 
   
The policy response has been to re-cast the institutional mechanism 
by which public sector pay is set in a new system called 
benchmarking. The purpose of this recasting was to eradicate the old 
relativities system that had been muted for the decade after 1987 
thanks to the centralized agreements, but had reappeared with the 
economic boom in the late 1990s. 
In 1997, nurses won a 14.5% pay rise, twice the P2000 
recommended limit. This would have been an isolated incidence of 
wage creep, if it had not been for the system of internal relativities 
operating in the public sector.65 The Department of Finance feared 
knock-on effects, and the next three years would prove them right 
(Scanlan interview 2000).66 The pay rise for nurses had the effect of 
opening opportunities for dozens of relativities-based claims, not the 
least of which was the relativities that existed between nurses and 
clerical staff within the administrative civil service (Merrigan interview 
2000).  
Following the successful 1997 claim was another nurse’s 
industrial action. This was more serious than the first and brought 
                                                 
65 While little quantitative data is available on health pay data (it still is not 
collected by the CSO), anecdotal evidence suggests that health pay is very important 
in the public sector. Health pay is determined by separate conciliation procedures 
with appeals to the Labour Court and is critical in its ability to influence the setting 
of public sector pay both inside the civil service and in the non-central authorities 
and boards. The reason for this lies in the system of internal relativities and external 
pay matching that was used in the public sector between the mid-1950s and 2002. 
The British Priestly Commission in the mid-1950s instituted a system in the Irish 
public sector whereby key grades within the public service were compared to 
comparable jobs in the private sector. These then acted as relativities anchors for 
other grades and occupations.   
66 Within the health sector, physiotherapist’s pay is determined relative to 
nurses’ pay, while prison officers and police pay is determined through relativities 
with physiotherapists (Scanlan interview 2000). Fire fighters pay is determined 
though relativities with police.  144 
   
into question the basis of public sector pay determination. The nine 
days national strike of some 27 000 nurses in October 1999 brought 
two issues to the fore: the professions to which the nurses should be 
compared (called the analogue comparison), and the overall pay 
increase required to achieve pay justice. It was in every respect a 
‘catch-up’ claim.  
The problem of increasing wage expectations resulting from the 
nurses win was realized by a series of ongoing one-day strikes by the 
Association of Secondary Teachers (ASTI) in late 2000 and 2001.67 The 
beginning of ASTI’s industrial campaign coincided with strikes and the 
threat of strikes to win pay gains at various occupational levels at Aer 
Lingus (50% state-owned), among DART rail drivers in Dublin, at Tara 
Mines, and the Eastern Regional Health Authority, and occurred a few 
months after ratification of the PPF (2000-2003) (EIRO 2000c).68 The 
teacher’s campaign also started as the PPF was being renegotiated in 
                                                 
67 This followed ASTI pulling out of the ICTU early in 2000. ASTI left the ICTU 
for two reasons: the ICTU’s decision to agree to 3% pay rises to early settlers under 
PCW; and being told in early 2000 by the Department of Finance that a 6% rise was 
all they could expect. Compared to the nurses late-1999 win of 25%, this was 
perceived as unacceptable. 
68 What is curious about the attitude of public sector unions in the period 1999-
2001 was that despite their opinions to the contrary, public sector employees still 
earned 13% more than private sector manufacturing and industrial employees when 
age, gender, hours, education, seniority and broad occupational categories were 
controlled for (Boyle et al 2001, 58-61). What is more, this premium increased from 
10% in 1997, and was near identical the wage differential observed in 1994. The 
relative compression of public sector earnings meant that the wage premium was 
greater for those at the bottom decile (17% in 2001) the median (12%) or than the top 
decile (9%) (Boyle et al 2001, 64). 
Such findings are contra to the mood and attitudes of union officials at the 
time. The perception of union officials interviewed in late 2000 (when the public 
sector wage premium was 10.8%) was that during the boom after 1997, public sector 
pay had fallen behind (Harbour interview 2000; Naughton interview 2000; Merrigan 
interview 2000; Kane interview 2000). This was evidently not the case, and further 
indicates the power of expectations and inaccurate and/or incomplete information in 
determining the patterns of wage settlements in a staggered round system.  145 
   
the context of planning for the 2001 budget, and amidst evidence that 
many parts of the economy were subject to high wage drift. IBEC 
leaders spoke of “heavy-handed tactics” by unions to secure above-
the-norm increases, and warned of the possible end to the SP process: 
“Sectionalism reappeared as groups fought to get themselves up the 
ladder and improve their lot in relative terms (Frawley 2000b).”69 
The ASTI industrial action was long and relatively bitter, but the 
government held its ground insisting ASTI abide by the benchmarking 
process. Finally, in March 2002, the ASTI campaign fizzled out rather 
than ended when it became clear that the government was not going to 
negotiate over the 30%. ASTI re-joined the benchmarking process.70 
The benchmarking process advocated in the PPF (2000-2003) 
came as a result of concerns of rising public sector wage militancy, 
poor public sector productivity and the rising problem of wage push 
inflation that surfaced during the latter stages of the PCW and 
continued during P2000 (1997-2000). A major impetus for the process 
came from a September 1999 report from Fitzpatrick & Associates, a 
Dublin-based economic consultancy.71 The affect of the report was 
                                                 
69 The teacher’s strike was reasonably substantial, and consisted of various 
one-day strikes, bans on supervision during non-class hours and threats designed to 
disrupt public examinations. 80% of the strike days for the first quarter of 2001 were 
accounted for by ASTI action (Cassidy 2002). Unhappy with the 18% increase 
provision from the PPF, teachers sought a catch-up from a 30% pay-rise. 
70 The backdrop of Irish prosperity and the references to catch-up especially 
early in the campaign, suggested that the 30% claim was always about relativities 
with the private sector and other groups in the public sector who had cashed in the 
context of an economic boom. 
71 Responding to a Minister of Finance brief with its origins in 1998 moves from 
the Office of the Taoiseach to link public sector pay more closely to performance and 
minimise the use of the automatic annual pay increment (NESC 1999, 249), most of 
the report is devoted to discussions of the decentralization of public sector pay 
determination, and the use of performance pay. There was a special focus on poor 
public sector productivity (Fitzpatrick & Associates 1999, 63ff).  146 
   
provisions in the PPF agreement in 2000 where unions and the 
government agreed to a Public Service Benchmarking Body (PSBB). 
The primary purpose of the PSBB is to re-cast the relativities 
system used for over 40 years since the Priestly Commission. Jobs in 
the civil service, health and semi-state agencies sector are linked to 
comparable jobs in the average firm in the private sector. Internal 
relativities are scrapped. Benchmarking differs from the pre-SP system 
in two major ways. First, it stops the coordination of wages in the 
public sector being set through reference to a few select private sector 
occupations, and; second, it stops the public sector pay being linked to 
pay leaders in the private sector. Instead, matched occupations are 
pay benchmarked to average profit firms. An independent body 
reporting every three or four years oversees benchmarking.72 
Benchmarking attempts to address the problem of pre-emptive 
claims by groups in the public sector that are enabled by the myriad 
pay setting schemes and institutional mechanisms (NESC 1999, 251). 
It is therefore a very important development in the Irish centralized 
wage system. Where the early years of SP imposed wage discipline on 
the public sector in order to stop relativities-driven wage claims 
bouncing back and forth between highly profitable export firms and 
                                                 
72 The first Benchmarking body established the method of pay determination. 
Independent consultants would evaluate each public sector job using set criteria 
(PSBB 2002, 30-33). A representative survey of a sample of firms in the private 
sector would follow, where similar data on the range of jobs within each firm, and 
their respective remuneration would be gathered. Jobs from the public sector would 
be matched with jobs from the private sector, and comparable public sector 
remunerations calculated from that matching process. The quid pro quo for public 
sector employees would be, among other measures designed to enhance productivity, 
the introduction of performance criteria to determine the granting of what were 
seniority-based salary increments.  147 
   
the public sector causing rising unemployment and inflation, 
benchmarking is an attempt to re-cast those relativities and in doing 
so, create an institutional brake on public sector wage rises that eases 
the pressure on the central agreements to generate wage restraint in 
the public sector.  
While the SP wage agreements tempered the relativities-driven old 
wage setting behaviours in the public service, they were not 
eradicated, as the teachers and nurses strikes made plain. Before 
benchmarking, the diversity of pay settlement mechanisms meant that 
groups who settled early in the bargaining round had more likelihood 
of securing their desired gains than later groups when it became clear 
what the total of pay rises would cost the government. But there were 
also plenty of instances of early bargainers receiving comparatively low 
wage rises after late bargainers responded to higher than expected 
inflation, and ‘cashed in’ with higher wage wins. The staggering of 
claims provoked a guessing game, where groups bid up claims early in 
the round on the full expectation that others would do so, and because 
of uncertainty over what later bidding groups would ask for. 
Expectations drove the bargaining process and led to a self-feeding 
game of wage leapfrog (Kane interview 2000; Scanlan interview 2000; 
Merrigan interview 2000; Harbour interview 2000).  
This game affected wage outcomes in the private sector, especially 
among higher skill employees, who had to guess what pay claims in 
the public sector would look like, and therefore match those guesses 
with their claims in order to maintain their relativity. Employers were 
happy to pay these claims, because, they too were interested in  148 
   
maintaining relativities with higher skill workers in the public sector in 
order to secure their workforce, and in order to signal those entering 
the workforce that theirs was a better paying career than the public 
sector. 
But the early performance of the PSBB has not led to wage 
restraint in the publics sector. Benchmarking, far from re-calibrating 
public sector relativities and slowing down wage increases has in fact 
accelerated them. Public sector pay restraint and adherence to the 
terms of the Social Partnership agreements appears to have come to 
an end.73  
Two factors have been responsible for the era of public sector pay 
restraint coming to an end. First, economic prosperity and a rapidly 
tightening labor market have altered pre-1999 public sector 
expectations about private sector wages.74 Before 1999, the SP 
                                                 
73 Union attitudes towards benchmarking have suggested that it is and was 
regarded in some quarters as just another pay claim (Kane interview 2000; Scanlan 
interview 2000). In many respects this is and was probably the case, and ICTU and 
member union support for the process has been secured by the large pay increases 
that the process has generated. While some of these have been as a result of the re-
calibrating of public sector jobs, it is difficult to see how the pay increases in 2004 in 
the civil service where pay increased at twice the rate of financial and industrial 
clerical employees in 2004, can be regarded as anything but an ending of public 
sector pay restraint. This led to calls from the General Secretary of the Irish Bank 
Officials Association for the government to ‘overhaul’ the government and trade 
union strategy on national wage agreements (McCaffrey 2005). 
74 The problems of tightening labour markets are reflected in the first report of 
the PSBB in June 2002 that led to large wage gains for civil servants in 2004. The 
report was based on data collected in June 2001. Surprisingly, no analysis or 
mention of public sector wage premiums appears in the report. Indeed, the report 
gives little indication of the methodology used to support the eventual findings 
beyond the brief description of the job matching methodology described above. As 
Ruane & Lyons (2001, 9) conclude: 
“It [the report] represents comparisons at a point in time, and at that 
point…represented a unique period (full employment) in the past 50 years. 
Thus it compared public and private sector earnings at a most atypical 
period, and one can only hazard a guess that the relativities taken at the 
end of 2002 would have been somewhat different.”   149 
   
agreements in the context of a slack labor market meant that public 
sector unions could decide to hold the line on pay claims, knowing 
that given slack labor market conditions, highly productive, exporting 
firms would not have to bid up the price of labour in order to secure 
their workforce. In fact, by being disciplined themselves, in exchange 
for tax cuts and increases in real take home pay enabled by those tax 
cuts, public sector unions could be a primary shaper of the going rate 
in the exporting sector.  
Second, there is widespread doubt about the ability of government 
to entice unions to the SP bargaining table through the promise of 
further tax cuts (Scanlan interview 2000; Kane interview 2000, 
McCarthy interview 2000; also see Hardiman 2000). The Sustaining 
Progress  agreement (2003-2005) is sanguine about income tax 
changes, prefacing the policy strategy, “to the extent that there is any 
scope for personal tax reductions progress will continue to be made” 
(Government of Ireland 2003, 39). 
6.3.3 The curse of prosperity 
Both SIPTU and IMPACT have been, for the most part, 
enthusiastic supporters of the SP process (Scanlan interview 2000; 
Kane interview 2000; McCarthy interview 2000; Merrigan interview 
2000; Harbour interview 2000). But some union officials in interview 
have also, for the most part, been wary to declare that bargaining 
behavior has drastically changed (Harbour interview 2000; Kane 
                                                                                                                                              
The government has since indicated that the PSBB will report again in 2007 
(Dooley 2004), but it would appear that the process is cumbersome and will almost 
certainly lead to industrial relations problems should the next report find that 
certain public sector jobs will have to take a pay cut.  150 
   
interview 2000). This perhaps reflects that SP never completely 
destroyed the old relativities system and benchmarking is another 
relativities system, albeit a less coordinated one.  
Unions remain in the SP process, it has been argued, in order to 
gain access to the policy-making process (Spring interview 2000; 
McCarthy interview 2000). But the pay data suggests that behavior 
has changed. Until the start of the economic boom in about 1997 or 
1998, public sector pay, with the exception of the very highly or highly 
differentiated and specific skilled (tertiary educators, police, utilities) 
was affected by the central agreements. This was achieved through 
side payments (tax cuts, entry into the policy process) promised in a 
series of roughly three-year agreements that secured union adherence 
(for the most part) to the deals in exchange for future government 
policy quid pro quo.  
The key to the tax cuts has been their neutral progressive income 
distributive outcomes. In fact, the middle classes have benefited more 
than the working poor (Hardiman 2000). Wage dispersion in Ireland 
during SP has increased. Based on ESRI data, between 1987 and 1994 
the 90/10 ratio for male full-time workers has increased from 3.67 to 
4.06. On OECD 90/10 data, this makes Ireland the least equal 
country, as far as income is concerned, in Western Europe and 
comparable only to the US and Canada (Barrett et al 1999, table 2 & 
3). Evidence suggests that this has been as a result of increasing 
returns to education (Barrett et al 1999, 90-93); returns unaltered by 
social policies or solidarity wage deals aimed at income re-distribution.  151 
   
But the limits to the process have become clear after 2000. Taxes 
can only be cut so much, and the labour market has tightened. Pay 
envy has subsequently re-appeared, especially in the public service. It 
would appear that the PSBB, designed to thwart the process by which 
jealousies can be translated easily into spiralling wage claims, has 
made a mistake in its new method of comparing public sector with 
private sector jobs. In the context of a boom economy, benchmarking 
has, in fact, accelerated the wage increases in the public sector, and 
created a new set of expectations that may be difficult to break should 
the economy hit hard times. 
Whether any kind of arrangement could be made which could stop 
the erosion of public sector pay discipline in a country with voluntarist 
industrial relations institutions and traditions is debatable. Indeed, 
the recent emergence of a legislated minimum wage (introduced in 
April 2000), coupled with a growing emphasis on legally enforceable 
individual employment rights in Ireland has been used to argue that 
Ireland is moving away from a voluntarist collective bargaining 
industrial relations system to one where rights and obligations accrue 
to the individual are defined and are enforceable under the law (EIRO 
2005). This may be a response to the ever-decreasing union density in 
the private sector, which in 2005 has by some lower estimates hit 20% 
(11% in MNCs) (Begg 2002). But the very high density in the public 
sector (85%) suggests that the increase in legislated labour law and 
the growing entry of the law into dispute settlement may be in 
response to the erosion of predictable behavior in the pay setting 
arena.   152 
   
This dissertation has argued that this pay predictability was 
predicated on public sector pay discipline and the control of growth of 
public sector employment. The SP regime, however, may have 
exhausted itself unless new side payments can be found to quell 
public sector union discontent; side payments that must also not 
ignite pay envy or distribution battles in the non-union parts of the 
economy, which is increasingly becoming to mean the private sector. 
6.4 Holding the line? Sheltered industrial, indigenous traded 
& local service pay 
From 1973 to 1987, indigenous manufacturing firms saw job 
losses of around 35 000 jobs, while MNCs saw the growth of a little 
less than 10 000 jobs.75 No doubt unions learnt from this previous 
experience, and were more favourable to pay restraint during SP.76 But 
as for the public sector, the grease of the wheels for non-export sector 
unions and workers with respect to the pay agreements was taxation 
reform, and similar arguments that pertain to the public sector about 
the success and limits of that strategy apply here.  
                                                 
75 This trend can be explained as a result of a phenomena normally seen in 
developing resource rich countries such as Jamaica or Chile, where pay in the highly 
profitable export parts of the economy forms the basis of wage claims in the 
unionized and less productive and profitable parts of the economy. In the 1970s 
there is good evidence to suggest that this was the case (Hardiman 1988, 89; also 
see Barry, Bradley & O’Malley 1999). 
76 The indigenous traded sectors have clear incentives to maintain pay discipline 
in order to remain competitive. Indigenous firms in Ireland are smaller, less 
profitable, are less capital intensive, employ lower skill workers, and spend less on R 
& D than their MNC counterparts (Barry, Bradley & O’Malley 1999). They are 
vulnerable to price-based competition from imports and therefore have incentives to 
control labour costs. Where there is some wage drift in these sectors, it can be 
attributed to the influence of wage increases in high productivity foreign-owned 
firms. These increases influence relativities-based claims and the going price 
necessary to recruit and retain labor in the indigenous industries and local services.  153 
   
Examining data introduced in chapter 5, pay discipline within the 
indigenous non-export and local services has generally had, if 
anything, a slightly better record than the public sector, until the 
boom begins after 1997. The exceptions are construction (not reported) 
and beverages. Firms in these two high paying industries are highly 
unionized and are price setters. In beverage, the Irish market is 
extremely protected and regulated, and exporters mainly making 
concentrate for intra-firm distribution or dealing in well-established 
brands (whiskey, beer) dominate the export sector of the market. 
These firms care comparatively little about labor costs. Some such as 
Coke are genuine price setters; others, such as Irish Distillers, have a 
well-established market. On the whole, labor costs are passed onto 
consumers. Wage drift should be expected in these kinds of firms, 
which account for around one-quarter of the food, drink and tobacco 
workforce in 2000 (table 4.3).  
As the degree of market competition increases there is a trend 
toward greater pay discipline. Food, clothing, footwear and leather, 
textiles, and timber and wood furniture (all traded) are more 
disciplined than beverage and paper and printing (sheltered), which 
are more disciplined than utilities and construction (non-traded). Even 
among higher skill and paying industries such as paper and printing 
the wage drift is small until the boom. In local services, the relative 
scarcity of IT skills in the 1990s bid up the prices of computer-related 
activities labor, but wholesale and especially retail trade (which saw 
keen competition with the entry and expansion of UK-based chains) 
were disciplined and conformed largely to the SP pay norms. Clearly,  154 
   
public sector pay discipline had an affect on the indigenous industries 
by limiting relativities-based claims, as did the effect of tax cuts on 
real take-home pay.77 
But 2000 brought widespread drift, and as in the public sector, 
defectors have appeared and old-style relativities-driven claims are 
being made. One journalist’s estimate placed compliance among firms 
unionized by SIPTU in 2000 at around 70% (Sheehan interview 2000). 
This reflected the, “successful pursuit by SIPTU of local bargaining, 
even though it had not been provided for by the PPF” (SIPTU 2002, 7). 
SIPTU’s opportunism exposed the fragility of the voluntarist basis for 
Irish wage coordination where the only sanction to ‘unauthorized’ local 
bargaining was the withdrawal from the SP process by IBEC or the 
government. Not surprisingly, threats of IBEC withdrawal were 
common in the years after 1999. 
Some of this drift was due to labour shortages. For instance, 
MANDATE, the major retail workers union, was able to extract major 
rises from retailers from 1998 onwards.78 The sudden rise in retail 
                                                 
77 This wage data evidence is supported by SIPTU reports on agreements to 
which it is a party. As the largest Irish union with around 200 000 members or 
approximately one-third of the workforce, SIPTU data is valuable in identifying drift 
trends in the unionized parts of the economy. Estimates of at least 95% of firms 
complying with the SP norms before the boom by industrial relations journalists 
(Sheehan interview 2000; EIRO 1999a) have been discounted slightly by union 
officials (Harbour interview 2000; Merrigan interview 2000). But the more accurate 
data from the P2000 period (1997-2000) collected by SIPTU shows that of the 1122 
pay settlements signed between January 1997 and mid-April 1999, 131 or 11.6% 
paid above-the-norm increases, indicating an 88.4% compliance rate of agreements 
(EIRO 1999a). This figure is probably closer to the mark, and broadly representative 
of the trends in pay in unionized firms in the pre-boom period. 
78 The first retailer to give major rises was Marks and Spencers in April 1998, 
where above the norm rises were associated with the introduction of performance 
pay. Tesco’s, another UK chain, followed suit in 1999. In November 1999, MANDATE 
and management agreed at Dunnes Stores, an iconic Irish-owned retail and 
supermarket chain, to replace the final 1% of P2000 with an average 16% pay rise to 
floor staff in January 2000. The rise affected about 8 000 employees (EIRO 2000d).  155 
   
pay, the lowest paying industry in Ireland, may have reflected the tight 
labour market, but it also reflected union unease in some quarters, in 
particular from MANDATE, at the lack of re-distributive policies, be 
they complete tax relief, or housing and childcare assistance, that 
accompanied SP (Kane interview 2000). This unease has seen a return 
to the old expectations game mode of thought characterized by pay 
packet jealousy in some unions such as MANDATE. But the attitude of 
SIPTU towards the low paid and inequality has to prioritize the ‘bottom 
line’ of employment creation and the fortunes of those with jobs.79 
The more radical minority is now about 40% of delegates if the last 
vote on ratification of the PPF is any indication (Dooley 2003a). This is 
substantial and suggests that the future of Social Partnership may be 
tenuous. MANDATE and the Irish arm of the UK union, the 
Amalgamated Transport and General Workers Union (ATGWU), are 
more concerned with substantive equality than equality of opportunity 
(Allen 2000). This attitude has led to militant union strategies in retail 
and transport. During the Irish boom and together with ASTI and the 
nurses, these unions have been at the vanguard of the union push to 
return to free collective bargaining.80 
                                                                                                                                              
This was followed by a 12% pay rise for 2001, agreed in October 2000, for around 10 
000 employees. Also in October 2000, Argos, another UK retailer pulled out of the 
PPF and granted a 19.2% pay-rise for 2001(Frawley 2000a). 
79 In a report on the PPF (2000-2003), priority is given to the role of taxation in 
improving the living standards of lower to middle income earners (SIPTU 2002, 8ff). 
More formally, SIPTU concerns with inequality primarily rested with the eradication 
of discrimination with respect to gender, race and disability (SIPTU 2002, 17) rather 
than with substantive equality based on material outcomes. 
80 Other unions to oppose Sustaining Progress (2003-2005) included the 
Communications workers Union, the Civil and Public Service Union, and the Irish 
Bank Officials Association (Dooley 2003a). A delegate for the National Union of 
Journalists at the ICTU Sustaining Progress ratification conference in supporting the 
deal said, “ I strongly believe that this may well be the last national agreement of its  156 
   
6.5 Liberalizing the export sector 
I now turn to the final of the three reinforcing elements of the Irish 
centralized wage bargaining system: the liberalizing of export sector 
wage setting from central controls. Once economies are open, 
governments ensure that exporters are uninhibited by institutional 
arrangements that make wages more rigid either upwards or 
downwards than in a decentralized and non-coordinated system of 
wage bargaining. The key, therefore, is to maximize wage flexibility for 
the export sector. This may be achieved in two main ways. 
First, when the export sector is unionized export sector unions 
must play a key role in wage coordination in order to control wages in 
less productive and sheltered areas of the economy.81 Export 
employers support wage coordination in these cases because it 
controls the growth of wages; a gain worth having despite any 
downward rigidity such an arrangement may cause.82 
Second, where the export sector is not unionized the key to wage 
coordination stability is to allow the export sector to free ride on the 
wage discipline of the public sector and the unionized private sector. 
                                                                                                                                              
type and in the coming 18 months we need to put our unions on a strong war footing 
and to prepare for a genuine battle with Government and employers.” (quoted in 
Dooley 2003b). 
81 The ‘Crouch thesis’ applies in one set of conditions where the export sector is 
heavily unionized and dominates the union movement, which, given the evidence in 
recent years of MNC preferences for countries with low levels of labor market 
regulation and US MNCs growing appetite for non-union plants and sites (Cooke 
1997; Bognanno, Keane & Yang 2005; Roche 2001), may be of decreasing empirical 
relevance. That relevance is doubly diminished in liberal economies, where 
unionization rates are lower, on the whole, than in CMEs. 
82 But as Swedish employers discovered in the 1980s, wage relativities can run 
from the public sector to the private; a development that upset settled wage 
distribution, altered their strategy of support for the status quo and led to the 
dismantling of the Swedish wage coordination system (Swenson & Pontusson 2000).  157 
   
In other words, the export sector is to remain uncoordinated. This 
partially coordinated wage system is best achieved via side-payments 
that are largely distribution neutral, i.e. through tax cuts. This kind of 
argument suggests that there is scope for a wage coordination 
arrangement in economies with a unionized exporting sector where 
public and non-exported sector union restraint can exist alongside 
exporting sector non-coordination. Ireland is the paradigmatic example 
of this kind of partial coordination, and the flexibility and freedom 
from wage coordination with respect to wages is reflected in the lack of 
scrutiny of wage movements in the exporting sector.83 
Evidence for the lack of coordination in the exporting sector 
should include a broad adherence to the agreements in times of slack 
labor markets, and drift in times of tight labor markets (as well as 
more direct evidence such as statements about the lack of 
coordination). Where sectors have specific skill requirements that may 
be in short supply in an otherwise slack market, or where sectors are 
characterized by companies with high levels of firm-specific knowledge, 
then we should also expect drift in comparison to sectors 
characterized by firms with lower levels of firm-specific knowledge and 
less specific skill requirements. These kinds of patterns are suggestive 
of free-riding where labor market conditions permit and more obvious 
market-driven behavior when markets tighten and labor supply is not 
so plentiful. A second indication of the non-coordination of exporter 
sector pay should be the comparatively high adoption of variable and 
                                                 
83 Given that the exporting sector is dominated by MNCs in Ireland, MNCs and 
exporting sector are interchangeable terms in the account below.  158 
   
flexible pay strategies or performance and profit sharing systems by 
export firms compared to non-export firms.84 
On variable pay, 1996/1997 data suggests that US-owned and 
other foreign-owned firms were far more, and statistically significantly 
more likely than Irish-owned firms to use profit-sharing. US-owned 
companies were far more likely than all others to use share ownership 
provisions as part of a remuneration package for employees (Geary & 
Roche 2001, table 2). Given the dominance of the export sector by 
MNCs, this data supports the export sector non-coordination thesis 
advanced here.  
Of the adherence and drift evidence for the export sector non-
coordination thesis, supporting evidence is found for the SP years, 
although there are some gaps in that evidence. Despite the massive 
input and growth generated by MNCs and the lobbying and high 
degree of contact between MNCs and the development arm of the Irish 
state, little information has been systematically collected on MNC wage 
setting behavior. Taxes are lowered, jobs subsidized into existence, 
                                                 
84 The reasons behind the priority given to exporter preferences by policy 
makers in Ireland as presented above in the discussion of NESC and its focus on 
competitiveness, is apparent when the contribution of MNCs to the economy is 
evaluated. MNCs in Ireland are more capital-intensive, have larger plants and are 
more productive than their indigenous counterparts and have been for the duration 
of SP (McCarthy 1999; Barry, Bradley & O’Malley 1999). Six industries, recorded 
media (software), chemicals, office and data processing equipment, the MNC portion 
of food and drink (cola concentrate) and medical and optical equipment are 
responsible for 3% of GDP growth per annum between 1993 and 1997 (McCarthy 
1999, 62). This was before the boom, and does not take into account the growth in 
support services and industries. Credible estimates suggest that as many as 93 
service jobs were created for every 100 MNC manufacturing jobs in 1983. By 1992, 
this figure had risen to 105. In 1983, 10 manufacturing jobs were created for every 
100 MNC jobs, rising to 13 by 1992 (O’Malley 1995). Figures like this suggest that 
the rapid rise in service employment after  1 9 8 9  i s  i n  n o  s m a l l  p a r t  d u e  t o  t h e  
increase of employment in MNC manufacturing. Ireland is a living example of FDI-
driven development. As a former Taoiseach concluded in a 2000 interview, “I don’t 
call it the Celtic Tiger, I call it the American Tiger’ (Spring interview 2000).  159 
   
infrastructure such as roads and telecommunications improved, 
education policy changed to ensure a steady flow of appropriately 
trained graduates (MacSharry & White 2000, 284), and non-union 
plants if not encouraged, then at least enabled, but little monitoring of 
MNCs actual work practices is done by the Irish state and SP 
partners.85  
The lack of monitoring is demonstrated by facts such as these: it 
was not until December 2000, that delegates from the FDI exporting 
sector met as a group at IBEC. Before this date, IBEC professed to 
know comparatively little about the wage movements of MNCs (Butler 
interview 2000). Recent surveys of MNC plants established in Ireland 
in the 1992-1997 period show that while around two-thirds of the 
parent companies joined an employer association, less than 10% 
actually used employer associations’ services in plant level industrial 
relations (includes issues of pay and conditions) (Gunnigle et al 2001, 
274). In 2000, union officials, politicians and journalists professed to 
know comparatively little about the wage movements of MNCs 
(Merrigan interview 2000; Kane interview 2000; Harbour interview 
2000; Spring interview 2000; McCarthy interview 2000; Sheehan 
interview 2000, O’Donnell interview 2000).  
What we know is limited to anecdotal and wage survey evidence 
and a handful of surveys of employers. The pay evidence in the 
previous chapter suggests that from the beginning of SP in 1987, firms 
within the pharmaceutical sector gave above the norm pay rises.86 
                                                 
85 Including, until very recently, Irish academia. 
86 This group includes companies such as Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, Abbot Ireland 
and Cara Partners.  160 
   
This is congruent with the findings of Sheehan (1996) who found that 
chemical companies who gave higher than average wage increases in 
the decentralized years 1981-1987, did not alter their wage setting 
behavior after 1987. It is also congruent with survey evidence from 
1996/97 that found that US-owned MNCs were more likely than other 
firms to give above national agreement pay rises (Geary & Roche 2001, 
table 2).  
While these companies paid above the norm increases, at various 
times they chose to abide by the centralized agreements. This 
demonstrates a free-riding pragmatism in the MNC approach to SP pay 
agreements where labor supply and demand and the costs of turnover 
plays a major role in firm decisions about pay rises. The aggregate 
wage data suggests that after 2000 the exercise of the choice to 
conform to the agreements was probably rarely made and chemicals 
was a clear pay leader in the private traded sector. This has led the 
General Secretary of the ICTU to state in an address to executive 
Council in April 2002: 
“There is…a high tech largely non-unionized workforce 
employed by multi-nationals which use the wage agreement of 
the PPF and its predecessors as a base on which to build 
competitive salaries in tight labor market conditions. These 
are companies who are free loaders on the benefits of social 
partnership” (Begg 2002).  
The exercise of the choice to conform among assembly 
manufacture exporters was far more likely and is apparent from the 
pay data trends presented in the previous chapter. Firms in this sector 
have low skill requirements compared to firms in the pharmaceuticals 
and chemicals industries. Hence, turnover costs are not as closely  161 
   
regarded when managers make pay rise decisions. On the whole, they 
are better conformers to the pay agreements. The post-1995 data 
demonstrates that within the metals and engineering sector, lower 
skill industries (office machinery and computer manufacture, and 
radio, TV and communication equipment and apparatus manufacture) 
were more able to adhere to the central agreements than industries 
requiring labor with more highly developed skills and training 
(electrical and optical equipment and medical, precision and optical 
instruments). 
A senior IBEC official in 2000 concluded in interview that there is, 
“a long way to go to formal anti-poaching strategies” (Butler interview 
2000) and there is no evidence to suggest any real change that 
warrants a revision of that view. SP has only modified wage behavior in 
MNCs, “to an extent” (Butler interview 2000). A SIPTU union official of 
33 years experience confessed, “central agreements and partnership 
means very little to these [non-union] multinationals” (Naughton 
interview 2000). The Secretary of the Department of the Taoiseach in a 
2000 interview stated that MNCs were, “unaffected by wage 
agreements” (McCarthy interview 2000). Between a ‘small extent,’ ‘very 
little’ and ‘unaffected’ lies the direct effect of the SP wage norms on 
MNC wage setting behavior. These comments reflect the lack of 
coordination of MNC pay, and their exclusion from the coordinated 
system that runs throughout the rest of the economy.87  
                                                 
87 What we do know about the adoption of performance pay and profit-sharing 
supports the conclusion that MNCs set pay in an uncoordinated enclave of the labor 
market. Geary and Roche (2001, table 1) found in a survey of firms conducted in 
1996 and 1997 that US MNCs, controlling for workplace size, occupational profile,  162 
   
But as the General Secretary of the ICTU has pointed out, SP has 
made it easy for MNCs to identify a wage increase norm which can be 
used to construct a competitive pay rate, scale and increase schedule 
in order to recruit and retain labor in a tight labor markets, and their 
pay behavior in slack markets as manifested in aggregate pay data 
suggests that they were the free-riding beneficiaries of union wage 
discipline.88  
While there is no overt behavior on the part of MNCs to betray an 
adherence to the SP agreements, there is clear evidence to suggest that 
the market environment created by the unionized and non-export 
sector has sponsored a mimicking behavior that has led some analysts 
                                                                                                                                              
sector and union recognition status, were more than eight times as likely to have 
profit-sharing and share ownership schemes than non-US firms. 
88 The possible one caveat to this argument is the use of performance-related 
pay (PRP) may be obscuring the real trends in the wage data. PRP would not show up 
in the average nominal hourly earnings data presented in the previous chapter, as 
these exclude irregular bonuses. This data may exclude some kinds of PRP’s, 
especially unannounced bonuses 
Of the direct evidence, we know that in 1995, US firms used PRP throughout 
the plant, from manager to clerk to cleaner, far more than Irish-owned firms and 
that the difference was statistically significant (Turner et al 1997, p. 98). In 1996 and 
1997, MNCs were far more likely than Irish companies to profit-share or use share 
ownership as part of the remuneration package (Geary & Roche 2001, table 1). 
According to the Geary & Roche data, which is based on a far more 
representative sample of 431 firms than the data relied upon by Turner et al (1997), 
21% of MNCs (US-owned 35.6%) had profit-sharing schemes compared to 8% of Irish 
firms. 24.6% of foreign MNCs (37.7% US owned) had share ownership schemes, 
compared to 6.6% of Irish firms. Not surprisingly, given the propensity of chemicals 
firms to pay above-the-norm pay increases and to pay high wages, US MNCs were far 
more likely to pay awards that exceeded SP agreements in the 1991-1996 period, 
than Irish-owned firms, and were far more likely to pay rates higher than others in 
the sector compared to Irish-owned firms (Geary & Roche 2001, tables 1 & 2). 
Profit sharing is an “irregular bonus” (unlike individual or group-related PRPs). 
It is hard to know exactly how much pay is being paid by irregular bonuses, but it is 
difficult to muster an argument that management are using irregular bonuses as a 
primary retention and recruitment mechanism, but rather as “icing on the cake.”  
Additionally, it is difficult to muster an argument that these irregular bonuses alter 
the argument presented here, and in fact, probably strengthen it since the 
widespread adoption of performance pay by MNCs suggests that they are exercising 
a pay determination freedom enabled by their being outside the centralized system.  163 
   
to believe that wage coordination runs throughout the economy (i.e. 
Baccaro & Simoni 2004). Clearly it does not, and cannot. There is little 
or no unionization in the MNC exporting sector, nor are there Japan-
like employer associations or networks coordinating wages. While 
MNCs do not appear ‘affected’ by the wage agreements, they are clearly 
the winners from them. SP for them, is a free-ride created by a system 
designed for them. Its apparent design belies its purpose.  
6.6 The 1970s & Social Partnership compared 
A ready test of the argument advanced above exists in the Irish 
case in the 1970s. Between 1970 and 1978, seven formal National 
Wage Agreements (NWAs) were struck between employers and trade 
unions in the bi-parte body, the Employer-Labour Conference (ELC); 
between 1979 and 1980 another two ‘understandings’ were also 
struck. Initially, the government was only involved as an employer, but 
by the fourth NWA in 1974, government began to informally use talks 
between unions and the government in the formulation of the budget. 
But no formal link between social policy or taxation and pay was made 
in 1974 (Hardiman 1988, 61). This was to informally arrive in the 
1975 budget, which contained revocable subsidies for food, gas, and 
tax incentives conditional upon the re-bargaining of the 1975 
agreement (Hardiman 1988, 62).  
The 1977 agreement was the first NWA that explicitly and formally 
linked budgetary provisions to wage agreements, with tax concessions 
forming the greater part of the government carrot designed to 
encourage wage restraint. A similar agreement was negotiated for 1978 
(Hardiman 1988, 64-70).  164 
   
The National Understandings of 1979 and 1980 saw government 
as a full partner in the central wage setting process, with the wage 
restraint budgetary concessions being in the form of taxation reliefs 
and job creation in the public service (Hardiman 1988, 74). 
By 1980, the centralized process was collapsing. Local above the 
norm bargaining was out of control and government’s commitment to 
budgetary concessions was seen as weak (Hardiman 1988, 77). The 
centralized system of the 1970s collapsed in 1981; a collapse caused 
by craft union emphasis on relativities and above the norm claims, 
public sector pay profligacy, a relentlessly expansionary government 
spending policy, and a lack of side payments in the form of budget 
concessions. 
The striking aspect of pay movements in the 1970s is the degree to 
which the actual movements of industrial earnings mirrored those of 
the public sector. Public wage deals allowed for far higher increases 
than those in industry, and the public sector tended to conform to the 
generous guidelines of the National Wage Agreements. Accommodating 
of union demands is the best way to describe the public sector pay 
deals crafted in the 1970s. ‘Erratic’ is another.  
As a result, industry wage movements far exceeded the far more 
stringent private sector pay deals in the NWAs (see table 6.3). The 
reason was a prevalence of above the norm bargaining fuelled by union 
insistence on maintaining relativities with other groups especially 
those in the public sector. 
The problem caused by the Irish trade union tendency to use 
relativities to frame pay claims, manifested it self in the large pay drift  165 
   
of the 1970s (Hardiman 1988, 71-72, 77, 82). But the failure of the 
centralized system cannot be solely attributed to that. While pay drift 
caused job losses in less productive industries and led to an employer 
revolt in 1981 that prevented the negotiation of a third National 
Understanding, two other factors were critical in the failure of the 
system. 
 
Table 6.3 
Pay indices, industry and public sector, Ireland 1971-79. 
 
   
1971-77 
 
1971-79 
1971 = 100  NWA basic  Actual  NWA basic  Actual 
 
Public Sector 
Clerical Officer 
 
 
220 
 
 
220 
 
 
290 
 
 
325 
Executive Officer  207  216  271  332 
Higher exec. officer  198  207  259  312 
Asst. Secretary  180  184  233  323 
Secretary 179  189  232  340 
 
Industry - Male 
     
High paying industries  142  216  *  370 
Middle paying industries  152  210  *  359 
Low paying industries  163  212  *  363 
 
 
Source: Hardiman 1988, tables 4.1 & 4.2 
Notes: * denotes no data given. 
 
The first is the lack of side-payments to labour to increase their 
real income and to provide incentives for wage claims restraint. The 
first three NWAs contained no references at all to policy: these were bi-
lateral agreements. The 1974 and 1975 NWAs contained a ‘grab bag’ of 
policy proposals, mostly in the form of tax benefits. It wasn’t until the 
1977 NWA that government became a third partner in the centralized 
wage bargaining process, but their side-payments were weak reflecting 
their reluctance to enter the process (Hardiman 1988, 65). The ICTU  166 
   
insisted on a more (upwardly) flexible pay policy in the public sector, 
and tax relief. £50 million of tax relief was forthcoming, and a desire 
for greater public sector pay restraint was abandoned by government 
negotiators Hardiman 1988, 67-68). The 1978 NWA contained similar 
kinds of trade-offs for labour: tax concessions for pay restraint. 
The two national understandings of 1979 and 1980 contained tax 
concessions and commitments from the government for employment 
creation (Hardiman 1988, 75-77). But the ability of employers and 
government to control local above the norm claims was of continuing 
concern. 
While the government came late to central wage bargaining in the 
1970s and began to give incentives to labor to restrain claims in 1977, 
in the context of already high wage expectations, an expanding public 
sector and seemingly uncontrollable public sector pay claims, it was 
no surprise when employers effectively pulled out of the process in 
1981. The tax concession program was ad hoc, and trade unions had 
no reliable information as to the future path of tax reform. In the 
context of an expanding public sector and rapidly rising public 
expenditure, they had little reason to believe that tax concessions and 
tax cuts were going to be delivered, even if they were promised. Hence 
unions adopted a short-term horizon and placed a greater emphasis 
on local above the norm increases. 
The second factor (which impinged on the first) was the growth of 
public sector employment, and wages. This had two effects. First, it 
raised wages in the private sector via relativities claims, and second, it  167 
   
created a competition for skilled labour that provided a further need 
for the private sector to bid up the price of labor.  
The differences between the profligacy of public sector pay and 
employment expansion compared to the frugality of the SP era are 
large and suggest that the argument advanced above is the right one. 
In the 1970s, public sector employment grew by 59%, compared to 
private sector service growth of 18%. Between 1971 and 1981, the 
public sector share of service employment grew from 33%to 40% 
(Hardiman 1988, 37, 38). Between 1975 and 1981, the public service 
bill rose at the rate of 25% per annum (Hardiman 1988, 117) and 
between 1971 and 1979 nominal civil service pay rose between 312% 
and 340% depending on the grade. By way of contrast, in the between 
the longer period of 1988 and 2003, the public sector employment 
share declined (figure 6.1), employment growth from 1988 to 2003 was 
just 25% (table 6.1), and civil service pay rose around 210% (figure 
5.12). 
6.7 The export sector non-coordination thesis 
Ireland represents, in many respects, a new kind of national 
response to growing openness and trade reliance. Many aspects of that 
response are clearly liberal (such as the size and operation of the 
welfare state and the tax regime) and have much in common with 
other like cases, such as New Zealand, Australia and the UK. But 
unlike those cases, Ireland has controlled its non-export sector wage 
movements though centralized agreements and tax cuts, while 
allowing export sector wage movements a great deal of freedom. Part of 
this is no doubt a happy accident, a by-product of Ireland’s voluntarist  168 
   
industrial relations system. But much of it appears to be by design. 
Irish policy-makers and the state have spent a great deal of policy 
effort to control public sector wages. They have done virtually nothing, 
by contrast, to control export sector wages.89 Public expenditure has 
been tightly controlled such that the state spend, in relative terms, has 
declined since 1987. At the same time, the IDA spends a great deal of 
money on job creation and subsidy schemes (see 4.2) that are little 
more than corporate welfare to convince MNCs to locate and stay in 
Ireland.  
The arrangement has been remarkably stable, despite the 
asymmetric divvying of responsibility for wage restraint. However, as 
the economy has boomed and unemployment reduced to a fraction of 
its historic levels, old systems of relativities have re-asserted 
themselves, especially in the public sector. This has spurred new 
efforts to control relativities-driven claims through the benchmarking 
process. But benchmarking in boom times has led to further and 
greater wage increases in the public sector. Public sector wage 
militancy now stands as the largest threat to the future of Social 
Partnership. 
Unemployment has been sufficiently low that low skill jobs such 
as retail have seen large increases in recent years. Export sector wages 
have responded to tightening labor markets and rising wages in the 
domestic and public sectors and are also increasing far more rapidly 
                                                 
89 It should be noted that the IDA was a major lobbyist for control on public 
spending in the mid-1980s, aware that public expenditure was causing high rates of 
inflation, which was deterring investors (MacSharry & White 2000, 210). In this 
regard it reinforced a wide consensus among policy makers and bureaucrats that 
fiscal discipline was a necessity after the 1987 election.  169 
   
than in the late 1980s and early to mid 1990s. In short, industry wage 
data now appears to indicate that the centralized agreements are 
having very little effect on actual wage movements. That stated, a good 
case could be made that if unemployment were to rise again due to a 
downturn in the European and US economies, Irish wage 
centralization would be again extremely effective and may escape the 
curse of prosperity that threatens to undermine the centralized wage 
bargaining regime.   
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Chapter 7 
The context of The Accord: 
Constitution, the tribunal system,  
economy, & trade unions. 
 
In the following two chapters, I present evidence, in the same vein 
as chapters 4 and 5, that is crucial background to the argument 
advanced in the following chapters on the decentralization of 
Australian wage bargaining. The mix of empirical detail I present is 
different from that of chapter 4 and 5, reflecting the different kinds of 
explanations in my two cases. In the Irish case, I focuses on wages, 
since the primary threat to decentralization there is public sector wage 
drift and the re-emergence of old relativities-driven bargaining. In the 
Australian case, public sector wage creep was never an issue. Rather 
the issue was the rigidity of the wage setting system imposed on 
exporters. In this chapter I therefore spend more time on examining 
the institutional mechanisms through which centralized bargaining 
was conducted in Australia, in advance of the argument that it was 
their rigidity and inability to deliver wage flexibility to exporters that 
was the primary cause of the decentralization of Australian wage 
bargaining. 
In this chapter, I also discuss trade trends and the issue of 
protectionism, since the consequences of the opening of the Australian 
economy is an important component in my argument. I also examine 
unionization trends to identify where union density and activity was 
high, and any correlations between export industries and levels of  171 
   
union membership and activity, since a major part of my argument is 
that the activity of trade unions in the export sector compounded the 
flexibility problems for exporters and increased their determination to 
be rid of the centralized system. This data is used in subsequent 
discussion of wage movements and in the causal explanation of wage 
decentralization in later chapters. 
7.1 The constitutional context of Australian wage bargaining 
7.1.1 Major features 
While this dissertation is mainly concerned with explaining 
developments at the federal level in Australia, each state in Australia 
has its own set of industrial relations institutions and mechanisms for 
dealing with pay disputes and coordinating wage bargaining and 
wages. The dominant feature of the Australian system, including at the 
state level, is the presence of quasi-legal bodies designed to hear 
submissions on industrial disputes including pay, and then issue 
rulings. Because these rulings have the status of an administrative 
order, fines for breach are either enforced through civil court 
proceedings or paid because of normative understandings of the 
system and the benefits that flow (absence of strikes, in particular) to 
all parties when it operates smoothly. 
Australia is a federation of six states and two federally controlled 
territories.90 Modelled to a large degree on the US, states are vested 
                                                 
90 While it is not the intention of this study to examine the development of state-
based wage determination institutions in detail, it is important to note that in the era 
of change in Australian industrial relations after 1983, with the exception of Victoria 
and Western Australia, the states have maintained tribunal-based systems, albeit 
while severely limiting the power of the tribunals. Victorian pay determination since 
1996 is decided under federal guidelines, while, since 1993, Western Australia has 
encouraged an employment contract system.   172 
   
with considerable powers of legislation. Federal power is expressly 
vested by the constitution in section 51. With the exception of an 
assumed “national interest” power (used for defense and internal 
security purposes in times of war), powers not explicitly vested are left 
to state jurisdiction. Under section 109 of the constitution, where 
federal and state legislation covers identical subject matter, federal law 
is paramount, and state law is unconstitutional to the extent of the 
inconsistency of the two laws. States may then legislate in areas 
expressly given to the federal government in the absence of federal 
exercise of that power.  
Under the Australian constitution, S51 (35), the federal 
government has the power to make laws with respect to, “the 
conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of 
industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of one state.”91 The 
section has been the principal head of power for industrial relations in 
Australia, although mooted changes to the industrial relations system 
                                                                                                                                             
This is important because the similarities between the states and federal 
systems have meant that experiences in one arena have often colored the 
perceptions of employers and unions of the others. This is particularly true of 
employers. In the Australian context, the similarities of state and federal systems 
has meant that lessons learnt at the state level have the potential to alter how senior 
executives at many companies view the federal system, and vice versa. 
91 The emphasis on arbitration and conciliation in the wording of the section 
reflected the experiences of compulsory arbitration and conciliation in many trades 
in pre-industrial Britain. The 1890 South Australian bill introduced by Governor 
Charles Kingston while never made law, allowed for the creation of quasi-legal bodies 
to take submissions from unions and employer bodies in order to facilitate the 
settlement of industrial disputes. This legislation became the model for the 1894 New 
Zealand Conciliation and Arbitration Act, which provided for compulsory arbitration 
or conciliation in disputes between registered trade unions, employers or employer 
associations. The blueprint also inspired legislation in Western Australia (1900) and 
New South Wales (1901). South Australia, Queensland and Tasmania also adopted 
the quasi-legal court approach.  173 
   
in late-2005 will rely on another head of power, the corporations 
power.92  
In 1904, the Commonwealth parliament passed the Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act. This Act has defined the political arena of federal 
industrial relations ever since and in substantive terms remained 
similar until the passing of the 1993 Industrial Relations Reform Act. 
The 1904 Act allowed for fines for strikes and lockouts during a 
tribunal hearing, and also allowed for collective bargaining via the 
tribunal making, ratification, and enforcement of collective 
agreements. 
Prior to the 1914 decision, Ex Parte Jones (1914) 18 CLR 224, the 
tribunal system was little used because of a restrictive reading of what 
constituted a dispute by the federal courts. That decision, upheld in 
1935 (Metal Trades Employers Association V Amalgamated 
Engineering Union 54 CLR 387), and again in 1997 (AG (QLD) V. 
Riordan 192 CLR 1), defined a dispute as not a suspension of 
industrial relations, but a disagreement, difference or dissidence. A 
trade union could therefore extend a dispute beyond the boundaries of 
one state by serving an identical log of claims on employers in more 
than one state. Trade unions could ‘rope in’ as many employers as 
possible to an award by serving logs in every workplace where they 
                                                 
92 Previously, the corporations power (section 51(20)) has been interpreted in 
such a way as to preclude Commonwealth legislation that attempted to regulate 
industrial relations without reference to the beyond the boundaries of one state 
proviso. However, the High Court in 1995 in Re. Dingjan, (183 CLR 323) signaled 
intent to interpret the corporations power widely. The Commonwealth will not, 
h o w e v e r ,  b e  a b l e  t o  l e g i s l a t e  o n  t h e  industrial relations of unincorporated 
businesses. The Howard government has declared that it will use the coercive power 
of blocking Commonwealth grants to the states in order to force them to cede power 
over all areas of industrial relations to federal jurisdiction.  174 
   
had members, provided that the employers constituted a “community 
of interest” (Re: AMEIU; Ex Parte Aberdeen Co Pty Ltd 1993 176 CLR 
154). In addition, trade unions could initiate a “paper” dispute in one 
state for the purpose of reaching an award agreement in another.93 
Once a dispute has been formed and an appeal for arbitration made 
(nearly always by a trade union), attendance at tribunal proceedings 
by all parties to a dispute is required, hence the term ‘compulsory 
arbitration’. While a claim must be uniform across states and 
employers, the award decisions of the federal tribunal in respect of the 
claim do not have to uniform. Awards can apply to specific states, 
sectors or even employers. 
A major consequence of the constitutional context is that it 
encouraged a wage determination system where trade unions wielded 
considerable power by being able to largely define the industrial 
relations agenda through the creation of paper disputes. This became 
one of the many major thorns in the side of renegade employers in the 
1980s, renegade employers who initiated a major ideological shift in 
thinking about the arbitration.94 
                                                 
93 For instance, a metal trades union may start a dispute in Victoria with 
respect to overtime pay and rosters, when its real aim is to push the federal tribunal 
into making an award decision with respect to a mining employer in Western 
Australia. 
94 Rawson (1978) and Peetz (1998, 26-27) argue that the doubling of trade 
union membership from under 27.9% of the workforce in 1911 to 53% in 1920 was 
largely due to the introduction and expansion of the federal arbitration system. The 
high level of union membership, it remained 50% of full-time employees between 
1919 and 1986 is in large part due to the ability of the AIRC and the old Court to 
preference union members in awards. The roll-back of arbitration in the 1990s has 
coincided with a drop in union membership of full-time workers from 43% (Peetz 
1998, 26) to an around 26% in 2002. Peetz (1998) argues that 2/3rds of the drop in 
membership resulted from legislative changes at the state and federal level that 
enabled non-union members to make similar gains as their union colleagues as well 
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The first cut conclusion on the organizational effects of the 
constitution is that when married to Australia’s peculiar arbitration 
tribunal system, it tended to disperse employer and trade union 
organization because the tribunal system diminished the need for 
unions and employers to seek numerical strength in order to exercise 
industrial power. In addition, the constitutional strictures encouraged 
that industrial disputes and conflicts over remuneration be resolved 
through peculiarly distinctive legal channels. The resort to judicial 
solutions in Australia stands in stark contrast with the voluntarism of 
the Irish industrial relations system. This has tended to make the 
Australian system of wage determination very rigid and wage drift very 
low during periods such as 1975-1981 and 1983-1987 when wage 
movements have been imposed from the center.  
Just as the voluntarist Irish system enabled exporter wage 
flexibility and prevented an employer revolt against the wage 
component of Social Partnership, so the rigidities of the Australian 
legal approach to institutionalized or non-market wage determination 
promoted discontent among exporters.  
7.1.2 Are tribunals independent actors? 
The importance of this issue is two-fold. First, if tribunals are 
independent actors, than it may be argued that perhaps they, and not 
employers or policy-makers were at least partially responsible for the 
decentralization of wage bargaining. Second, it may be the case that 
                                                                                                                                              
federal governments made preference arrangements (closed shops) in awards illegal 
and allowed individual contracts to override awards. New South Wales lead the way 
in 1991, followed by Victoria (1991), Western Australia (1993), South Australia and 
Tasmania (1994), and the Commonwealth (1996).  176 
   
the tribunals are independent in certain circumstances or situations 
and that it is in these circumstances that this independence has an 
effect on export employers or policy-makers that make them more 
likely to prefer decentralized wage bargaining. In this section, I argue 
that the degree of independence of the central tribunal (the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission or AIRC) in National Wage Cases is 
virtually zero during the Accord years. But in individual wage cases 
between an employer or groups of employers and a union or group of 
unions, it is capable of much independence. As such, the AIRC is 
likely to impinge on the process aspect of pay flexibility that exporters 
value. This had the effect of mobilizing exporters against the 
centralized system and the tribunals (discussed in chapter 9). 
Much of the scholarship on the Accord has tended to emphasize 
its break from the past. But the tribunal system by which the Accord 
was enacted did not represent anything new. The principle difference 
between the Accord and the period before the 1970s was that the 
ACTU and the Australian Labor Party government agreed on what the 
submissions to the national wage case would be beforehand, and they 
did so on the basis of policy trade-offs. A central wage bargain was 
struck that was taken to the AIRC for ratification.  
The Accord altered the role of the AIRC in very important ways. 
The AIRC became less of a wages umpire or referee in National Wage 
Cases as it had tended to be before the 1970s, and more of a rubber 
stamp for agreements hammered out by the ALP and the ACTU. This 
was partly due to the broad agreement of union and government 
submissions to the tribunal.   177 
   
Why should the broad agreement matter? In the pre-Accord years 
when government and union submissions differed, the tribunal was 
faced with a choice. Assuming that the tribunal always feared 
legislation that would undermine its power, it should have always been 
concerned not to give a decision that was further away from the 
government’s preferred position than the status quo. Doing so may 
incur the wrath of legislators. This accounts for the majority of 
tribunal decisions bending to the government’s wishes. But history 
shows that the tribunal has not always done this, most noticeably in 
the early 1950s (see section 7.2). Why? Policy makers presumably care 
about winning over the median voter. In a highly unionized country 
the median voter is safely assumed to be a union member. When the 
umbrella union preference (in a highly unionized country such as 
Australia before the 1980s) differs greatly from that of the government, 
the tribunal therefore faces a choice. Knowing that governments care 
about the median voter, it may make a decision such that the status 
quo is shifted further from the government’s preferred position and 
closer to that of the union’s, safe in the knowledge that the 
government’s position will follow in the pursuit of votes. Rather than 
incurring the wrath of the government the adoption of a decision closer 
to the union position will signal the government that it’s policy 
position is too far from that of the median voter, causing the 
government to change policy. 
Once union and government preferences coincide, however, the 
situation changes. Assuming that the median voter is still a union 
member, the tribunal is limited to a set of decisions that are closer to  178 
   
the government and union’s than the status quo.95 Failure to do this 
may incur the wrath of legislators and may lead to legislation that 
curtails tribunal power. This kind of event occurred in 1991 when the 
AIRC rejected the initial claim from employers, the ACTU and the 
government for the sanctioning of enterprise bargaining. Following 
threats by government and a rejection of the decision by all parties the 
AIRC did a legal u-turn and ratified the so-called ‘enterprise 
bargaining principle’ that ushered in the decentralization of Australian 
wage bargaining (Tingle 1994, 294-296; Edwards 1996, 418-422). In 
1993 during negotiations over Accord VII which cemented and 
furthered enterprise bargaining and largely removed bargaining 
outcomes from AIRC review, Keating has been quoted as saying:  
“[T]he IRC will have to do it [ratify Accord VII], because if 
they don’t they have no other role. They’ll have nothing to do. 
If they knock it back, we abolish the…commission” (Edwards 
1996, 491).  
This reflected earlier observations by Keating’s industrial relations 
advisor, John Edwards, that Keating regarded the tribunal as “feeble” 
and stated in a meeting with union leaders following the initial 1991 
rejection of enterprise bargaining that, “the Accord gave it its role” 
(Edwards 1996, 421).  
The tribunal for the period of the Accord cannot therefore be 
regarded as an independent actor with regard to the core National 
                                                 
95 In the case where the median voter is not a union member, then the tribunal 
faces a decision similar to that of the pre-Accord era. However, given the problem of 
ascertaining what the median voter actually is or wants (opinion polls are rarely this 
subtle or precise), tribunals face an information deficit that undermines any attempt 
to accurately judge what the median voter position is. In these circumstances, judges 
even if appointed for life, may be risk averse, preferring to play it safe rather than 
risk change to their institution by legislation.  179 
   
Wage Cases. As the analysis suggests, independence is apparent 
rather than real, and derives from the relative policy positions of 
unions, government and employers. It acted at the behest of others 
and when it did try independence it was sharply rebuffed by 
employers, unions and the government. But when faced with an 
individual wage case, that is, in specific decisions over a workplace or 
series of workplaces, the tribunals during the Accord years, as before 
the Accord, were able and did deliver judgments that failed to satisfy 
both parties. In these cases where the government made no 
submissions, the AIRC could and did exercise some degree of 
independence as is illustrated in chapter 9 in the Robe River case in 
particular. The importance of that independence was that it infringed 
on exporter’s preference to maximize control over the wage-setting 
process. This infringement resulted in a exporter-led employer 
backlash on central wage bargaining and the tribunals system. 
7.2 Wage bargaining until 1983 
The purpose of this section is two-fold. First, it is to establish a 
sense of the continuity in wage determination in Australia before and 
after 1983, so as to establish what was genuinely new about the 
Accord. Hence the analysis of why the arbitration system changed so 
drastically between 1983 and 1996 will be able to sift out what was 
different in the 1980s and 1990s from previous challenges to the 
system. Second, I want to establish how and why employer 
associations changed between 1907 and 1983.   180 
   
7.2.1 1907-1953 
In the Harvester decision of 1907 (2 CAR 1), Justice Higgins of the 
Commonwealth Court of Arbitration and Conciliation (hereafter CCCA) 
in responding to an application for exemption from tariff duties under 
the 1906 Excise Tariff Act, proposed the idea of a ‘fair and reasonable’ 
wage that would be necessary to sustain an, “average employee 
regarded as a human being in a civilized community.” Such an 
employee was regarded as a blue-collar unskilled male with a wife and 
three children. This notion, of a family living wage became the 
cornerstone of Australian wage arbitration until 1969 (Creighton & 
Stewart 2000, 41-42; Hagan 1981, 135).96  
Adjustments to wages tended to occur in two ways through the 
CCCA and the post-Boilermakers case incarnation, the Conciliation 
and Arbitration Commission (hereafter CAC). In the first, a trade union 
logged a claim with the CCCA/CAC to vary an existing award, be it an 
industry, regional or national-based award.97 The second adjustment 
path was through the logging of a basic wage claim by the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions, formed in 1927. This claim extended a basic 
wage rise to all employees, union and non-union alike. These national 
wage cases became the focal point of the Accord after 1983. 
                                                 
96 Ward estimates that the decision in Harvester, which Higgins openly admitted 
was reached with no regard for the employer’s capacity to pay, was to increase the 
minimum pay of all federal award workers by 27% (1977, 49). 
97 Before WW2 the most important award was for Australian Workers Union 
members, a rural industry-based union. After WW2, the primary award was that of 
the Metalworkers Union and its various antecedents. This benchmark award led to 
patterned claims or flow-ons in two ways. First, non-metal workers with metalworker 
union members in their firm, applied for an award increase and re-structure 
patterned after the metalworker award; and, second, other unions benchmarked the 
award in their own log of claims (Sheridan 1989, 154ff).  181 
   
Prior to 1983 the history of these cases reveals a slow backing 
away from Higgin’s needs principles to a basket of principles that 
included consideration of the effect of wage increases on the macro-
economy and the ability of employers to pay. The Depression’s effects 
on employer profits induced the notion of employer capacity to pay in 
the CCCA. In 1930, a railway trade union submission argued its case 
not on the basis of what workers could or could not live on, but what 
effect a reduction in the Basic Wage would have on the national 
economy: the first time macro-economic effects had been used in a 
submission. The ACTU in the same year, in its very first submission to 
the CCCA as the nation’s peak trade union association, argued that a 
wage decrease would stifle consumption, demand and production, 
leading to further unemployment, and proposed that an expansionary 
monetary policy be adopted by the Commonwealth Bank in order to lift 
the restriction on credit (Hagan 1981, 136-137). 
While the CCA rejected the ACTU’s proposals and imposed a 10% 
reduction on all wages, the consideration of the macro-economic 
repercussions of wage determination became the norm in submissions 
from unions, employers and the federal government. This was an 
important development.  
The Australian Labor Government of Ben Chifley (1945-1949) did 
little to alter the trend of CCCA decisions. Its one innovation was to 
allow the court to make preference arrangements for trade unionists 
(closed shops). In retrospect, this was significant for two reasons. 
First, the metals trades were highly unionized (engineering, sheet 
metal, and boilermaker unions dominating) and were able, in  182 
   
Australia’s high tariff environment, to extract above basic wage awards 
(known as margin case awards) than any other union in any other 
sector. As Sheridan (1992, 12) observed of wage bargaining in the 
1950s, “a [metal trades] margins increase now had virtually the same 
national wage-cost as a basic wage alteration.”  
Second, preference arrangements survived the industrial upheaval 
of the late-1960s and early 1970’s. Unusual by OECD standards, 
many industries, notably in the mining and construction industries, 
on the waterfront and in many areas of transportation and public 
sector professions (nurses, teachers), remained virtual closed shops 
into the late 1980’s. Based on the 1990 Australian Workplace 
Industrial Relations (AWIRS) Survey, Peetz (1998, 88) estimates that in 
1976 around 34% of all employees worked in a closed shop, with the 
figure declining about 1% per year until 1996, when preference 
arrangements were made illegal by the 1996 Workplace Reform Act. 
This was a major contributor to anti-union attitudes among business 
and the exporter-dominated Business Council of Australia in the 
1980s and 1990s. 
7.2.2 1953-1966 
The thirty-year era of automatic basic wage increases based on the 
CPI ended with the 1953 national wage case. In its place, annual 
reviews of wages took place. The decision was a major victory for 
employers. The Metal Trade Journal referred to the quarterly 
adjustments as the “fundamental fault” in the economy (Hagan 1981, 
218). Of particular consequence for the organization of employers was 
the clarification by the court on the ability to pay principle:  183 
   
“The evidence of individual employers is not really helpful. 
We now specifically intimate that it is the to the total 
industry…we will regard in assessing…a foundation wage.” (77 
CAR, 509). 
This and the success of the ACTU in its annual claims, claims put 
to the court by the recent Oxford University graduate, ACTU Research 
Officer Robert J Hawke, led to the creation of the National Employers 
Association (NEA) in 1959 in order to better coordinate employer 
submissions to the tribunal. 
The period between 1953 and 1966 is significant because for the 
first time employers organized to counteract union power; specifically 
the power of the various metal unions (especially the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union (AEU), and the ACTU. The end of automatic wage 
indexation in 1953 had lead to a new emphasis on collective 
bargaining by metal unions in particular. This maturation in sections 
of Australian unionism provoked a predictable countervailing 
organizational effort on the part of metal employers through the 
formation of the Metal Trades Industry Association (MTIA).  
7.2.3 1966-1972 
The period between 1966 and 1972 produced further employer 
amalgamations. Again the stimulus was the growing stature within the 
arbitration process of the ACTU, the growing moves for amalgamation 
between the AEU and other metal unions, the fallout from decisions 
made by the AIRC, and finally, the 1971 decision by the MTIA to hold 
secret negotiations with the AEU on over-award payments. 
That secret negotiation decision by the MTIA came after a 
tumultuous four-year period in the metal and allied trades. Between 
1966 and 1973, the value of Australia’s mineral exports tripled.  184 
   
Unemployment ran under 2% of registered men and women over 18 
seeking jobs. The 1967 Metal Trades Work Value Case decision 
recommended large pay increases, but curiously also recommended 
that these payments be partially or wholly absorbed into existing over-
award payments already granted by the AIRC. In response to the series 
of strikes in the first two months of 1968 by unions attempting to 
avoid the award being absorbed into previous gains, including one 
stoppage that affected 320 metal and engineering works on February 
6, the Metal Trades Employer Association invoked the Metal Trades 
wage agreement clause that banned industrial action over matters 
decided by the AIRC; a clause that dated back to a 1950 CCA decision. 
The penal fines soon mounted, and after a two-month campaign, the 
Commission overturned its own decision. Further industrial unrest 
followed. In May 1969, the Victorian Secretary of the Australian 
Tramways and Omnibus Employees Federation, Clarrie O’Shea, was 
gaoled for contempt in proceedings related to the recovery of fines for 
stoppages banned under the 1967 Work Value case (Hagan 1981, 268-
270).  
Within days, over one million workers struck around Australia in 
the largest industrial protest since the Great Depression. The 
difference between the original intentions of arbitration in Governor 
Kingston’s 1890 bill in South Australia, and the situation 80 years 
later illustrates the growing problems of arbitration, Australian-style.  185 
   
Where once it was designed to avoid industrial dispute, the system 
now appeared to sanction and promote them.98 
7.2.4 1972-1983 
Gough Whitlam concluded on his ill-fated government (1972-1975) 
that the, “chief economic failure of my Government resulted from the 
wage explosion in 1974” (1985, 198). Whitlam traced that explosion to 
the failure of his parliamentary party to persuade the ACTU to accept 
an increase in the social wage - education, health and infrastructure 
spending - in exchange for wage restraint. The ACTU attempted to 
continue its wage claims strategy aimed at maximizing pay via the 
AIRC. This resulted in an average yearly increase of full-time worker 
pay of 19.9% between 1972 and 1975, with 1974 seeing a massive 
28% increase (Teicher 1987, 13).  
The AIRC became a forum for leapfrogging claims, sparked by the 
May 1974 GM and Vehicle Builders Employees Federation deal. In the 
months that followed, waterside workers, restaurant employees, 
transport and oil workers all went to the Commission and received 
lump sum pay rises. The NSW President of the Chamber of 
Manufactures complained that pace-setting wages in the public sector 
were making it impossible for employers to resist union demands 
(Whitlam 1985, 200, 201). The coordination of the arbitration system 
had completely fragmented. Whereas in the 1969-70 fiscal year an 
                                                 
98 In the first three years of the 1970s, strike days lost rose above 2 million in 
1970, to over three million in 1971. Average weekly earnings rose 29.7% between 
October 1969 and October 1972, while CPI in the six capital cities rose 19% (Hagan 
1981, 229). The incidence of strikes rose from an average of 1 400 per year between 
1965 and 1967, to 1 713 in 1968, to 2 014 in 1969, and to 2 738 in 1971. Strike 
numbers stayed around this level until 1976 (Whitlam 1985, 199).  186 
   
estimated 52.6% of wage increase came via National Wage cases, the 
number dropped to 37.7% for 1972-73, 19.1% for 1973-74 and 21.2% 
for 1974-75 (ABS, cat. 6311.0). 
In an attempt to curb the runaway wage increases in all sectors of 
the economy, both the ALP and the ACTU called for a return to the 
pre-1953 days of wage indexation (Hagan 1981, 358-359).99 The 
Commission did so in the May 1975 National Wage case. Indexation 
remained in place until July 1981.100  
During the six-year period of wage indexation, employer and 
Fraser government submissions to the Commission routinely asked for 
zero percent wage increases while the ACTU supported CPI increases 
(Dabscheck 1989, 32). The Commission tended to split the difference, 
offering near full indexation increases on most occasions. In addition, 
the 1975 case opened up the possibility of productivity claims. The 
operation of these followed an old pattern. In 1978, waterside workers 
received an $8 per week “work value” increase. By April 1981, 80% of 
the workforce had received a similar increase. The flow-on of extra 
claims, long a feature of Australia’s “comparative wage justice” tactic 
by the ACTU, was in full effect (Dabscheck 1989, 29). The result was 
an astonishingly high level of central wage coordination. Wage 
indexation increases accounted for 98% of the change in the male total 
                                                 
99 6% in 1972-73, 12.9% in 1973-74, and 16.7% in 1974-75 (Reserve Bank of 
Australia 1997, Table 5.7b). 
100 The breakdown of centralized bargaining in Australia in 1973 had 
predictable effects on employer organization. By December 1977, two dominant 
groups with the loose-knit NEA, the ACMSA and the ACEF formed the Confederation 
of Australian Employers (CAI). The new group was a direct result of the chaotic wage 
days of the Whitlam government.  187 
   
wage in 1978. The lowest contribution for the period was 81% in 1980. 
Women’s wages were similarly coordinated (ABS, cat. 6311.0). 
Wage indexation was abandoned in 1981 on the back of a 
commodity price boom. Exporters and export servicers --mining, rural 
and transport employers -- could afford to pay more than the CPI.101 
The result was a wages breakout. Metal unions pushed for a 35-hour 
week, and special claims abounded in early 1981. While nowhere near 
the 28% average earning increase of 1974, 1980-81, 1981-82 and 
1982-83 saw average earning increases of 13.4%, 13.5% and 12.9% 
respectively (RBA 1997, Table 4.17). The end of the Fraser government 
echoed the chaos of the Whitlam years. In December the Commission 
in response to employer and government submissions introduced a 
six-month wage freeze. By then the Fraser government was finished. In 
March 1983, the ALP lead by ex-ACTU leader Bob Hawke, and 
Treasurer Paul Keating took office in a landslide victory. 
7.3 Declining union density  
In 1982, just prior to the coming to power of the ALP government 
and the advent of the Accord, union density among employees was a 
healthy 49%. When Labor left office 13 years later, union density stood 
at 31% (see table 7.1). All industries saw a decline in union density, 
but the decline was especially marked in mining (down 25 percentage 
points), construction (down 20 percentage points), transport and 
storage (down 24 percentage points), and communication services 
(down 23 percentage points). Union decline after 1990 was especially 
                                                 
101 The average price for Australian coal on the world market increased US$7 
per tonne in 1980. Bauxite prices increased by one-third between 1978 and 1980, 
and iron ore increased over 50%. Beef prices also increased dramatically.  188 
   
steep and coincided with the move to enterprise bargaining and the 
ending of union preference and bargaining preference arrangements in 
many workplaces that created closed shops throughout the 
economy.102  
The number of workplaces with union members dropped in the 
early 1990s. For instance, the number of unionized mining workplaces 
declined from 77% to 58% of the industry total. Other industries with 
large gains in the percentage of workplaces without union members 
between 1990 and 1995 include wholesale trade (24% to 60%), finance 
and insurance (7% to 21%), construction (5% to 20%), transport & 
storage (4% to 14%). The numbers of non-union establishments in 
manufacturing increase by 10% from 18% to 28% between 1990 and 
1995. Almost 100% of public sector workplaces had union members in 
both surveys (Morehead et al 1997, table A7.1a). 
The mere presence of union members in a workplace is but half of 
the issue. The other is the presence of union delegates who can place 
pressure on and bargain with management over pay. According to 
                                                 
102 Best estimates are that in 1990, 54% of union members were in these closed 
shops. By 1996, the figure was around 25% (Peetz 1998, 86). Within the firms who 
were members of the Business Council of Australia (comprising most of Australia’s 
largest firms), in 1988 82% of workplaces were closed shops. By 1992, the figure had 
dropped to 74%. Between 1976 and 1988, the proportion of employees in 
compulsorily unionized jobs fell from an estimated 34% to 23%. By 1990, the figure 
was 21% and by 1995, just 11% (Peetz 1998, 87). 
Peetz estimates that the demise of closed shops accounted for 1.1% percentage 
point per annum drop in union density between 1990 and 1995 and 0.6% per 
annum between 1976 and 1990). In the 1990-1995 period, five of the six states 
enacted legislation that banned closed shops: NSW in 1981, Victoria in March 1993, 
Western Australia in December 1993, Tasmania in 1994, and South Australia in 
August 1994 (Peetz 1998, 99). The Commonwealth banned closed shops in 1996. 
The shift of employment from public to the private sector created by privatization in 
the central government accounted for another 0.2% per annum drop between 1990 
and 1995 (1998, 150). Structural change and the demise of the closed shop are 
therefore the cause of union decline in the first half of the 1990s.  189 
   
1990 data from the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 
(AWIRS), 92% of unionized mining workplaces had at least one 
delegate.103 In total, 66% of unionized Australian workplaces had a 
union delegate in 1990.104 
 
Table 7.1 
Trade union density by industry, Australia, 1982-1996. 
 
  
1982 
 
1988 
 
1990 
 
1996 
 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing & hunting 
 
20 
 
13 
  
- Agriculture, forestry & fishing      13  7 
Mining  64 63 63 39 
Manufacturing  54 48 46 39 
Electricity, gas & water  78  80  80  65 
Construction  50 47 45 30 
Wholesale & retail trade  28  23     
 - Wholesale trade      19  15 
 - Retail trade      25  23 
Transport & storage  72  62  58  48 
Communication  services  85 76 75 62 
Finance, property & business services  42  28     
- Finance & insurance      44  34 
- Property & business services      21  11 
Public administration & defence  63  61  60  47 
Community services  54  49     
- Education      58  50 
- Health & community services      41  34 
Recreation, personal & other services  36  26     
- Cultural & recreational services      37  23 
- Personal & other services      37  29 
 
Total 
 
49 
 
42 
 
41 
 
31 
 
 
Source: ABS 6325.0 (1989; 1997) 
Notes: Density is percentage of all employees. Industries were re-classified in the 1990s and this is 
responsible for the break in some of the data series. 
 
                                                 
103 Electricity, gas and water (82%), transport and storage (83%), 
communication services (81%) and public administration and defence (76%) were the 
other industries where over ¾s of workplaces had delegates (Callus et al 1991, table 
5.1). 
104 In 1995, that figure was 70%, due to the overall drop in unionized 
workplaces from 80 to 74%. The number of workplaces with unions and delegates 
remained more or less steady, decreasing just one percent from 53 to 52% of all 
workplaces. Mining delegate density in unionized workplaces dropped however, to 
77%, and from 71% to 45% of all workplaces (Morehead et al 1997, table A7.1a).  190 
   
Mining is one of the more unionized industries in the 1990s, but 
what stands out is the high presence of union delegates in mining 
workplaces. AWIRS data suggests that mining workplaces had many 
more delegates per workplace than any other sector, and that those 
delegates had more years experience, on average, than those in other 
industries. Delegates in mining were far more likely to talk to 
management about IR issues more than once a week than in any other 
industry. In the management survey of the 1990 AWIRS, 57% of 
workplaces in mining had discussions and meetings between delegates 
and management at least once a week. In 1995, the figure was 48%. 
This compared to figures of 24% (1990) and 19% (1995) for all 
workplaces105 In 1995, 54% of workplace mangers in mining reported 
that pay issues were frequently raised by delegates-a higher 
percentage than any other industry (Morehead et al (1997), tables 
A8.1a, A8.1b,.A8.3, A8.10a, A8.10b, A8.11). 
The conclusion we can draw from this data that is relevant for the 
causal argument advanced in this dissertation is that in the first half 
of the 1990s and presumably before, unionism in mining workplaces, 
the major export industry in Australia in the 1980s and 1990s, was 
comparatively healthy from a membership perspective, and very active, 
if the delegate data is any indication.  
                                                 
105 Other industries with similarly high rates of contact between delegates and 
management include transport and storage (1990, 47%; 1995, 30%), construction 
(30%, 20%), wholesale trade (22%, 27%) and communication services (25%, 29%).  191 
   
7.4 The economic context of the Accord 
7.4.1 Declining protectionism 
It is no exaggeration to say that in Australia between the late 
1940s and 1972, some form of protection covered every aspect of 
production. No uniform measure of tariff levels across all industries 
are available for Australia before 1968, but figure 7.1 shows that in 
the late 1960s, the average tariff and other forms of direct assistance 
such as price subsidies, and interest rate and taxation rebates for all 
traded industries and services was 24%.106 
The sector that tended to be excluded from direct assistance was 
the mining sector. In 1951, coal accounted for just 0.1% of Australian 
exports in dollar terms. By the mid-1980s, coal accounted for 16% of 
exports. Iron ore was not exported in any critical quantities until the 
late 1960s. Bauxite production remained equally low until the mid 
1970s. But the coal and iron ore mining industry benefited for the 
government’s encouragement of the steel industry in particular, which 
fed the down stream production by protected sectors, especially white 
goods and motor vehicles (Bulbeck 1983, 222). 
Foreign capital before the 1970s tended to concentrate in the 
domestic manufacturing industries in order to overcome the tariff wall. 
                                                 
106 This figure, although useful in showing how assistance declined in the mid 
1970s and again after the Hawke government came to power, tends to obscure the 
extremely high rates of assistance in some industries. In the late 1960s, the effective 
protection level (which included indirect barriers to trade, including health and 
safety and product regulation) of textiles was 43%, clothing and footwear, 97%, and 
motor vehicles, 50%. At this time, the manufacturing average was 36%. By 1981, the 
effective protection on motor vehicles had risen to 124%, and clothing and footwear 
enjoyed a 204% protection level. Australian consumers were paying three times their 
neighbors for clothes and footwear, and over twice for motor vehicles (Anderson & 
Garnaut 1987, 163).  192 
   
Exact data before 1962 is unavailable, but between 1962 and 1972, 
the foreign control of domestic manufacture in terms of output value 
increased from 24 to 34% (Bulbeck 1983, 222-223).107  The 1970s saw 
a change in the target of foreign capital. The Vernon report in 1965-66 
questioned the economic soundness of the tariff, and recommended it 
be lowered over time. The reduction of tariffs by 25% introduced by the 
Whitlam government in the mid-1970s heralded a shift in 
international capital resources from manufacturing to the mining 
sector. The beneficiaries of Australia’s tariffs changed. International 
capital moved to mining, while domestic capital stayed in the high 
tariff zones such as footwear, clothing and textiles. Motor vehicles 
remained the one area of foreign control and 1950s-type tariff 
protection (Bulbeck 1983, 223).  
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Figure 7.1: Effective & nominal rates of trade protection, 
Australia, 1969-1994 
Source: RBA (1997), table 1.14a. 
                                                 
107 Foreign capital was also critical in the rise of the Australian services sector. 
By the early 1980s, MNCs controlled 45% of insurance, 19% of life insurance, 41% of 
finance and 51% of Australia’s advertising revenue (Bulbeck 1983, 222-223).  193 
   
The Hawke and Keating governments, after the status quo years of 
the Fraser Government (1975-1983), recommitted Australia to a free 
trade strategy in the context of a balance of payments crisis. In 
conjunction with industry plans (most successfully executed in motor 
vehicles, steel and textiles, clothing and footwear) which included 
bounties, training schemes, R & D grants and export development 
programs108, the Hawke government moved to cut tariffs and import 
quotas. The aim was to increase the percentage of consumer goods 
that were exported, estimated to be 14% in 1984. Australia was the 
only advanced capitalist country not to see this share increase since 
the 1950s (Capling & Galligan 1992, 133, 141).  
Following the 1986 monetary and balance of payments crisis, the 
Hawke government capitalized on the depreciating dollar to cut tariffs 
uniformly to 15% if over 15% in 1988, and to 10% if between 10 and 
15%. The aim was to reduce the average tariff protection from 19 to 
14% by 1992/3. This was followed by a March 1991 announcement 
that tariffs were to be cut to 5% by 1996 (Capling & Galligan 1992, 
151, 157).  
The move to free trade by the ALP governments originated from 
policy-maker interpretation and diagnosis of the balance of payments 
and debt, and exchange problems faced by Australia in the mid-1980s. 
It provided a vital stimulus to policy makers to decentralize wage 
bargaining, which was regarded as a corollary of free-trade and 
necessary to promote competitiveness and economic and job growth. 
                                                 
108 In 1987, Australia was the largest spender per export dollar on export 
promotion of all the advanced capitalist countries (Capling & Galligan 1992, 142).  194 
   
The wage policy reaction of the move to free-trade policies and the 
adoption of competitiveness are re-visited in chapter 10. 
7.4.2 Increasing trade 
The protection of the Australian economy is demonstrated by 
Australia’s relatively low exposure to the world economy. In the 1980s, 
exports averaged 15.4% of GDP, and imports averaged 17.6% of GDP. 
However declining tariffs and quotas have spurred both imports and 
exports. Exports grew from 13.4% to 19.8%% of GDP between 1970 
and 1996, while imports grew from 13.8% to 19.5% of GDP. In the 
1980s, the Euro zone average exposure to trade was far higher. 
Exports, on average, accounted for 27.7% of GDP, imports 27.6%. 
Exposure to trade also grew at a faster rate between 1970 and 1996, 
with exports increasing from 205% to 29.7% of GDP, imports 20.4% to 
27.6% (OECD 2001, tables 6.11, 6.12). 
Australian exports have relied upon primary industries. In the 
immediate post-WW2 period, rural primary commodities comprised 
almost 90% of Australia’s exports in dollar terms. By the mid-1990s, 
primary rural commodities accounted of less than 30%. This massive 
change in the export share of commodities such as chilled meat, wool 
and grains was due to a stalling of growth in the volume of farm 
exports and the rapid growth of mining and manufactures exports 
from the 1970s onwards. By the mid-1990s manufactured goods 
accounted for almost 30% of all exports in dollar terms in the mid 
1990s. Mining emerged in the 1970s as a significant contributor to 
exports, reaching its zenith in the mid-1980s when the sector  195 
   
accounted for around 30% of export revenue, with metal products 
contributing an additional 8% (see figure 7.2).  
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Figure 7.2: Export shares, Australia 1950-1997. 
Source: derived from ABARE (2004), table 3.  196 
   
The Accord therefore coincided with the height of the mining 
sector’s contribution to export revenue. Revenue to Australian firms 
from the resource sector rose by over 5000 million dollars per quarter, 
compared to an increase for manufactured goods of around 4200 
million dollars per quarter. Most of this growth was due to the 
expansion of coal and gold exports (see figure 7.3). In a period of a gain 
in the share of manufacture exports, in absolute terms export growth 
in the resource or mining sector was greater due to the growth of coal 
and gold exports (see figure 7.4). 
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Figure 7.3: Mining commodity exports, Australia, 1988-1996 
Source: ABS, 5368.0 (various years).  197 
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Figure 7.4: Exports by value, Australia, 1983-1996 
Source: ABS catalogue 5302.0 (time series, electronic delivery) 
 
7.4.3 Debt & the balance of payments. 
The most persistent and problematic macro-economic problem 
faced by Australia since the 1970s has been its poor record on balance 
of payments and the corresponding mounting debt bill. Australia 
imports far more than it exports, and beginning in the 1970s this has 
led to an endemic and worsening balance of payments problem (see 
figure 7.6).109 Since 1977-78, the current account deficit as a 
percentage of GDP has only dipped under 2% in one year (1979-80). 
Since 1960-61, the current account has only been in surplus in one 
year (1972-73). Since 1980-81, the deficit has averaged 4.5% of GDP 
(ABARE 2004, table 10).  
                                                 
109 Australia’s poor balance of payments record is reflected in national savings 
data, which shows that in the 1980s, net saving averaged 4.7% of GDP compared to 
the OECD average of 8.6% (OECD 2001, table 6.15).   198 
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Figure 7.5: Current & capital account, Australia, 1970-1996 
Source: ABS, 5302.0 (time series electronic delivery). 
This, in turn, increased the national debt and interest re-
payments on the debt (see figure 7.7). While some countries have had 
episodes of negative current account deficits (in some cases quite 
severe, for instance in Ireland between 1976 and 1986, and Norway 
1974-1978 and 1986-1988), Australian balance of payments has been 
persistently negative and steadily worsening since the early 1970s 
(Argy 1992, 119). By the 1990s interest payments constituted around 
2.5% of GDP. Between 1980 and 1990, net debt as a percentage of 
GNP increased from 6% to 34% (Argy 1992, 224). Interest payments on 
debt increased from 6.7% of the value of exports (free on board) to 
20.6% between 1981/2 and 1989/90 (Reserve Bank data in Kearney 
1997, table 5.5). Viewed from a comparative OECD basis, Australian 
debt and the amount of income payable overseas in the 1970s and 
1980s were high. In the 1990s only Mexico, Turkey, Poland, the Czech  199 
   
Republic, Hungary and Iceland had comparable or worse records of 
debt as a percentage of GDP in the OECD (OCED 2001, table 6.14).  
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Figure 7.6: Debt servicing, Australia, 1989-1996. 
Source: based on RBA (2005), table H07, from ABS data 
 
7.4.4 Mining contribution to the balance of payments 
The primary importance of debt and the balance of payments in 
labor market policy adjustments is discussed in chapter 10. It is 
sufficient to say here, that given the reliance of Australia on primary 
commodity exports, and the necessity to correct the chronic balance of 
payments problem, it is no surprise that mining and agribusiness 
firms were powerful influence on labor market policy in Australia in 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics 
(ABARE) data on the contribution of the resource sector to 
merchandise trade on a balance of payments basis shows that in the 
1980s farm and resources revenues on annual average comprised 
72.5% of Australia’s merchandise exports on a balance of payments 
basis (mining 47.1%, farm 25.4%). In the 1990s, the annual average  200 
   
was 73.2%. In 1969/70 mining accounted for 31.7% of exports on a 
balance of payments basis, growing reasonably steadily to a high of 
53.3% in 1990-91. Farming revenues have declined since 1960-61 
from 74.3% to 43% in 1980-81. The drought of the early 1980s meant 
that many producers dropped out of the market and the significance of 
farming has declined somewhat, so that by the end of the 1990s, 
revenues accounted for around 25% of exports on a balance of 
payments basis (ABARE 2004, table 5). 
On a total trade basis (including internationally traded services), 
in the 1980s the resource sector averaged 38.7% of exports on a 
balance of payments basis, and in the 1990s, 36.7% (ABARE 2004, 
table 6). 
7.5 Structure of the mining industry 
With the exception of gold mining, the resources sector is 
dominated by a few large firms operating very large mining operations. 
In terms of capital intensity and size of the workplace workforce this is 
a group of the largest workplaces in Australia. For instance, the 22 
iron ore mines in Australia in 1995-96 responsible for around 4.2% or 
ARL$250 million in exports employed on average 294 employees per 
mine or around 6500 in total. The 172 coal mines responsible for 10% 
of Australian exports in 1995/6 or around ARL$650 million in exports, 
employed an average of 148 people per mine or around 25 500 in total 
(figure 7.4; ABS 1996, tables 8.5, 12.1). In 1995, the average size of 
the mining workplace (140) was larger than any other industry save 
government administration (179) and health and community services 
(164) (Morehead et al 1997 table 3.2).   201 
   
At the top end of the mining sector are a few very large firms 
operating huge mines. The 12 largest managerial units of the 376 in 
operation in 1995-96 employed 30% of the employees, accrued 39% of 
the turnover, 42% of the total value-added and were responsible for 
39% of fixed capital expenditure (ABS 8415.0 (1996), table 2.1). The 
seven largest mines in Australia, all with over 1000 employees, 
employed 24% of all mining employees, paid 25% of the wage and 
salary bill, accrued 14% of the turnover and 10% of value-added, and 
invested 10% of the industry total of fixed capital expenditure (ABS 
8415.0 (1996), table 2.3. 
In the iron ore mining industry the concentration is even more 
pronounced. The top four iron ore mining managerial units in terms of 
employees (being a corporation or a discrete sub-division of a 
corporation) ran seven mines that employed 94% of the iron ore 
mining workforce, accrued 87% of the sub-industry’s total turnover 
and 84% of the value-added, and made 94% of the fixed capital 
investment. If we make the reasonable assumption that 100% of the 
production of these mines is for export, the seven largest iron ore 
mines contributed around 3 ½ to 4% of Australia’s exports in the mid-
1990s, and contributed around 11% of world production in iron ore 
(own calculations based on ABS 8415.0 (1996), table 13.1). 
Correspondingly, in the coal industry, the four largest managerial 
units operated 16 mines, turned over 31% of the industry’s revenue 
and were responsible for around 3% of Australia’s exports (ABS 8415.0 
(1996), table 2.6).  202 
   
It is easy to see that the closure of, or loss of production in any of 
these massive mines represents a real threat to the health of 
Australia’s balance of payments. Given the size of the group, the 
resources available to the members, and the group’s economic 
contribution, the influence of this handful of firms on labor market 
policy should be considerable.  
7.6 Summary of the main points 
The major points to be taken from this chapter and used in the 
ones to follow are: 
The tribunal system 
•  Wage bargaining in Australia is structured by two sets of 
arbitration institutions: one set of tribunals at the state level, another 
at the federal or Commonwealth level. There is an institutional 
continuity between the pre-Accord and Accord periods: that of the 
tribunal system 
•  The tribunal system has meant that unions have not been forced 
to amalgamate and build size in order to wield considerable power over 
industrial relations in any one firm or industry. Compulsory 
arbitration has meant that unions in Australia have tended to be small 
in size and great in number. The result has been that it is usual that 
workplaces have many trade unions covering the workforce.  
• The independence of the arbitration system on any particular 
issue in any particular workplace case may be somewhat significant. 
But the tendency of the tribunals to follow government policy, 
especially on significant issues such as in national wage cases in most 
instances can be explained by the anticipation by tribunal judges of  203 
   
the possibility of corrective action in the form of legislation should any 
decision stray to far from the preferred position of the government. 
• The great difference between the pre-Accord and Accord eras is 
the degree to which union and government submissions before the 
federal tribunal have agreed. This has meant that the federal tribunal 
has become much more of a ‘rubber stamp’ for national wage 
negotiations than in the pre-Accord era. 
• In contrast to the Irish system, the Australian wage bargaining 
system is based around legal wage disputation settlement institutions. 
Tribunal decisions that have legal authority confer rights and 
bargaining power. The system is quite formal and rigid in comparison 
with the Irish system and gives trade unions power of bargaining 
outcomes that they would not enjoy in a voluntarist system. 
Trade 
• While the Whitlam government cut tariffs dramatically in 1973-
4, the Hawke/Keating government has been instrumental in the move 
to an open economy model of economic growth. During the ALP 
governments of 1983-1996, nominal and effective protection rates were 
halved. 
• Australia has a very low exposure to the world economy in 
comparative terms, but total trade as a percentage of GDP rose by over 
one-third between 1970 and 1996. 
• Primary industries are the backbone of Australian exports. In 
the mid-1980s, mining commodities accounted for around one-third 
and rural production another one-third of total export revenue. 
Manufacturing export share has grown since 1970, however, from 16%  204 
   
to 29%. The share of export revenue from mining peaked during the 
Accord. 
• Coal and gold were the two fastest growing and most significant 
contributors to mining export revenue in the 1980s. 
Debt & balance of payments 
• Australia’s largest and most persistent macro-economic 
problems have been and are debt and continuing balance of payment 
deficits. These are both very high by OECD standards. Australia 
imports far more than it exports, and spends more than it saves. Debt 
re-payments fluctuated between 3 and 4% for most of the Accord 
years. About three-quarters of this were loan interest payments. 
Australian balance of payments has steadily worsened from 1980 and 
the record is among the worst in the OECD. 
• The mining industry, which has a very large influence on the 
balance of payments, is massively concentrated. The largest 12 mines 
employed 30% of employees, accrued 39% of turnover and 42% of the 
total value-added in 1995-96. Companies owning and running these 
mines should have a significant influence over policies the government 
deems to be important to improving Australia’s trade position. 
Trade unions 
•   Union density declined significantly since 1982 from around 
49% of all employees to 31% in 1996. This was due to an increase in 
the share of non-union workplaces, and the abolition of preference 
arrangements (closed shops). Mining is one of the most unionized 
industries in the 1980s and, if the number of union delegates per  205 
   
workplace is any indication, had a very active presence within the 
mines and in pay negotiations.  
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Chapter 8 
Australian pay, 1983-1996. 
 
8.1 Overview of the chapter 
The purpose of this chapter is to first, introduce an outline of the 
Accord agreements so that the reader gains a quick understanding of 
the three distinct periods: centralized (1983-1987), the so-called ‘two-
tier’ period (1987-1991) and the enterprise bargaining or decentralized 
period (1991-). Second, I outline the subsequent pay outcomes in the 
export and traded, local or ‘indigenous’, and public sectors, examining 
real pay increases. For the sake of completeness I examine all 
industries in order to briefly check whether public sector wages were 
increasing more quickly than elsewhere in the economy. A third task 
of this chapter is a comparison of the nominal pay data for the 
dominant export sector (mining) in comparison to a selection of other 
industries (manufacturing, government and administration, business 
and financial services, retail and wholesale) in order to show, in 
contrast to the relative chaotic trend of Irish export pay, the relative 
conformity of export pay trends with the rest of the economy under the 
Accord. This serves to illustrate the lack of pay flexibility afforded 
exporters that was the primary cause of the decentralization of wage 
bargaining during the latter Accord years. 
To summarize the findings of the second part of this chapter, I find 
evidence that the centralized years of wage bargaining in the Accord 
were characterized by public and sheltered sector wage restraint. It 
was not until pay was decentralized that public sector pay was  
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substantially increased in real terms. Sheltered sector pay, especially 
in utilities, substantially increased in relative terms in the enterprise 
era. This leads to the conclusion that the centralized years of the 
Accord suppressed public sector wage drift pressures. This road to 
decentralized wage bargaining must be ruled out.  
In the export-heavy sectors (mining, manufacturing, traded 
services) the record on pay during the centralized years is mixed, with 
the services experiencing real wage growth perhaps associated with 
technological and occupational changes, while mining and 
manufacturing saw real wage stability. It was not until wage setting 
was decentralized after 1991 that there is striking evidence of 
increasing relative and absolute pay in mining suggesting that pay 
pressures were perhaps suppressed by the centralized era (acirrt 1999, 
76).  
This is a counter-intuitive finding, given that mining companies 
were at the forefront of employer efforts to decentralize wage 
bargaining. However, this data must be read with several things in 
mind. First, the recovery in mineral and coal commodity markets in 
the 1990s and especially the 2000s eased the employer push to 
minimize wage bills even as decentralized bargaining was won. 
Second, the general anti-union push in mining from employers after 
the mid-1980s suggests that the push for pay flexibility was in the first 
instance and is largely now against constraining pay setting processes, 
rather than raw wage outcomes. Certainly pay levels were a concern 
for Peko-Wallsend in their Robe River mine, and led to a critical 
industrial dispute that encouraged other mining and export employers  208 
   
to join the anti-centralized bargaining push. But for the majority of 
mining and export firms pay flexibility meant getting rid of centralized 
bargaining institutions first and foremost. Doing so was a form of 
insurance against poor wage outcomes in the future.110 
A final major finding coming out of the second part of this 
chapter’s examination of wage trends is that the two-tier system from 
1987-1991 performed poorly in terms of holding down real wages: the 
record of those years is far worse than the centralized years of 1983-
1987 and the enterprise bargaining years after 1991. While inflation 
was slightly higher for the 1987-91 period than the 1983-1987 one, 
this is not the source of the majority of the difference in wage restraint 
between the two periods. This poor record provided an impetus for 
employers to increase pressure on what was left of the centralized 
system. The problem of spiralling wages also fed into the calculations 
of policy makers who shifted their support to a decentralized system in 
search of a productivity-driven wage increase regime in the late 1980s. 
These issues are further explored in chapters 9 and 10. 
8.2 The changes in wage bargaining, 1983-1996. 
The Accord agreements are summarized in table 8.1. Wage 
bargaining moved from a highly centralized arrangement with annual 
CPI-based wage increases between 1983 and 1987 (Accords I and II), 
to a two-tier system, with a basic centrally granted increases and a 
local component, from 1987 until 1991 (Accords III, IV and V). 
                                                 
110 The move on the inflexible process of wage-setting is reflected in the large 
increase in the use of contractor labor and the continuing push for greater 
percentages of pay to be linked to performance throughout the 1990s and into the 
2000s (see Bowden 2000; and Barry, Bowden & Brosnan (1998)).  209 
   
Enterprise or plant level bargaining was introduced in late 1990 in 
Accord VI, and was further entrenched in Accord VII which allowed for 
no limit enterprise bargaining. 
 
Table 8.1 
The Accord agreements between the ACTU & the ALP 
governments, 1983-1993. 
 
 Wages  Trade-offs 
Accord I 
Feb 83 
Centralized wage bargaining: 
Fully indexed to CPI every 6 months 
No outside bargaining 
 
Govt: “Avoid income tax increases’ 
Indirect taxes and govt charges to be 
minimized 
Accord II 
Sept 85 
Centralized wage bargaining:  
CPI less 2% 
 
Govt: Tax cut equal to 2% of wages 
Employers: Superannuation safety net 
 
Accord III 
March 87 
Partially decentralized but coordinated 
wage bargaining (‘Two-tier’): 
Central: $10/week + 1.5% 
Local/industry: up to 4% based on 
efficiency or award re-structuring, paid in 
1 or 2 installments (‘Restructuring and 
wage efficiency principle’).  
 
Employers: Superannuation claims of up to 
3% of ordinary time earnings in 2 payments 
in 1/88 & 1/89 to be allowed at local or 
industry levels. 
Accord IV 
Aug 88 
Partially decentralized but coordinated 
wage bargaining (‘Two-tier”): 
Central: 3% 
Local/industry: up to $10/wk provided 
productivity improvements made 
 
Govt: First explicit tax/wage trade-off. 
Promises of further tax cuts provided re-
structuring takes place and depending on 
actual wage rises gained. 
Accord V 
Aug 1989 
Partially decentralized but coordinated 
wage bargaining (‘two-tier’): 
Central: $10-15/per week or up to 3% 
Local/industry: based on productivity 
improvements such that overall increases 
to 6/90 do not exceed 6 ½ % total. 
 
Govt: Promises of tax cuts (delivered in 
89/90 budget & equivalent to around 5% of 
average wage), increases in family 
allowances and other social welfare, 
including supplementary payments to low 
income earners of up to $70 per week 
(severely marked down by AIRC). 
 
Accord VI 
Sept 90 
Mostly decentralized and partially 
uncoordinated bargaining (enterprise 
bargaining begins): 
Central: $12/wk later modified in 4/91 to 
2.5%. 
Local: no limits on productivity-based 
bargaining (ratified 10/91) 
 
Govt: 1/91 tax cut of $7.50 per week for 
average wage earner. 
Employers: Employees to claim up to 12% 
rise in super contributions 
Accord VII 
Feb 93 
Mostly decentralized and mostly 
uncoordinated: 
Central: safety net adjustments for low 
pay workers of $8 (93) and $24 over 3 
installments to mid-96. 
Local: Enterprise bargaining principle: no 
limit bargaining. 
 
Govt: Promises of tax cuts worth between 
$19 and $46 per week for average wage 
earner by 1996. 
 
Sources: Wilson, Bradford & Fitzpatrick 2000, 283-406; Kelly 1994, 489-493; Argy 1992, 210-211; Tingle 
1994, 165.  210 
   
Examining table 8.1 shows a couple of trends worth noting in the 
context of the argument advanced here. The first is the increasing use 
over time of tax cuts in order to generate wage restraint. This occurred 
as the wage bargaining system was decentralizing, however. The first 
explicit wage/tax trade-off came in Accord IV and was designed to slow 
unions from making high wage claims in local bargaining. Second, 
employers even though they were not parties to the Accord agreements 
had obligations placed upon them in Accords II, III and VI in the form 
of increased pension or superannuation contributions. 
8.3 Pay and the Accord 
What were the effects on wages of the changes from a centralized 
system to a more decentralized one? Several important trends can be 
observed The centralized system (1983-1987) was very successful in 
restraining wages in real terms, largely due to the delay between CPI 
rises and the actual granting of indexed pay rises, and the discounting 
under Accord II. The two-tier phase between 1987 and 1991 was 
somewhat of a disaster compared to the discipline of the 1983-1987 
period. Private sector industries with strong unions (manufacturing, 
mining, communication services) experienced real wage growth, as did 
most of the public sector. The enterprise period after 1991 continued 
to see public sector real wage growth. But real wage growth in mining 
and manufacturing was curtailed to a degree for the first few years 
while wages in property and business services, retail trade and 
accommodation, restaurants and cafes declined in real terms. These 
results lend themselves to the interpretation that pay movements 
during the partially decentralized 1987-1991 period would have only  211 
   
provided more ready ammunition to the employer cause that pay 
bargaining be more decentralized. 
The real wage restraint between 1983 and 1987 in the centralized 
Accord years is demonstrated in figure 8.1. After 1988 real wages 
increase until 1991, and flatten out slightly following the enactment of 
enterprise bargaining in 1991. As the disaggregated data presented in 
the next section indicates, the increase after 1991 was largely due to 
public sector real wage increases, while the 1987-1991 increase was 
due to a more widespread rise in the real wage. 
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Figure 8.1: Average real total weekly earnings, Australia, 1983-
1996 
Source: own calculations based on nominal seasonally adjusted data in ABS 6302.0, table 2. 
Notes: Nominal data deflated by CPI (all capital cities) average of previous four quarters from ABS cat. 
6401.0 (various years). 
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Figure 8.2: Nominal average yearly pay index increases, export & 
import high competition sectors, Australia 1983-1996. 
Source: derived from ABS 6302.0; 6401.0, (various years) 
Notes: 11/83-11/87 is centralized bargaining period; 11/87-11/91 is two-tier bargaining period; 11/91-
11/95 is enterprise bargaining period. 
 
Examining the wage movements for the export heavy sectors 
shows that the centralized era was very successful in holding real 
wage increases to a minimum in mining and manufacturing (see figure 
8.2).111 By contrast the two-tier period saw marked increases in the 
average real mean earnings in mining and manufacturing. The 
enterprise bargaining period of 1991-1996 has a far better record of 
real wage restraint, with real wage increases dropping markedly in 
property and business services, noticeable in mining and slightly in 
manufacturing. Finance and Insurance defies the trend, although this 
may be due to technological and occupational changes associated with 
                                                 
111 The data presented in figures 8.7, 8.8 and 8.9 refer to average ordinary time 
earnings. These have been converted to an index and average increases obtained for 
the three bargaining periods (centralized, two tier and enterprise). These are then 
plotted against the average CPI increases for each period. This allows an assessment 
of real wage movements under the three wage regimes.  213 
   
the opening of the banking sector to international competition and the 
progressive and increasing use of computer technology. 
In local services, the centralized era also shows real wage restraint 
in the centralized years (see figure 8.3). The two-tier years saw a real 
wage break out in the low skill retail and accommodation, cafes and 
restaurants industries. This indicates just how poor the two-tier 
arrangement between 1987 and 1991 was able to control real wage 
increases, although the other local service industries saw real average 
wage declines of up to 2% per year. The enterprise bargaining period 
sees a reversal of the two-tier years, with retail and accommodation 
industry employees subject to, on average, up to 2% per year decline 
in real ordinary time earnings. By contrast, the other services claws 
back some of their real wage losses during the two-tier years. 
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Figure 8.3: Nominal average yearly pay index increases, local 
service sectors, Australia 1983-1996. 
Source: derived from ABS 6302.0; 6401.0 (various years) 
Notes: 11/83-11/87 is centralized bargaining period; 11/87-11/91 is two-tier bargaining period; 11/91-
11/95 is enterprise bargaining period.  214 
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Figure 8.4: Nominal average yearly pay index increases, public & 
sheltered sectors, Australia 1983-1996. 
Source: derived from ABS 6302.0; 6401.0, (various years) 
Notes: 11/83-11/87 is centralized bargaining period; 11/87-11/91 is two-tier bargaining period; 11/91-
11/95 is enterprise bargaining period. 
In the public and sheltered sectors, we observe real wage decline 
for all industry divisions except construction during the centralized 
years of the Accord. This demonstrates the early success of the Accord 
in restraining real wages. However, the two-tier years of 1987-1991 
were opportunities for these union-strong sectors to use local 
bargaining to increase real earnings, a trend that continued and was 
amplified in the enterprise bargaining years after 1991 (see figure 8.4). 
The jump in real earnings during the two tier years reflects the 
similar experiences of the similarly heavily unionized manufacturing 
and mining sectors. Mining saw real average earnings increases of over 
4% per year, manufacturing just under 2% per year, while the utilities 
received over 3% per year increase, and with the exception of 
government administration and defense, the rest of the sheltered and  215 
   
public sector received between 1 and 2% per year real earning 
increases, on average. If occupational restructuring occurred and there 
was clear evidence of an upskilling trend during the two-tier years, 
then these increases could be attributed to returns to increases in 
human capital. But as is discussed in chapter 10, the two-tier 
restructuring efforts were mostly cosmetic and rarely involved an 
upskilling or training component. An exception was in the metal 
trades, but efforts there floundered, and it is debatable whether 
increases in the manufacturing real wage between 1987 and 1991 is 
due to an a secular upwards trend in human capital. 
8.4 Comparing export, non-export £ public sector pay trends 
Figure 8.5 shows in a simple but compelling way the effect of the 
inflexible centralized wage bargaining on wage movements in the 
1980s in comparison to the flexible decentralized years in the 1990s. 
From 1983 until 1990, including the two tier years between 1987 and 
1990 and further demonstrating the failure of two-tier years to 
introduce pay flexibility, movements in the average wage in mining 
(allowing for seasonal changes) compared to manufacturing, business 
and financial services, wholesale and retail and government 
administration and defense appear to be highly coordinated.112 This is 
in stark contrast to the Irish pay data reported in chapter 5 where 
export pay trends appear chaotic compared to non-export and the 
public sectors both before and after 1999 (see figures 5.1 through 5.7).  
 
                                                 
112 A similar coordination can be observed in the median wage trends of every 
major industry division not reported here. See ABS 6302.0.  216 
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select non-export industries, Australia, 1983-1996 
Source: ABS 6302.0. 
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The data in figure 8.5 supports my argument that it was the 
absence of pay flexibility in the export sectors, especially the mining 
sector, which was a major cause of the decentralization of Australian 
wage bargaining.  
The Australian experience of centralized wage bargaining stands in 
contrast to the Irish one, where export sector pay movements reported 
in chapter 5 support the argument that pay flexibility afforded the 
export sector is key to the stability of Irish centralized wage 
bargaining. In Australia however, the movement of export sector pay 
(mining) until decentralization in 1991 appears to mirror movements 
in other sectors of the economy. This high degree of coordination 
suggests an absence of pay flexibility in the Australian system: an 
absence that was a major cause of the decentralization.  
With the advent of decentralized bargaining in the early 1990s, we 
observe a noticeable dispersion of average pay between these 
industries. As already discussed, mining commodity markets 
improved, and despite worries by mining employers over wage levels in 
the 1980s, mining pay moved upwards in the 1990s at a greater rate 
than before. By contrast, the services average wages reported here 
stagnated, government pay growth slowed, and volatile consumer 
markets in business and property services caused wage movements to 
fluctuate up and down. 
8.5 Summary 
The pertinent conclusions to be taken away from this chapter are: 
• The tax cut for wage restraint trade-off matured and was favored 
by government as wage bargaining decentralized. It was not a primary  218 
   
strategy during Accords I and II, where it was used in an ad hoc 
manner and supplemented wider social welfare initiatives. 
• Employers were obligated, even though they were not parties to 
the Accord agreements, to provide increased pension contributions 
under Accords II, III and VI. 
• The centralized system (1983 - 1987) restrained real wage growth 
thanks to the delays in granting CPI increases (Accord I) and to the 
discounting of the CPI claim in Accord II. It would appear that that at 
least some of the wage restraint problems of the two-tier years were 
due to the build-up of wage pressures during this period. 
• The two-tier phase (1987 – 1991) saw real wage growth in most 
of the public sector, manufacturing, mining and communication 
services where strong unions used local bargaining to build on gains 
won centrally. While CPI was slightly higher in the is period than the 
1983-1987 period, this cannot be used to account for the lack of 
restraint, since local or plant and industry claims were not based on 
the inflation rate but on improvements to productivity.  
• The enterprise bargaining period (1991 - 1996) saw real wage 
growth in the public sector, but declines in low wage service sectors, 
property and business services, and a curtailment of real wage growth 
in manufacturing and mining. 
• The wage restraint difficulties of the two-tier years reinforced 
employer demands for a decentralized bargaining system. 
• The centralized wage bargaining years of the Accord produced a 
high degree of coordination in average wage movements between the 
export, public and non-export private sectors. This illustrates the lack  219 
   
of pay flexibility that was the major cause of the decentralization of 
wage bargaining. This is contrast to Irish pay trends and Irish 
centralized wage bargaining stability reported in chapter 5. Here, we 
observe very different trends in wage movements between the export 
(chaotic and not appearing to conform to the central agreements) and 
non-export and public sectors (closely conforming to the central 
agreements until 1999 and then exhibiting similar orders of pay drift 
thereafter). In contrast to the Australian data, the Irish data illustrates 
the high degree of pay flexibility afforded exporters, which is one of two 
conditions ensuring the stability of centralized wage bargaining until 
around 2000, when public sector wage drift took hold and caused a 
diversion between actual wage outcomes and central wage agreements. 
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Chapter 9 
Explaining the decentralization 
of Australian wage bargaining: 
The actions of employers 
 
9.1 Causal effect & employer politics 
How are we to assess the causal effect of export employers on 
policy makers and their policy decisions? Teasing out the direct 
influence of export capital proves to be difficult. While my argument 
suggests a large degree of instrumentality in the influence of exporters 
on wage bargaining policy, trying to find the ‘smoking gun” such as 
minutes or recollection of a meeting where a policy-maker says words 
to the effect that exporting firms or the BCA needs with regard to wage 
bargaining policy must be heeded proves to be a fruitless task. The 
closest we come is evidence of Prime Minister Paul Keating’s pro-
market orientation developed through his long contact with the mining 
industry when Shadow Minister for Mining and Energy (Edwards 
1996, 149-150) 113 
John Dawkins 1994 speech to a corporate affairs NGO in 
Melbourne following his resignation from the Keating government 
when he was Treasurer suggest why finding these links is a frustrating 
exercise. After stating that the BCA’ agenda was pursued with ‘vigor’ 
by the Labor governments, the ex-Keating government Treasurer 
argued that it would not be politic for a Labor government to be seen 
as enacting policies authored by the BCA, and it was expedient to 
                                                 
113 The mining industry has an industry-wide preference for neo-classical 
economics and policy solutions (see Grover 1983).  221 
   
create some distance from business in order to maintain a close 
relationship with the union movement (Dawkins 1994, 4-5).114  
The asymmetry of the Accord presents a causal problem in view of 
these remarks. Business was never formally incorporated into the 
Accord: it was an agreement between the Australian Council of Trade 
Unions (ACTU) and the government. There was never any institution 
within which business could directly affect policy: there is no 
Australian equivalent of the Irish NESC. Most of the direct influence 
on policy came via one-to-one meetings between Prime Minister Bob 
Hawke and his many business associates and Treasurer then PM Paul 
Keating and business leaders (McEachern 1986, 1991; Hawke 1994; 
Kelly 1994, 275-278). While the relationship between the trade union 
movement and the state can be broadly described as corporatist, the 
state/employers relationship was classically pluralist (Dabscheck 
1989, 119). But it was pluralist with a government that could not 
appear to be in a too cosy a relationship with export employers. This 
                                                 
114 The influence of business and the BCA is well summarized by former ALP 
member for Adelaide during the decentralizing Accord years (1990-1993), Bob Catley: 
“The primary role for the management of the state in a free-trade era 
is for it play its role in the formation of a national economy capable of 
competing successfully with other national economies. The benchmarks for 
this are the external account balances and national economic growth 
figures” (Catley 1996, 213). 
More concretely, this means that: 
“The interests of business remain second only in the mind of 
government to maintaining the support of a majority voting coalition. In the 
long term popular support can only be maintained by ensuring the 
continuation of business investment, growth in output, and employment 
opportunities – not necessarily pandering to the latest demands of the 
business community…an examination of the major macroeconomic 
decisions of the Labor government over the last decade makes this 
clear…although it might be reasonably argued that each represented the 
interests of private capital as a whole” (Catley 1996, 98).  222 
   
has meant that admissions of influence, such as the one by Dawkins, 
are few and far between. 
I argue that the preferences of the Business Council of Australia 
(BCA) for greater control of wage bargaining at local and firm levels 
established the agenda of debate over wage bargaining reform during 
the Accord. That they were able to do was due to the changing policy 
environment in which wage bargaining policy was embedded. 
Protection was a policy regime of the past: openness was the future. 
The litmus test for policy was that, “competitiveness became the 
essential condition of success” (Watson 2002, 367). All exporters 
needed to do in these circumstances were to voice opposition to the 
centralized system and claim that it hindered the flexibility of their 
operations. This did not mean exporters got everything they wanted. 
Clearly, some of them would have liked labor markets that were and 
are union free. But the state in the late 1980s and into the 1990s 
delivered policies that responded to their key demands: the need for 
firm and plant level wage bargaining. In the argument that follows, I 
outline how the demands ff new employer organizations evolved (this 
chapter) and how state policy preferences evolved to coincide with 
those views (chapter 10).  
Employer demands became clear through three distinct phases. In 
the first, exporters found themselves both excluded from the Accord 
wage bargaining process and within their own employer associations 
that were numerically dominated by small business and still worried 
about the move to free trade and the abolition of tariffs. This resulted 
in the formation of a new group: the Business Council of Australia.  223 
   
The BCA served large companies that competed in overseas markets or 
had the capacity to successfully compete against overseas companies 
in the domestic market. The second phase saw the initiative of a few 
radical employers that signalled that a cadre of employers objected to, 
and was prepared to take on significant costs to get rid of the 
centralized wage fixation system in Australia. In this phase, I highlight 
and two disputes among exporters in particular: the Robe River 
dispute (mining) and the Mudginberri dispute (agribusiness). The final 
phase saw the BCA take up these ‘new right’ employer concerns 
through research that demonstrated that these views were more widely 
held among Australia’s exporters. The research explicitly advocated an 
enterprise or firm-level bargaining position that linked improved 
competitiveness to decentralized wage bargaining.  
For the sake of presentation in my examination of employers and 
the move to decentralized bargaining, I examine the actions of radical 
employers first, followed by an examination of the formation of the 
Business Council of Australia (BCA), finishing with an examination of 
the evolution of the BCA wage bargaining policy from 1983 until 1996.  
9.2 Radical employers come in from the margins 
1986 was a watershed year in Australian industrial relations. Just 
four years after the formulation of the Accord and just 30 months into 
its operation, four major industrial disputes, two involving exporting 
firms (Robe River (iron ore), Mudginberri (buffalo meat), one a small 
family business (Dollar Sweets (confectionary), and the last, a major 
publicly-owned corporation that sold electricity to distributors (South 
East Queensland Electricity Board), signalled major changes in the  224 
   
thinking of many business leaders in the veracity of the arbitration 
system. These disputes also signalled a shift in power in employer 
politics in Australia, and the rise of new less formal groupings of 
business leaders that were to be highly successful in having their 
industrial relations agenda adopted by the Labor government. 
Common to all four disputes were managements facing major 
interruption of manufacture and distribution of their product due to 
industrial action. Wage levels and the manner in which disputes were 
settled were at issue. Common to all four cases was blame for those 
interruptions being laid at the door of the arbitration system and 
“irresponsible unionism.” Management argued that the arbitration 
system gave trade unions too much power over management – central 
arbitration threatened management’s prerogative to manage as it saw 
fit. A final commonality was a shared willingness of the employers in 
these cases to “go it alone” in their fights. In doing so they were the 
thin edge of the employer force for industrial relation change.  
In the case of Robe, which was the most important industrial 
dispute in the 1980s, declining profitability and stagnant and 
declining commodity prices were vitally important spurs to action by 
management towards a campaign against unions both within and 
outside the workplace. While Robe management was upset over the 
total cost of the wage bill and wanted to promote more flexible wage 
outcomes at the mine (the outcome aspect of pay flexibility), the 
primary target of the campaign was against union interference in the 
pay setting process itself (the process dimension). It displayed this 
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tribunals, and in other various union-busting and marginalizing 
measures. Robe management’s concerns therefore were consistent 
with the BCA’s concerns about the lack of the process aspect of pay 
flexibility in the Australian centralized system. 
The contrast of these industrial disputes with the Irish experience 
in the 1980s and 1990s couldn’t be starker. Irish exporters faced little 
union input into wage negotiations or the management of their 
businesses. Indeed, after the mid-1980s, export firms became 
increasingly likely to be running non-union plants. Strike action was 
almost unheard of. Disputes of any kind were few and far between. 
Conciliation and mediation institutions were almost entirely voluntary. 
Legal coercion to compel adherence to these voluntarist institution’s 
decisions was rare. Where the Irish system arranged itself neatly 
around the needs and wage policy preferences of exporters, the 
Australian system was more concerned with offering unionists 
procedural rights by which they could access more control over their 
work and how their pay was set. This provoked a prolonged and well-
funded opposition from exporters against the centralized system, the 
tribunal system and trade unions. 
Of the four cases, the dispute at Robe River, a joint venture iron 
ore mine in the remote Pilbara region in north-west Australia became 
the most significant. The Robe River dispute involved a major exporter, 
and the voice of its management included the first Chairman of the 
H.R. Nicholls Society, a small group of senior executives, bureaucrats 
and federal politicians committed to the dismantling of the arbitration 
system and Australian wage bargaining centralization. Robe was  226 
   
significant not because the management explicitly sought a non-
arbitration settlement to the dispute. Rather it signalled a new meaner 
mood amongst employers, and demonstrated willingness by senior 
management to use lockout and sackings as union busting techniques 
- measures not seen in Australia since the coal strikes of the late 
1940s. Robe was significant for the strength it gave a growing network 
of CEO’s, right wing party politicians and bureaucrats to widen and 
amplify their ideological fight for the opinions and allegiances of labor 
politicians and officials of more moderate employer associations, and 
to weaken the resolve of major unions determined to make centralized 
bargaining and all the Accord promises of 1983 work. At the time, 
Robe management’s strategy, and that of Premier Bjelke-Petersen 
Queensland government in the South-East Queensland Electricity 
Board dispute, the owners of Dollar Sweets and of the small buffalo 
processing plant in a federal national park at Mudginberri, appeared 
to be radical. But the “new right” as it was called in Australia seized 
the debate on wages on the back of falling profits and perceived 
problems of Australian labor productivity, efficiency and flexibility. I 
now examine Mudginberri and Robe River in the order they occurred. 
9.3 Mudginberri & the National Farmer’s Federation 
Australia in the mid 1990s was the second largest meat exporter 
in the world, worth $400 million in exports in 1994, or around 6% of 
all Australian exports. Meat is Australia’s fourth most valuable export 
commodity (O’Leary 1999, 139). The Mudginberri dispute was 
significant for the way it motivated rural employers to political action. 
Despite the fact that the dispute was in a very small export operation,  227 
   
it captured national media attention as a major farming employer 
group and a militant trade union fought a bitter industrial battle over 
a few head of buffalo. 
Mudginberri Station was a buffalo meat-processing homestead, 
located in the Kakadu national park in Arnhem Land, Northern 
Territory - some 250 kilometres east of Darwin. The plant exported 
buffalo meat, around 20 000 head per year, to East Asia, mostly Japan 
(Noonan 1985a, 10). A long bitter dispute involving less than 30 
employees began in July 1984.115 This small fight involving a tiny 
exporter and a powerful union became the lightening rod for agrarian 
capital discontent with the arbitration system. At issue was the tally 
system, first introduced into meat processing awards in the 1960s.116 
The system was widely criticized by employers, and had lead to the 
closure of some meat works, including the Katherine meat works, in 
the Northern Territory because of competition from meat works using 
other methods of remuneration. The AMIEU sought to extend the 
Katherine tally system to Mudginberri. The problem was, an award 
between the employers and the employees at the station covered the 
workplace. The award specified a minimum wage, plus a bonus 
payment system based on productivity. The AMIEU acted against the 
effective shutting out of the union from Mudginberri by imposing a 
                                                 
115 The luxury non-frozen export meat business in 1985 was a $20 million 
export industry, based on 10, 000 tonnes per annum, airlifted largely to Japan, Hong 
Kong and the US (Noonan 1985c). 
116 The tally system is a piecework quota system. In the award, a minimum and 
maximum number of head are specified per worker per shift. This range was usually 
between 16 and 20 head. If an employer wished to process 600 head, they would 
require 30 workers. Any number over the maximum tally would be subject to penalty 
rates. Therefore if the shipment of head were, say, 630, every worker would receive a 
penalty rate of one “over” (O’Leary 1999, 145).  228 
   
picket on the plant on May 10, 1985. The AMIEU also established 
similar pickets at two other meat plants. As a result of the pickets, 
federal meat inspectors (since Mudginberri was on federal land) 
refused to enter the meat works. Processed meat ready for export 
rotted at the plant (Houlihan 1986).117 
A series of court actions saw the AMEIU fined by close to half a 
million dollars.118 It was also liable for the revenue lost by 
Mudginberri. The result was a disaster for the union and the pickets 
ended up costing the union over two million dollars.119 
The striking aspect of Mudginberri was that the award system that 
had been created 80 years previously to create orderly industrial 
relations failed to head off a dispute or from a dispute escalating. 
Quite the reverse, the award was in this case actually causing the 
dispute. The contrast with the Irish system and the experience of 
                                                 
117 The pickets were clearly illegal under section 45 (D) of the Commonwealth 
Trade Practices Act. That provision makes secondary actions on employers in the 
way of strikes, pickets or other forms of industrial action illegal. A secondary action 
is one by parties not directly in dispute. The fines are hefty: complete restitution by 
the offending party (i.e. the union) to the employer for lost revenue, plus fines. (On 
the operation of 45D, see Creighton & Stewart 2000, 13.92.) 
118 Conferences before the federal tribunal failed to solve the problem, and the 
employer sued under the s. 45 (D) of the Trade Practices Act that banned strike 
action by parties not directly involved in a dispute. On May 27, a federal judge 
granted an injunction against the union under 45 (D) and ordered that the picket be 
lifted. On June 21, a federal court imposed fines of $10 000, plus $2 000 per day the 
picket remained in place – all payable to the employer. This led the employer at 
Mudginberri to file a federal court order to sequester the funds of the AMIEU in order 
to recover the fines, then some $44 000, plus costs estimated to be around $100 
000. AMIEU’s accounts were first frozen then sequestered by Mudginberri on July 18 
- the first time such an action had taken place in Australia since 1946 (Noonan 
1985b). The union was then fined a further $100 000, plus costs (around $279 000) 
by the federal court for criminal contempt of court for ignoring the initial injunction 
on September 11 (Donohue, Robinson & Bone 1985). 
119 The case went all the way to the High Court. Mudginberri successfully sued 
the government for refusing to provide meat inspectors. Waterside and transport 
unions who imposed sympathy strikes were also heavily fined under 45 (D) (Kelly 
1994, 256).  229 
   
exporters there could not be plainer. In Ireland, exporter management 
faced little organized opposition or institutional hindrance to the 
setting of wages. In Australia, the award system was perceived as not 
only cumbersome, but it failed to provide employers with the 
guarantee that was its raison d’etre: industrial peace. 
The dispute was “red meat” enough for radical employers in 
Australia. But it was the intervention of the National Farmer’s 
Federation, and their leader, Ian MacLachlan that ensured that the 
dispute had long-lasting political effects on the arbitration system. The 
National Farmer’s Federation (NFF) had in 1985 some 170 000 
members, and could justifiably claim to be the voice of rural Australia. 
The NFF objected to the tally system and Mudginberri, as a member of 
the NT Cattlemen’s Association and hence the NFF, became the locus 
of their fight.120  
But the NFF’s intervention had wider motivations: the 
diminishment of trade union power and the abolition of the tribunal-
based wage bargaining system in Australia. Through the NFF’s 
involvement in the dispute and their creation of a fighting fund, 
Mudginberri was able to secure a $2 million line of credit from 
Westpac Bank that meant that it could stay in the courts for as long 
as it was necessary to defeat the AMIEU (Williams 1986). 
                                                 
120 The NFF managed to collect around $10 million in donations from employers 
and farmers during and shortly after the Mudginberri dispute. This enabled it to 
expand its lobbying capacity considerably. The donations came because of the NFF’s 
contribution to Mudginberri’s legal offensive against the AMIEU’s pickets, and the 
federal government over the meat inspector issue. The NFF also fought the action of 
the Transport Workers Union in imposing a ban on the airlifting of chilled sheep 
meat on September 9 from Australian airports; a ban they claimed was a secondary 
strike (Kelly 1994, 256).  230 
   
The principle problem the NFF had with the arbitration system 
and trade unions was the affect they each had on the farm sector’s 
cost structure. Tribunals enabled inefficient manning practices such 
as the tally system, the two-man shovel operator teams in mines, and 
extra guards on the railways. MacLachlan argued that unions deterred 
investment, encouraged tariff protection that drove up exchange rates, 
made farm exports less competitive, and increased the cost of 
imported capital goods. Unions increased transportation costs and the 
cost of locally made inputs, such as tractors and harvesters. 
MacLachlan lamented the necessity of political intervention to support 
the dollar on the open market, in particular the use of higher than 
prudent interest rates. This, again, deterred capital investment. 
Finally, the tribunal system created wage rigidities that lead to 
inflation and unemployment. This necessitated greater social spending 
that acted as a dead weight loss drag on the economy (MacLachlan 
1986, 2-6). Again the contrast with the Irish experience is obvious. 
As Mudginberri and the other three disputes between 1985 and 
1987 illustrate, the problem employers had with the arbitration system 
was that the tribunals failed to curb what they viewed as the 
irresponsible use of union power that curbed the managerial right to 
set pay as they saw fit. The arbitrators and conciliators failed to do 
their job – to solve disputes – and the employers resorted to other 
means to achieve their goals. The effect was two-fold. First, the 
disputes that are described here illustrated that the tribunal system 
was unable to cope with the new times. Those new times were 
characterized by keener global competition and falling real prices in  231 
   
sectors where Australia had traditionally dominated world markets: 
meat, grain and minerals. The centralized system regulated by the 
tribunal set of institutions was proving to be rigid and, according to 
export employers, far too easily manipulated by trade unions. 
Tribunals undermined the process aspect of pay flexibility. This lead to 
the second problem: the disputes bundled the tribunal problem of 
interference with the managerial right to set pay as they saw fit, with 
the employer’s problem with union power. An attack on one became an 
attack on the other. This became a theme running throughout 
employer’s objections to the tribunal system. 
The Mudginberri dispute was an early ‘warning shot’ from export 
agrarian employers that the centralized system was not to their liking. 
It was to be followed by a much larger dispute at a mining operation 
that made significant contributions to Australia’s export: Robe River. 
9.4 The Robe River dispute 
9.4.1 Course of events 
In December 1983, Peko-Wallsend, a mining conglomerate 
incorporated in New South Wales with large stakes in many of the 
largest gold, iron ore and coal mines in Australia, acquired Robe River 
Ltd. The key business in the acquisition was a 35% stake in Robe 
River, a Pilbara-based iron ore and shipping joint venture (Copeman 
1987,1). In January 1985, Peko increased its stake to 50.9%. 45.5% of 
Robe at this time was owned by three Japanese steel makers – Mitsui 
and Co., Nippon Steel and Sumitomo Corp. Inc. Robe employed 
around 1500 workers and produced between 15 and 16 million tones 
of iron ore per year, making it the third largest iron ore producer in the  232 
   
Pilbara, a remote desert region in the north-west of Western Australia 
(Hewett 1986a). Of that production, between 11.5 and 11.8 million 
tones of iron ore were exported to Japan, accounting for 80% of Peko’s 
total exports at that time, and around 10% of Australia’s total export 
tonnage.121 
Robe River by any estimate was and still is a vital producer in the 
Australian economy. Being a joint venture, Robe’s accounting figures 
are not publicly available, but a reasonable estimate would be that in 
the 1980s based on the data above, Robe accounted for around 1 ½ to 
2% of Australia’s export revenue. Despite it’s prominence, by the time 
Peko increased its stake in January 1986, management claimed that 
over-employment and restrictive work practices had eroded 
profitability (Copeman 1987, 2). Management estimated that ore 
production was running at 2/3rds capacity and productivity 
(measured as tonnes mined/employee) was claimed to have remained 
stagnant for the previous 12 years (Copeman 1990, 4).122 
Robe’s and Peko’s reliance on the Japanese market also made the 
venture especially vulnerable to work stoppages. Japanese steel 
management tended to take a dim view of supply interruptions, and 
                                                 
121 Throughout the 1980s and until the mid-1990s, mining exports accounted 
for around half, in dollar terms, of Australia’s exports, with iron ore and minerals 
averaging between a third and one-quarter of that value. In 1985, Australian iron ore 
accounted for 41% of Japanese ore imports, some 7% of the average of 48%. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Australia remained the largest iron ore exporter in 
the world (Robins, Noonan & Hywood 1986, 1, 3; Economist Intelligence Unit, 1999). 
122 Part of Peko’s profitability problems stemmed from its comparatively low 
grade ore. The Pilbara deposit average is around 64% pure by weight, Robe’s 
scattered pockets tended to average around 56%. The scattered nature of the 
deposits also necessitated frequent moves of the plant adding to capital expenditure 
which even allowing for generous depreciation schedules trimmed margins more 
than Robe’s direct competitors (Copeman 1990, 1; Durie 1986, 61).  233 
   
telexed Robe’s management during the 1986 and 1987 disputes urging 
them to resume supply or face the consequences. Charles Copeman, 
Peko-Wallsend CEO and founding Chairman of the H.R. Nicholls 
Society also credited a strong Yen, and world over-production as 
increasing competitive pressures on iron ore suppliers to Japan during 
that time and on Robe in particular (Copeman 1990, 1; Copeman 
1987, 2). Iron ore prices since the late 1970s have declined in real 
terms (see figure 9.1). 
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Figure 9.1 Mining export commodity prices, Australia 1975-1995 
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia, Statistics Bulletin table 1.14c (updated May 1996). 
 
Ironically, the low-grade ore at Robe combined with the collapse in 
commodity prices after 1982 made for cooperative workplace relations 
at Robe until 1986. Continuity of supply remained management’s top 
priority and union management, lead by the metal unions extracted 
many working condition concessions. After taking control of Robe in  234 
   
early 1986, Peko management came to view this industrial peace as 
coming at too high a price. A fact-finding mission of 12 senior 
executives in June 1986 was sent to Robe by Peko.123 
The Peko mission advised management in Sydney to sack the 
entire Robe management. Copeman did so on July 31, 1986. Following 
Peko’s sacking of the Robe management, the workforce at Robe was 
given a circular requesting that workers work within the Western 
Australian state award guidelines, and that all locally bargained side 
agreements be cancelled. Union representatives were required to give 
notice before coming on site, mid-shift ‘smoko” meals were cancelled, 
and union site convenors (called “leading hand” appointments by the 
AMWSU) sacked. Office staff workers were advised that many of them 
would be transferred to general mine duties. Finally, the AMWSU was 
advised that Peko would be seeking a new federal award to replace the 
current state one (via the creation of a paper dispute) (Copeman 1987, 
2-3). That award substantially reduced wages, abolished penalty rates 
for night work, and cut overtime pay (Peko Wallsend 1986a; Mayman 
1986, 1) 
                                                 
123 This followed a hostile response from union representatives to Peko’s 
monitoring of the negotiations between the metalworkers union (then known as the 
Amalgamated Metalworkers and Shipworkers Union AMWSU, later the AMWU, or 
Amalgamated Metalworkers Union) and Robe management. What the mission found 
appalled them: full-time union convenors on-site, all with fully-equipped offices paid 
by Robe, wildcat strikes, including one over the canteen running out of certain 
flavors of ice cream, tinned seafood provided for workers during smoking breaks, 
work bans on anything not specified in award agreements, inefficient procedures 
during shift changes, and virtual free housing for a workforce earning on average 
$41, 000 per year - more than twice the national average wage at the time 
(McGeough 1986). CEO Copeman became concerned over the viability of Peko’s 
expansion plans at Robe, which included a ARL$ 60 million capital expenditure plan 
to support the acquisition of additional iron ore holdings (Copeman 1987, 2).  235 
   
An appeal from the metal unions to the Western Australian 
Commission resulted in a court order restraining Peko from making 
“wholesale changes.” Peko, according to union accounts continued to 
transfer office staff personnel, and issued notice that 185 positions of 
the 1180 award positions or so at Robe would be made redundant 
through the non-replacement of retiring and quit workers (AMWSU nd 
(a), attachments, 1; Copeman 1987, 3). Workers refusing transfer of 
duties would be sacked. 
By August 10, according to union documentation, 64 workers were 
sacked for refusing transfers (AMSWU n.d. (a), attachments, 1).124 
Western Australian Commissioner Coleman (not to be confused with 
CEO Coleman) ordered Peko on August 11 to re-instate the sacked 
workers, and that the shop floor status quo of July 31 be re-imposed. 
Peko responded by closing the plant that night for reasons of “health 
and safety” (Hewett 1986c). 
The real issue at hand, Peko’s assertion of the management’s 
prerogative to manage, was abundantly clear. CEO Copeman argued 
later that: 
“For the new management to accede to this Order, and 
then to have to await the hearing of the disputed practices 
before the commission in the ensuing weeks and months, with 
all the restrictive practices in place during that time, would 
have constituted a complete victory to the unions, and a 
complete defeat of management’s right –and responsibility- to 
manage” (Copeman 1987, 4). 
Robe’s dismissal of 1300 employees on August 11, a blatant 
defiance of the WA Commission decision, and intention to re-hire non-
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union workers provoked a union response strategy that mostly lay 
outside the ambit of the arbitration system. Notes from an unofficial 
and confidential August 18 meeting of senior AMWSU officials reveal 
that the union intended to, at a very early stage to use all the weapons 
at its disposal to, “ensure that R-R [Robe River] do not produce/deliver 
and advise all customers of this.” Additionally, senior officials planned 
to, “ensure that all other companies in the Pilbara produce as normal” 
(Campbell 1986, 1).125  
The lockout by Peko ran until September 3 – barely over 3 weeks. 
Short perhaps, but the inability of the accepted channels of Australian 
dispute settlement to end the lockout and the quick recourse by Peko 
management and the AMWSU to traditional enterprise collective 
bargaining and, in the case of deadlock, court room solutions 
demonstrated the fragility of the arbitration system in the face of 
employer resolve. Intervention from the state government, WA 
commission orders and pressure from federal politicians all went for 
naught.  
It was not until Peko’s appeal against a WA Commission directive 
that Robe resume pre-July 31 operations was dismissed by the WA 
Industrial Appeal Court, that the lockout ended. But this came not 
                                                 
125 To that end the officials discussed the problem of the federal ban on 
secondary boycotts in Australia under section 45 (D) of the Trade Practices Act, and 
how to circumvent the ban. That provision provides for extremely heavy fines for 
unions who are not party to a dispute but whose actions produce loss of revenue for 
the firm in dispute. 45(D) would prevent the AMWSU from sympathy striking in other 
mines owned by Peko, or from allying with maritime unions in a strike that 
prevented the movement of Peko ore in their dockyards. AMWSU official George 
Campbell wrote in his notes of the meeting: 
“It is not impossible to show that “dispute” has sufficient independent 
e x i s t e n c e  t o  b e  s a i d  t o  h a v e  a  d o m i nant purpose…[and] that it was not 
impossible to do this.” (Campbell 1986, 1, 5)  237 
   
before Peko attempted to use office staff to run the electricity plant. 
The staff that refused were dismissed. In the following four days more 
staff that refused job transfers were dismissed. Between August and 
October, 520 employees left Robe, during which time, the WA 
Commission continued to hear submissions on the management’s 
proposed re-structuring. Both the Western Australian and Federal 
governments made submissions to the tribunal against Peko’s 
proposed changes. While the October 30 decision of the tribunal 
largely rubber-stamped many of Peko’s changes made between July 31 
and August 11, a critical issue of manning of shovel drivers was left 
undecided. Also critical was a ban on work stoppages during the 
period of the award. With the workforce on a go-slow policy that had 
its roots in the August 18 meeting of senior AMWSU officials (Campbell 
1986), in the weeks before the pre-Christmas shipping rush Robe 
experienced a shortage of shovel drivers. Robe responded by ordering 
non-mining staff to man the drivers and help monitor loading of the 
trains to the docks (Copeman 1987, 4, 5). 
Robes’ unions voted to strike indefinitely. The strike started on 
December 16th and lasted until January 25th.126 In a January 6 
meeting between AMWSU officials and Robe management, Robe Chief 
Dr. E Miller asserted that Robe had no faith in the tribunal process or 
the unions they faced, and that, as such, Robe had no recourse but to 
“crash or crash out.” (Newman 1987, 6). 
                                                 
126 Copeman claimed that Jack Marks, President of the Iron Ore Mining Unions 
Association, claimed publicly that the strike was aimed at destroying Peko. Given the 
August 18 meeting of AMWSU officials, the charge was probably near the mark.  238 
   
In practice that meant using whatever means necessary to achieve 
the re-structure they wanted, and the use of tort to force the union 
back to work. On December 31, writs were served on all the striking 
unions, as well as the senior officials Peko deemed to be responsible 
for the strike. Four causes of action were claimed: that the unions and 
the named officials induced employees to breach their contracts of 
employment, that unions and officials had interfered illegally with 
Robe’s contracts to supply ore to customers, and that the unions and 
officials conspired to induce breach and interference in the first two 
claims (Copeman 1987, 6).127 The writs served their purpose and 
forced the unions to re-negotiate the Robe award. Robe succeeded in 
                                                 
127 The legal advice received from Northmore, Hale, Davy and Leake to the 
AMWSU on January 2nd, 1987 did not bode well for the union movement: 
“If the claims…are successful then, the flood gates may well open to 
claims by employers of striking workers for damages against a union…to 
recoup losses they sustain during any form of industrial action. Were the 
parties to this action other than Peko-Wallsend et al, who are making 
public capital of being the vanguard of the “New Right”, we might be 
inclined to dismiss the claim…as a “try on” or “speculative”. Given the 
anxiety of Mr. Charles Copeman to fetter the effective industrial power of 
the Trades Union movement we consider that a concerted effort may now 
be made to extend the so-called industrial torts” (Northmore, Hale, Davy & 
Leake 1987, 2-3). 
Given that the October 30 decision of t h e  W A  C o m m i s s i o n  h a d  a  n o  s t r i k e  
clause, the advice concluded that, “the employer is saying to employees that they 
have no right or duty to work” and hence employees were procured to breach their 
contracts of October 30. The advice continued: 
“It is of cardinal importance that the industrial action at “Robe” 
continues to be seen inside and outside of court as self motivated “grass 
roots” industrial action…We clearly will seek to argue that the self 
motivated grass roots strike at Robe is withdrawal of labor by the 
workforce-motivated by local industrial strife and outside the control of 
(and indeed against the preferred policy of” the State Industrial Unions” (4-
5). 
Given the high level of involvement of senior state and federal union officials in 
the strike since August, and the notes of George Campbell at the 18 August meeting 
(“if in a position of weakness, need to look at possibility of returning to work (1)”) and 
the discussion of slow-downs and secondary action in that meeting, it would have 
been extremely difficult for the AMWSU at the least to claim that the strike was not 
due to some large degree to the actions of union officials, and that the strike had no 
secondary aspects that caused interference with Robes supply of iron ore.  239 
   
forcing most of the changes they desired, including the critical issues 
of shift lengths, penalty rates and overtime, transfer of workers, and 
use of staff for essential services when mine labor was not available.128 
9.4.2 The effects & implications of the dispute 
The militant campaign conducted by the new management at Robe 
River in the second half of 1986 and 1987 demonstrated the lengths 
that mining companies were prepared to go in order to reduce union 
influence at their operations during the centralized wage bargaining 
years of the Accord in order to achieve pay flexibility. The fact that 
Robe management was so militant can be attributed to two broad 
factors. First, unlike manufacturing firms, mining (and agribusiness) 
have a very limited ability to use the threat of exit from the economy in 
order to influence governments or unions to change policy or to temper 
their militancy. Mining and agribusiness go where the land dictates 
them to go, and the workforce they find there is the workforce they 
must use come what may. Denied a credible exit option, mining 
companies are therefore prone to use their political voice and 
industrial muscle. In the case of the Robe River dispute this meant 
using extreme tactics such as lockouts and mass sackings in order to 
get what they desired: a more compliant workforce over which they 
could mostly dictate the negotiations and terms of pay. Outside the 
workplace, mining companies sought out new employer groupings and 
poured large amounts of resources into them to lobby and cajole the 
                                                 
128 Critical in the final phase was the interjection into the dispute of the ACTU. 
The ACTU conceded Robe’s assertion that productivity at Robe was causing the mine 
to run at a loss: “the future viability of the operations at Robe River lies in improved 
productivity and efficiency” (ACTU 1987c, Attachment 2, 1).  240 
   
government to accept and enact their preference for a decentralized 
system that would give them the opportunity to regain the wage 
flexibility they desired. This is further taken up in the next section. 
Second, as the narrative suggests, the restrictions on managerial 
controls over wages and the deployment of labor imposed by the 
tribunal system were considerable. This provoked an extreme 
response. 
It is inconceivable that a dispute like Robe could have occurred in 
Ireland. Several points of difference explain why and make it easy to 
see how Australian centralized wage bargaining within the tribunal 
institutional context was extremely unlikely to succeed or survive for 
long in the 1980s and 1990s. First, the Irish wage bargaining system 
allowed exporters to either free-ride on the wage restraint of the 
domestic and public sectors, or to pay higher rates in order to recruit 
and retain labor. Indeed, the system allowed them complete freedom to 
do essentially what their own labor needs dictated. The Australian 
system by contrast, imposed a set of tribunal institutions on 
employers that gave unions a great deal of bargaining power that was 
embedded in the procedural rights to legal arbitration. Exporters, 
including Robe, could not deny organized labor their day in 
arbitration. This meant that, no matter what the employer’s will or 
means at their disposal, organized labor had the capacity to extract 
concessions from management. Indeed, Robe had to justify its 
restructuring to the WA tribunal. Irish exporters wanting to re-
structure their workplace would not be faced with a similar restriction. 
Australian wage bargaining institutions clearly and quite  241 
   
fundamentally compromised exporter wage flexibility by undermining 
the process aspect of pay flexibility. As the narrative above suggests, 
the tribunal system was slow, cumbersome and it was not always clear 
that problems would be resolved. Indeed, as I have suggested in 
chapter 7 in the brief narrative history of arbitration, the system 
seemed to entrench and prolong disputation. 
Second, there is the issue of economic structure. As already 
canvassed, the Australian export sector is dominated by companies 
who are far more likely to become politically and noisily active if faced 
with wage policies they do not like compared to the Irish export sector. 
Irish exporters, mostly manufacturers and traded services, can leave. 
Miners and farmers cannot so easily. It is easier to establish a new 
factory than it is to find a profitable mineral deposit or several 
thousand square miles of prime farming and grazing land. This simple 
difference suggests that Australian exporters would be more 
committed to changing the wage bargaining system if it was 
disagreeable to them. Irish exporters could, in the last resort, leave 
rather than fight. This would imply that within the Irish system, there 
would be certain degree of political slack allowed any wage bargaining 
system that encroached on export sector wage flexibility.129 
                                                 
129 In their discussion of the decentralization of wage bargaining in Sweden, 
Swenson & Pontusson argue that the resource industries in Sweden were not 
prominent players pushing for decentralization because they were capital intensive 
industries with small relative labor costs who cared more about avoiding industrial 
disputes and the interruption of supply to markets, and because their labor 
processes were such that pay flexibility was not important to forestry employers 
(Swenson & Pontusson 2000, 93-94). The critical difference between the Australian 
and Swedish cases is that the mining resource sector faced a prolonged stagnation of 
export prices, which when coupled with active and militant unions whose power was, 
in large part, enabled by the tribunal system led mining employers to campaign 
against the tribunal system and the centralized wage bargains through which union  242 
   
Finally, there is the complete contrast in the unionization of the 
Australian and Irish export sectors. Mining in Australia has very high 
rates of unionization (63% of employees in 1988 – see table 7.1). By 
contrast, the Irish export sector, with the exception of 
pharmaceuticals, is increasingly union-free and has probably a union 
density of less than 20% (see chapter 4). The likelihood that an export 
employer or a mining export employer will find themselves negotiating 
with a union over wages is far higher in Australia than in Ireland in 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
Robe had three vital implications for the centralized system of 
wage bargaining in Australia. First, the dispute illustrated that any 
employer offensive against the arbitration system was also clearly one 
against the trade unions, since much of the industrial power unions 
held prior to 1985 came via the arbitration system at the state and 
federal levels. Hence the lack of local flexibility came to be seen as a 
dual arbitration/trade union problem. Second, given that the Accord 
wage bargains were structured around tribunal National Wage Cases, 
growing frustration from militant mining firms and agribusiness over 
the restrictions on wage flexibility imposed by the tribunal system kick 
started the campaign against centralized wage bargaining. Disputes 
such as Robe highlighted the rigidity of the system that took the 
central deals and shaped actual wage outcomes. The campaign against 
the tribunals fed the nascent campaign for a move to decentralized 
                                                                                                                                             
power was further enhanced and their own control of pay severely compromised. 
Historically, the mining sector has received no assistance from the government and 
has at various times been subject to extra taxation. This has lead them to an 
aggressive free market position (see, for instance, Grover 1983, 89-129).  243 
   
bargaining. Finally, the dispute showed fellow exporters and employers 
that if arbitration was unsatisfactory to management, common law 
actions were a viable option. This struck at the heart of the main 
argument in favor of arbitration and the centralized system: that it 
provided an orderly and complete solution to industrial disputation. 
Clearly it did not, and as the discussion in chapter 7 of the history of 
arbitration in the 1970s suggested, it had failed to do so in many 
significant opinion-forming disputes for over 15 years. The rationale 
for the system was now under question. 
What is telling is the response of the government to the dispute. 
The timing of Robe was fortuitous for opponents of centralized wage 
bargaining, because as is documented in the next chapter, it came as 
the federal government began to make public statements of the need to 
boost competitiveness in light of the worsening balance of payments 
problem. Debt made the Labor government if not sympathetic to the 
strategy used by Peko management, then certainly to the underlying 
message. On August 13, Prime Minister Hawke accused Peko of 
holding double standards – being critical of unions for flouting the 
system but doing it themselves when it suited them. Hawke, however, 
added that unions needed to recognize that old work unproductive 
practices were inappropriate and had to be eradicated (Robins, Noonan 
& Hywood 1987, 4) Clearly, Hawke understood the message Peko sent. 
It was its manner that was unpalatable. This was an important 
reaction.130 
                                                 
130 This message was emphasized to AMWSU officials in a January 7 meeting 
with Senator Peter Cook, the new federal Minister for Industrial Relations. In that 
meeting Cook is recorded as saying that he did not see the problems at Robe as due  244 
   
9.5 The Business Council of Australia 
9.5.1 Formation & membership 
Most commentators and academic literature on the subject 
conclude that the BCA became the primary voice of big business in 
Australia during the Accord years (for instance, see Mathews 1994, 
204; Sheldon & Thornthwaite 1999c, O’Brien 1996). In the heyday of 
its influence between 1987 and 1993 it was the most important 
employer body in the decentralization of wage bargaining debate.131 
Formed in September 1983 five months after the National Economic 
Summit through a merger of the Business Roundtable and the 
Australian Industry Development Association, membership was by 
                                                                                                                                             
to any ‘new right’ influence, and that the largest problem was the potential spread of 
the industrial unrest throughout the Pilbara (Newman 1987, 4). The trade minister, 
Peter Willis, also expressed similar concerns to Cook in August 1986 (Robins, 
Noonan & Hywood 1987, 4). Neither ministers appeared to be troubled by what Peko 
was trying to achieve, only that the tactics used by Peko at Robe shouldn’t provoke 
industrial unrest at other mines. 
131 During the years of the Accord, the number of peak employer associations in 
Australia increased from three (the Confederation of Australian Industry (CAI), the 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) and the National Farmers 
Federation (NFF) to seven (ACCI, NFF, CAI, the Metal Trade Industry Association 
(MTIA), the Australian Chamber of Manufactures (ACM), the Australian Mining 
Industry Council (AMIC) and the Business Council of Australia (BCA). These seven 
groups were unusual in that the majority of trade and sector associations were not 
members, rather their constituent firms were. The exception was the CAI, which 
allowed only trade association membership. Formed in 1977 and intended to be the 
peak association a la Confederation of British Industry, the CAI suffered from holes 
in its membership: there were no public sector associations, no AMIC, or the 
Australian Finance Council. Also absent were ACCI and the Federal Chamber of 
Automotive Industry. In other words, what was absent from the CAI was large 
business, especially large exporters, who came to regard the CAI as a pro-
protectionist lobby and the preserve of small business interests. Burdened by 
declining membership and the exit of the Australian Chambers of Manufactures in 
1989, CAOI merged with ACCI in 1992. Outside of ACCI remained the three large 
exporter employer associations: The BCA, the ACM and the NFF (Mathews 1994, 
202-204; McEachern 1986, 20).  245 
   
invitation only.132 The purpose of the association was simple: to bring 
more influence over policy making, especially labor market policy. 
Most members had highly unionized plants and workplaces. A 
1989 BCA survey estimated that union density in the member 
companies was around 75% (Hilmer et al 1989, part 2, 10). In terms of 
their revenue in 1989, 23 of the largest 30 firms in Australia were 
members of the BCA. 23 of the largest 30 employers were members, 
and 17 of the largest 30 asset holders. Prominent exporter members in 
1989 included BHP (mining, steel manufacture), Elders IXL 
(agribusiness), BTR Nylex (chemicals), and Pacific Dunlop 
(predominantly textiles). The membership list also included four bank 
CEOs (ANZ, Commonwealth, NAB and Westpac), three life insurance 
companies, five oil companies (BP, Esso, Mobil, Caltex and Shell), five 
auto manufacturers (Ford, General Motors Holden, Mitsubishi, Nissan 
and Toyota) and seven mining companies (Alcoa (bauxite), CRA (now 
Rio Tinto, then predominantly iron ore), MIM, North Broken Hill Peko, 
Santos (natural gas), Woodside Petroleum, and Rension Goldfields) 
(Mathews 1994, 205). Of these members, mining interests came to 
dominate the executive and administration with the second and third 
Presidents of the Council being Western Mining chief, Sir Arni Parvo 
and (later Sir) Roderick Carnegie, who resigned his post as chairman 
and chief executive of CRA to take up the Presidency (Sheldon & 
Thornthwaite 1999c, 55). 
                                                 
132 Turnover was comparatively high-only 10 of the original 73 members 
remained in 1993 (Sheldon & Thornthwaite 1999c, 48-49).  246 
   
The roots of the creation of the BCA lay in the disunity and lack of 
effective peak employer association representation at the 1983 
Summit. The Financial Review described the business response at the 
Summit as a “rabble” (Financial Review 14 April 1983, 1, 10). Present 
at the Summit was the Confederation of Australian Industry (CAI), 
which purported to represent business, and a number (18) of CEOs 
from Australia’s major corporations. Most commentaries seem to agree 
that while Prime Minister Hawke was not directly responsible for the 
formation of the BCA (despite his stated wish to unite employers) the 
Summit highlighted the lack of an effective organizational voice for 
large pro free trade firms: in other words, exporters (McEachern 1991, 
20-21; Kelly 1994, 276-277; Hawke 1994, 182; Sheldon & 
Thornthwaite 1999c, 48-49). In 1989, 62% of the BCA member CEO’s 
believed that their employer associations only partially represented 
their interests (Hilmer et al 1989 part 2, 4). 
Evidence also suggests that the so-called ‘Gang of 18’ formed the 
BCA because the Accord was negotiated by unions and the 
government but imposed costs on employers in terms of pay rises and 
potential inflation. This became apparent from the opening economic 
Summit. At various points as the Accord progressed, lower pay rises 
were traded off for increased pension contributions by the government 
and the union movement.133 Employers therefore bore a great deal of 
the cost of the side-payments to labor in the achievement of real wage 
restraint. The Accord was not and never was a genuine tri-parte 
agreement. This fact, despite costs being imposed on employers arising 
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from the Accord negotiations, was a major impetus to BCA flourishing 
and becoming as influential as it was in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. As Sir Peter Abeles, Chairman of Ansett Airlines and Managing 
Director of TNT, a multinational transportation company, commented 
at the initial Economic Summit:  
“I challenge you [PM Bob Hawke of whom he was a close 
friend], Sir, I challenge the government and the ACTU to make 
a bilateral agreement into a trilateral agreement…it would only 
be an extension of the spirit of this Summit if business was 
incorporated as the third party of this accord, as an equal 
partner. I am sure that you, sir, would not like to feel as most 
of us have felt during the early days of this Conference, as 
though we have been invited to play singles tennis against a 
championship doubles combination (NESC 1983a, 194).” 
Despite business never being directly incorporated into the Accord, 
the BCA became a policy agenda-setter, especially in the labor policy 
arena. Setting itself between the ‘new right’ of the HR Nicholls Society 
and a group of aggressive mining and agribusiness firms, and the right 
wing of the ALP of which Treasurer and later PM Paul Keating was the 
most prominent figure, the BCA managed to exercise considerable 
control of the policy agenda (Dawkins 1994, 4; Tingle 1994, 283; 
Sheldon & Thornthwaite 1999c, 283ff). The successful political 
strategy to achieve decentralization and labor market de-regulation 
was via a series of small policy shifts, rather than the dramatic large- 
changes that appeared in New Zealand around the same time (Bray & 
Neilson 1996; Goldfinch 2000). It was during the Presidency of 
Roderick Carnegie after 1987 that the BCA exercised it largest 
influence over policy: an influence that owed much to Carnegie’s 
political strategy of gradualism that gave the BCA a veneer of  248 
   
moderation. Core to this strategy of gradual change was the refocusing 
of the decentralization of bargaining debate onto the benefits of 
enterprise bargaining (EB) and away from the new right’s pre-
occupation with the supposed evils of the arbitration system (Sheldon 
& Thornthwaite 1999c, 55).  
9.5.2 Policy position 
What is striking about the BCA’s opposition to central wage 
bargaining is that the focus of their campaign, by and large, was on 
the process aspect of pay flexibility. At times, pay outcomes surfaced 
as a major concern, but over the length of the campaign, it was the 
institutional process that delivered the centralized system and set 
wages that was the primary target. As I showed in chapter 8, wage 
restraint in the public (and also the private) sector meant that wage 
creep was never a great concern. Where the issue of rising wages was 
raised, it was in the context of how the centralized system via the 
tribunals had the capacity to create spiralling wages in the future.134 
The focus on pay setting processes rather then pay outcomes meant 
that much attention was directed at the tribunal system and, 
increasingly over time, towards what was regarded as the obstruction 
of trade unions towards the achievement by employers of greater pay 
flexibility necessitated by more competitive markets. 
                                                 
134 There is a certain irony here when the union’s acquiescence to the move to 
decentralized wage bargaining is considered. Briggs (2001) argues that a major 
reason for the union support of the move was to obtain larger wage rises, since the 
centralized system was regarded as holding back wage movements. This was a 
mistake, as the comparison of wage movements between the two-tier and EB periods 
in chapter 8 shows.  249 
   
Before, during and after the EB campaign, the guiding frame of the 
BCA policy position was competitiveness. Through this prism came 
their emphasis on flexibility and, by 1987, enterprise bargaining. This 
trajectory can be neatly and appropriately tracked through its 
publications. Alongside its gradualist approach to change, the BCA 
was unique among employer associations in Australia in its highly 
developed research capacity. From its early days, the BCA positioned 
itself as a generator of policy ideas. Throughout the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, the BCA established the Industrial Relations Study 
Commission which conducted three major pieces of research by a 
team headed by ex-McKinsey Australia head, Fred Hilmer: Enterprise-
based Bargaining Units: A Better Way of Working (Hilmer et al 1989), 
Avoiding Industrial Action (Hilmer et al 1991)135, and Working Relations 
(Hilmer et al 1993). These reports coordinated by teams of academics 
were critical in providing the BCA cause with the gloss of intellectual 
authority.136  
Comparisons of Australia’s wage costs relative to competitors were 
the initial focus of the BCA. In its first newsletter (the Business Council 
Bulletin) in December 1983, the lead article is simply entitled 
“Competitiveness.” The list of the ten threats to international 
competitiveness is headed by, “escalating wage costs” and “escalating 
non-wage labour costs” (BCA 1983, 1, 2). At this early stage, the BCA 
                                                 
135 Later re-worked and released as separate book: Productive Relations: 
Australian Industrial Relations & Workplace Performance (Drago, Wooden & Sloan 
1992) 
136 These reports were heavily criticized within Australian academe as being 
poor research based on questionable methods, selective use of evidence and 
motivated by political concerns (Dabscheck 1990; Frenkel & Peetz 1990a; O’Brien 
1994)  250 
   
was not advocating enterprise bargaining. Rather the emphasis was on 
promoting ‘flexibility of attitudes’ and overcoming ‘resistance to 
change” (BCA 1984a, 6). The same 1984 article proceeds to argue, 
“labour market failures are perhaps the most important obstacle to 
improved competitiveness and economic performance in Australia” 
(12). What were the reasons for these failures? Prominent candidates 
cited included centralized wage fixation that included elements, “which 
detract from genuine communication and negotiation at the enterprise 
level, artificially create disputation to achieve intervention [and operate 
on conflict and ambit claims” (12). Others were comparative wage 
justice effects (the pursuit of relativities claims by trade unions) that 
spread wage rises throughout the economy. There was a perceived 
‘one-sided bargaining power’ between employers and unions 
presumably meaning that union bargaining power was too great (BCA 
1984a, 12). 
Numerous articles throughout 1985 reinforced these themes: 
competitiveness, flexibility and the need to eradicate rigidities within 
the centralized system (BCA 1985a; 1985b; 1985c; 1985d; 1985e). 
This included avoiding union intervention in the name of real 
‘industrial democracy’ and linking productivity to wages (BCA 1985b, 
2).  
In early 1985 the BCA position was not a fully articulated EB 
position, rather it advocated against, “formal tribunal-based industrial 
relations from…becoming…all-embracing (10).” Following the release 
of the Hancock report in mid-1985 that essentially supported the  251 
   
tribunal-based wage fixing status quo137, the BCA moved more 
decisively in an EB policy direction.138 Commenting on the 
Mudginberri dispute in September 1985, the Bulletin argued that the 
dispute: 
“Reflects what must be done to redress our poor, long 
standing productivity performance…They are… in the ‘traded 
goods’ sector…They provided export income which in turn 
contributes to our ability to import and the stability of our 
balance of payments and exchange rate. The Mudginberri 
affair has already resulted in the loss of export contracts. The 
activities of the trade union movement…have thus caused 
some damage to our national welfare (BCA 1985d, 8)”139.  
By 1986, many exporters had become less confident about the 
ability of the Accord centralized system to restrain real wage growth. 
This is despite the excellent record on this (as documented in chapter 
8).140 Explaining the paradoxical attitude of the BCA in light of the 
movement of real wages, the BCA Director of Policy Analysis and 
Research argued in a Canberra speech in August 1986 that trade 
union acquiescence was probably temporary, the quid pro quo of the 
Accord I and II could not continue (cuts in income tax thresholds and 
superannuation increases) and the creation of CPI increases as a 
                                                 
137 This was a Senate ordered inquiry into wage bargaining that essentially 
recommended the preservation of the Accord I and II era status quo. 
138 This shift coincided with a rejection of Accord II because the wage rises in 
the agreement were too high. ‘Flexibility’ was again the buzzword (1985c, 14). 
139 The article concluded that trade unions in the Mudginberri dispute had 
interfered with the, “close and beneficial cooperation at the enterprise level” and that 
the dispute, “symbolises some critical choices for Australia (1985d, 9).” 
140 Average real earnings fell from November 1983 until November 1988. 
Between the end of 1983 and 1987, the only industries where average real earnings 
rose were in mining, property and business services, finance and insurance, cultural 
and recreational services, and marginally in retail and accommodation, restaurants 
and cafes (see figures 8.2-8.4). In at least the three service industries where real 
earnings rose, the suspicion is that this was due to occupational change and in 
cultural and recreational services, the growth of professional sports. Hence, it was 
only in mining that it can be confidently concluded that real wage rises rose to any 
significant extent in the centralized years between 1983 and 1987.  252 
   
‘right’ paid no attention to enterprise needs and productivity. The 
speech concluded that the wage bargaining system need to move, 
“toward a system progressively more geared to performance-related 
incentives at the enterprise level (BCA 1986b, 9).” The BCA was far 
more concerned with the process aspects of pay flexibility and the 
capacity of the absence of such flexibility to promote damaging large 
pay rises in the future.  
As a result of this primary concern over the process aspect of pay 
flexibility, the BCA suspicion of unions became more prominent as the 
Accord wore on. The employment of Fred Hilmer of McKinsey in 1986 
was a clear public indicator of the BCA’s non-union agenda.141. In a 
March 1986 article that expressly discusses union power, it is argued 
that unions via closed shops had been given power and privilege 
beyond those available to other associations of individuals, and that 
there was, “widespread compulsion or coercion in relation to 
membership, and indeed on the freedom of individuals to act against 
the demands of unions (1986a, 9).” While somewhat circumspect, the 
                                                 
141 McKinsey is renowned for its promotion of non-union workplaces. While not 
overt, the case studies used in Tom Peters’ & McKinsey partner, Robert Waterman’s 
1982 management ‘how to’ manual, In Search of Excellence, are all non-union 
workplaces. The McKinsey way in the 1980s was to promote responsibility and 
obligation among employees within a flat managerial hierarchy of a highly skilled but 
numerically lean staff. This responsibility and obligation is then infused with heavy 
doses of popular psychology: of employees expressing themselves, finding personal 
fulfillment or as Fred Hilmer terms it, a “volunteer mindset (Hilmer 1985, chapter 
1).” Obligation and responsibility create trust between employer and employee. 
Within this framework, outside influences, AKA trade unions are an unwelcome 
intrusion (On the McKinsey influence on the BCA, see O’Brien 1994.).  253 
   
piece argues against regulation and, “intermediaries external to the 
firm (10)” defining the interests of a firm and its people.142 
With the move of CRA (mining) CEO, Rod Carnegie (another ex-
McKinsey consultant) to the Presidency came an explicit move to an 
EB policy position in March 1987.143 Pay flexibility was prioritized, 
with possibilities for performance-related pay, and an emphasis on 
productivity-based pay raises and single enterprise agreements (rather 
than the possibility and reality of many agreements governing one 
workplace that is still characteristic in 2005) (BCA 1987a).144 Kelly 
(1994, 280) concludes on the emergence of this policy preference as, 
“the pioneering of the new industrial relations culture. It was a turning 
point.” 
By 1987 the BCA had adopted many of the ‘new right’ concerns 
about the power of trade unionism.145 Whereas the ‘new right’ attack 
                                                 
142 The article then moves onto to advocate a classic McKinsey position called 
‘new management’ based on flat hierarchies, mutual commitment to the goals of the 
firm, enhanced employee participation and scope for personal growth (10). 
143 . The BCAs new industrial relations policy was coordinated by Stan Wallis of 
Amcor (mining), with significant input from Jim Layt of Blue Circle Southern Cement 
and Ian Webber of Mayne Nickless (transport). 
144 The policy on unions was that they were welcomed in the envisaged EB 
system, but conflict should and would be avoided because long-term interests of 
employees and the enterprise are essentially aligned. 
145 The bastion of the new right was the HR Nicholls Society. Formed in early 
1986, the H.R. Nicholls Society was named after a small Tasmanian newspaper’s 
editor contempt fight with Justice Higgins, the father of Australian arbitration and 
responsible for the 1907 decision that tied wage levels to need rather than the 
employer’s capacity to pay. The society was founded by Western Mining executive 
officer, Ray Evans, and at the inaugural conference in Toorak, Victoria in late 
February, a small but vastly influential group of around 40 attended committed to 
what they termed as “our Higgins problem.” The list of attendees included High 
Morgan, executive director of Western Mining, John Stone, former head of the 
Commonwealth Treasury and Peko-Wallsend board member, Charles Copeman, 
Peko-Wallsend CEO, Barrie Purvis, director of the Australian Wool Selling brokers 
association, the director of the National Farmer’s Federation, Ian MacLachlan, 
Federal Opposition leader John Howard’s policy adviser, Gerard Henderson, a young 
Peter Costello, Barrister at law in the Owen Dixon Chambers in Melbourne and 
currently the federal Treasurer, Sir John Kerr, former Arbitration Commissioner and  254 
   
was in the context of a desire for the unfettered use of employer 
prerogatives in the workplace, the BCA tacitly, at least, agreed that 
unions had a right to exist (as the right of association). What the BCA 
wanted was a wage setting institutional structure and a widespread 
managerial style that marginalized and made unions largely irrelevant. 
By the beginning of 1989, the BCA was explicitly linking changing 
markets to the need for an increased emphasis on workplace wage 
bargaining. The argument was simple: only customers can ensure 
economic expansion of Australia. Customers want the choice of the 
best from anywhere in the world, and only the enterprise unit can act 
optimally to deliver that choice. Enterprises need to be able to respond 
quickly in order to be successful (BCA 1989d, 5-6). The two-tier 
system offered no proper alternative because, “it is aligned with 
national union and government agendas…and is actually holding them 
back (BCB 1989d, 9).” Business Council Bulletin articles in 1988 make 
it clear that the two-tier was regarded as a staging post for the full 
transition to a decentralized system (BCA 1988a).  
Growing evidence of the non-union preference of the BCA became 
clear in the first and most influential of the BCA reports, Enterprise-
based Bargaining: A Better Way of Working, in 1989.146 By the time of 
publishing, the two-tier system had been operating for over two years 
                                                                                                                                             
infamous as the Governor General who sacked the Whitlam government in November 
1975, Michael Porter, Monash University academic, Andrew Hay, Liberal Party 
research director, and Wayne Gilbert, executive officer of the SEQEB. The 
proceedings of the conference were published as Arbitration in Contempt and were 
launched publicly by Professor Geoffrey Blainey. 
146 The 1989 report was based on a series of paired comparisons and a survey of 
management of 330 predominantly large workplaces. All respondents and cases 
studies were from BCA member firms.  255 
   
and little progress on workplace restructuring and pay flexibility, both 
in terms of outcome (severing relativities, generating downward wage 
flexibility) or process (second tier agreements still had to be ratified by 
the AIRC), had been made (see section 9.5). In fact, real wages had 
risen across the board, especially in the export and public sectors (see 
figures 8.7-8.9), and BCA fears about union militancy in mid-1986 
had been realized to some extent. 
The report made three broad conclusions from which a number of 
others followed. First, CEOs equated economic prosperity with their 
own competitiveness within the world marketplace. Second, a shift 
from an industrial relations mindset to an employee relation mindset 
was needed. Finally, several institutional changes were necessary to 
achieve the first two -- namely, the continuing opening of the economy, 
further reform of management structures (to more horizontal 
structures) closer alignment of union with enterprise goals, and finally, 
further reform of the industrial relations institutional and tribunal 
framework. This final change specifically involved the promotion of 
remuneration levels and patterns that reflected enterprise-specific 
factors (Hilmer et al 1989, 2).147 Only institutions that support 
enterprise-specific responses to changing markets and customer tastes 
would be growth enhancing. A fully legitimated workplace or firm-
based bargaining option was necessary (4). 
                                                 
147 The enterprise-based industrial relations system is argued in A Better Way of 
Working as the only one that can address the ‘first truth’: “that only customers can 
underwrite the expansion of economic activity and employment in Australia (BCA 
1989, 3)  256 
   
While critical about pay outcomes, the 1989 report emphasized 
the process aspect of pay flexibility. Within the argument for enterprise 
bargaining the primary goal of the creation of single enterprise 
bargaining units was advocated. Enterprise bargaining would move the 
locus of control over wages and conditions to the firm at the plant 
level, thereby improving efficiency (Hilmer et al 1989, 55). Single 
bargaining units would mean the end of demarcation disputes: 
disputes between unions at a single workplace over what work was 
covered by what award, what union and by extension which particular 
worker or group of workers (Hilmer et al 1989, 61-66).148 Single 
enterprise bargaining units would also weaken the ability of trade 
unions to block workplace change (71-73). But primarily, single 
enterprise bargaining units would promote the reward and 
development of individuals at work with respect to the work they do 
rather than having their wages (and conditions) set through 
relativities-based process enabled by multiple unions at the one 
workplace. The BCA message was that while decentralization of wage 
bargaining was necessary at a minimum, breaking the linking of wage 
movements between plants and firms, across industries and the 
economy -- the non-coordination of wages -- was a long-term necessity 
(Hilmer et al 1989, 20-22; also see Angwin & McLaughlin 1990, 14-17; 
BCA 1989a; 1989b; 1989c; 1989d; 1989e).149 
                                                 
148 The problem of demarcation disputes and the multi-bargaining unit system 
that created them according to Martin Ferguson, ACTU President between 1990 and 
1996, was the second reason, along with mining employer opposition, that caused 
the decentralization of wage bargaining (Ferguson interview 2001). 
149 The clear influence of the McKinsey approach to human resource 
management is apparent in the report, not surprising given that Fred Hilmer chaired 
the research team. The report concluded that employee relations should be  257 
   
While the desire for one single workplace agreement per enterprise 
was preferred in the report, given the fractured nature of Australian 
unions and the prevalence of many agreements in most workplaces, 
such a goal was probably not practical or indeed possible in the short-
term.150 However, the explicit emphasis on EB and the stated 
preference of most surveyed CEOs for an EB wage bargaining system 
was a significant outcome of the report.151 152 
The anti-union bias of the BCA membership was demonstrated in 
the 1988/89 site manager survey portion of the 1989 report. On three 
measures: labor flexibility (an index emphasizing managerial 
prerogative to deploy labor as they see fit), effort (the prevalence of 
shirking) and work to rule (the prevalence of union’s strictly adhering 
to agreement guidelines over the division of labor), the authors of the 
report found that union power and influence (measured as an index of 
items examining union influence over pay, hiring and firing, the 
                                                                                                                                             
characterized by mutual interests, increased trust, individualism and flexibility 
whereas industrial relations as practiced in Australia was characterized by conflict, 
low trust, central control and the promotion of uniformity and equality over 
flexibility. The report estimated that productivity increases would be in the order of 
25% if a move to enterprise based bargaining units was made (Hilmer et al 1989, 5, 
8). 
150 For instance, according to AWIRS data, workplaces with between 100 and 
199 employees had an average of 3.3 awards per workplace; workplaces between 200 
and 499, 4.5, and ones over 500 employees, 5.3. The average for all workplaces in 
the 1988-89 survey was 1.8 (Callus et al 1991, 41) 
151 In the CEO survey on which part of the report was based, 76% indicated 
they believed that the current award system was “cumbersome and outdated.” 79% 
supported the introduction of company-based awards. 83% of CEOs believed that 
there needed to be a greater enterprise focus within the industrial relations system 
(Hilmer et al 1989, part 2, 5, 6, 7) 
152 In the BCA member site manager survey that accompanied the CEO survey, 
54% of site managers believed that being unable to reward good performance had a 
moderate or large affect on productivity. 68.4% objected to the provision of so-called 
‘penalty rates’ for weekends and evening work on the basis such rates also affected 
productivity (Hilmer et al 1989, part 2, 25. 26). Penalty rates were a feature of 
centralized agreements.  258 
   
allocation of work, and changes to work processes) was a powerful 
negative influence on labor flexibility, worker effort, and a positive 
influence on restrictive work behavior (Hilmer et al 1989, part 2, 41). 
At the back of the main report, under the heading of “longer-term 
directions” the non-union goal of the BCA was made explicit.153 Any 
industrial relations system needed to, “provide for this preference to be 
recognized formally” (Hilmer et al 1989, 103).154 
                                                 
153 Further reports in 1991 (Avoiding Industrial Action) and 1993 (Working 
Relations) expanded on these themes. The 1991 report emphasized strategic HRM 
(especially the use of alternate communication channels and management/employee 
quality circles and action groups) as a way to avoid unions at the workplace (BCA 
1991). Whereas the 1989 report argued that centralized bargaining was outdated due 
to changing product market conditions, Avoiding Industrial Action criticized the 
centralized award system as fostering industrial conflict. Conflict increased at the 
workplace level due to the uncertainties of application at the workplace of multi-firm 
and industry awards. The centralized wage setting process was not merely outdated; 
it was always the wrong system for Australia (Hilmer et al 1991, 26-55). 
Working Relations (1993) advocated a further reduced role for the AIRC (largely 
adopted in the 1996 Act under PM John Howard), and further mechanisms for 
rationalizing union organization (Hilmer et al 1993). By 1993, however, the overt 
influence of the BCA on policy debate had waned to some extent: a press conference 
for the launch of Working Relations was cancelled due to a lack of interest (Sheldon 
& Thornthwaite 1999c, 61). This waning was mostly due to the adoption of the BCA 
position by ALP leaders and the growing acceptance of decentralized wage bargaining 
among trade unionists (see section 9.7). The 1993 report lamented that while much 
progress had been made, reforms were not of the pace and magnitude necessary to, 
“lift the performance of Australian firms to levels needed for international 
competitiveness” (Hilmer et al 1993, foreword). The report also stated that BCA 
m e m b e r  C E O s  w e r e  n o w  i n  f a v o r  o f  a b o l i s hing compulsory arbitration altogether. 
Commenting on the 1989 report’s findings that CEOs regarded the arbitration 
system and centralized wage bargaining as barriers to change, while site managers 
were more likely to be sanguine about their effects, the 1993 report stated that the 
site manager’s conservatism was a reaction to the costs of initiating change at the 
workplace: it was “just too hard” (Hilmer et al 1993, 99). The report advocated, in 
overcoming these difficulties, individual and collective bargained workplace 
agreements with no AIRC intervention other than to act as an enforcer of minimum 
standards (121-123). 
154 The BCA got their wish. The 1993 Industrial Relations Reform Act allowed for 
non-union collective agreements, while the 1996 Industrial Relations Act allowed for 
individual (and non-union) agreements.  259 
   
9.6 Conclusion: the export employer offensive on central wage 
bargaining 
The core of the attack on centralized wage bargaining from the 
leaders of the offensive such as Peko-Wallsend, the National Farmers 
Federation and the BCA, was on the inability of the centralized system 
to deliver a wage setting process that these groups and employers 
regarded as capable of delivering flexible pay now and in the future. 
Hard-up employers such as Robe wanted a more malleable wage 
setting process free of institutional interference that gave entrenched 
union bargaining power. This was essential for them so that they could 
be free to decrease their wage bill when markets tightened and prices 
dropped. In practice this meant decreasing hourly rates, increasing the 
use of contractors and paid-by-the-hour employees (‘casuals’) and the 
ability to use low wage office employees in the mines. Peko-Wallsend 
and other employers like them in the ‘new right’ extended this anti-
centralization push to an attack on the tribunals for they saw these 
institutions as rigid, as enhancing union power and as a danger to 
their desire to exercise complete managerial control over pay.  
For the BCA, the ability to use such tactics was a concern too, but 
their argument was couched in more terms of enhancing 
competitiveness. For the BCA, this meant linking pay to productivity: a 
link that could only be made by locating pay setting at the plant and 
firm level. This meant, at the least, getting rid of the centralized system 
and allowing enterprise bargaining. This also lead the BCA to an 
increasingly anti-union position because they linked the centralized 
system to an enhanced power of unions to resist changes to moving  260 
   
wages in a productivity-based direction, and away from one based on 
the relative bargaining power of management and organized labor.  
The BCA’s policy position was influential in re-casting the debate 
on wage bargaining in Australia, especially in the important years of 
change between 1986 and 1991. The strategy was very simple: 
advocate gradual legislative change within an argument that continued 
to stress enterprise bargaining and the decentralization of wage 
bargaining. As wage bargaining decentralized, further more radical 
reforms were called for. The aim was to shift slowly but surely the 
terms of the debate on wage bargaining and workplace regulation in 
Australia. By 1991, the language of enterprise bargaining was 
mainstream in the Australian debate (O’Brien 1994, 488).155  That the 
BCA was able to take control of the debate was due to the 
government’s firming commitment to an open economic model of 
economic growth between 1983 and 1986, the critical importance of 
export dollars to the health of the economy and the government’s 
arrival at a view very much identical to that of the BCA: that 
decentralization was necessary to boost competitiveness of the 
economy. 
                                                 
155 The creation of the BCA fits the theoretical discussion of the successful LME 
employer association. It was a comparatively small group drawn from very large 
firms, with much to gain from the proposals it advanced. It developed quickly, and as 
the policy scene changed did so itself: it was quick on its feet.   
261   
Chapter 10 
Explaining the decentralization 
of Australian wage bargaining: 
The actions of policy makers 
 
10.1 Following the employers 
From very early on in the Accord, the potential for an expanding 
public sector and excessive public sector wage drift were avoided. 
Much like the experience of Ireland’s Social Partnership, the 
government imposed tight controls on public spending and on public 
sector wages (see chapter 8). As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
problematic issue for Australian centralized bargaining was the rigidity 
of the system and the inability of the institutions that delivered wage 
outcomes to allow any flexibility in the process by which pay was set. 
This lead to the argument by export employers such as Robe, that the 
tribunal system was also delivering wage outcomes greater than a 
tribunal-less environment would deliver. The tribunal wage setting 
process often tilted the balance of power in the favor of trade unions 
over management, and enabled unions to extract concessions from 
employers that in the absence of the tribunals they would not have 
received. As discussed in chapter 7, the system in specific cases could 
exercise some degree of independent power. Add that to the way the 
system enhanced the power of atomized and otherwise quite 
organizationally weak unions and export employers, and the 
opposition of export employers to the system was understandable. 
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Policy-makers came relatively quickly to a similar view in the 
handful of years after 1985 and sought to decentralize wage setting as 
a means to marginalize the tribunals and enable the process aspect of 
pay flexibility. This was viewed as a prerequisite for pay outcome 
flexibility that would mean that wage levels would reflect plant and 
workplace level productivity. I leave the issue of trade unions and their 
influence on policy makers as far as possible to a separate section that 
immediately follows where I specifically address whether trade unions 
were the important causal actor in the decentralization of Australian 
wage bargaining. 
10.2 The first Accord & the floating of the dollar 
In a speech in 1999 to the University of New South Wales, the 
Treasurer from 1983-1990, Paul Keating, summarized the challenges 
facing the Australian economy under Labor: 
“[T] he Labor Government found – and had to find – a new 
way of delivering growth to the Australian economy. It did this 
by embracing openness rather than the protectionism of the 
past. It saw competition as the best way of ensuring that in a 
more open economy the interests of ordinary working men and 
women were better secured” (Keating 1999). 
This was not dominant view or the policy framework within the 
Cabinet when the ALP came to power in 1983. International economic 
pressures caused a re-focus of economic policy and with it, a re-
casting of wage bargaining policy. The original conception of the 
Accord, and its actual development within the first three years were 
remarkably different. In its conception, the Accord looked like a 
northern European corporatist experiment: highly centralized wage 
bargaining, with social wage trade-offs for wage restraint, and an  263 
   
activist industrial policy for job creation. But budget deficits and the 
floating of the dollar undermined this vision. By 1986, wage bargaining 
was no longer linked with the social wage and macro-economic 
stabilization. It was a tool for micro-economic change. Unions traded 
wage restraint for tax cuts. The early years of the Accord were 
conducted within the context of a government not fully aware of what 
a commitment to an open economy model for economic growth would 
mean for other areas of public policy such as wage bargaining. As the 
commitment to an open economy way firmed in 1985 and 1986 and 
the economic effects of that became known and clear to policy-makers, 
wage bargaining policy changed. The transition to later permutations 
from Accords I and II is therefore a neat test of the argument that the 
motivation that drives policy maker’s labor market preferences in an 
open economy is the pursuit of competitiveness, and how this 
translates into a policy preference for decentralized bargaining. The 
goals of wage bargaining shifted sometime around 1986 when the 
imperatives of open economy competitiveness dictated that exporter 
preferences over wage bargaining policy be heeded by policy-makers. 
The UK solution under Thatcher to the problems of rising inflation 
and unemployment following the collapse of the Social Contract had 
been to raise the price of money and to tighten public expenditure: the 
monetarist solution.156 This was accompanied by a crackdown on 
trade unions that culminated in the Miner’s Strike. The ALP when it 
came to power in 1983 sought another path - a possible third way that 
was neither socialist nor monetarist. During the 1983 election 
                                                 
156 See Thatcher 1993, chapters 2 and 5.  264 
   
campaign, ALP opposition leader, Bob Hawke advocated a social pact 
with trade unions designed to control wages, alongside an 
expansionary fiscal policy designed to create employment (Stilwell 
1986, 8).157 The aim was to steer wage bargaining away from a focus 
on gross pay to one focused on a social wage where household income 
was the litmus test and welfare payments, state and employer pension 
contributions and tax cuts entered the wage bargaining calculus 
(Hawke 1994, 134).  
Economic events undermined the intention by Labor to run an 
anti-cyclical expansionary fiscal policy and made tax policy the 
cornerstone of government incentives for wage restraint. The day after 
the election of the Hawke government, Treasury Secretary John Stone 
reported to the Cabinet that the projected budget deficit for 1983/84 
would be $9.6 billion or more than 6% of GDP (Hawke 1994, 148; 
Edwards 1996, 172-173). Inflation was running at around 8% and 
unemployment had reached 10% for the first time since World War 2: 
in the March quarter of 1983, inflation was more than 11%. In the 
early 1980s, over 100 000 metals jobs had been lost. There were 150 
                                                 
157 The Accord had its seeds in meetings between ACTU Secretary Bill Kelty, 
ACTU research officer Jan Marsh, then opposition spokesperson for employment and 
industrial relations, Bob Hawke, and shadow treasurer Ralph Willis in the months 
after the 1980 election when the Liberal (right) Fraser government was re-elected. 
Initiated by Willis and inspired by the Social Contract in the UK, the concept of a 
centrally bargained wage/tax/social wage pact was endorsed in the 1982 ALP 
National Conference. The primary aim of the pact was the control of inflation and 
unemployment growth caused by large and frequent pay increases such as those 
that dogged the Whitlam government in 1974 and the Fraser government in 1981-82 
(Willis 2003, 142; Hawke 1994, 134-135; Carney 1988, 16-20). The ‘misery rate’, the 
Australian measure of stagflation and being the unemployment rate plus the 
inflation rate or CPI, had been in the 4 to 5 range throughout most of the 1960s. In 
1974 during the ALP Whitlam government and in 1982-83 under Fraser the index 
was over 20 (Stilwell 1986, 7).  265 
   
000 fewer manufacturing jobs in March 1983 than in June 1981 
(Edwards 1996, 174, 175). In the first half of 1983, over 266 000 
people joined the ranks of the unemployed (Kelly 1994, 63) (see figure 
10.1).  
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Figure 10.1: Unemployment rate, 1978-1996, Australia 
Source: ABS 6203.0 (various years) 
In the weeks before the election, $2700 million had left the 
country in response to the then conservative government’s claims that 
a new ALP government would regulate foreign investment in order to 
stop money leaving Australia (Hawke 1994, 145). Capital flight was 
placing enormous strains on the Australian dollar.158 The government 
responded with a devaluation of 10%, a decision made the afternoon 
after the election. The election campaign’s counter-cyclical fiscal policy 
was abandoned soon after (Kelly 1994, 57).  
                                                 
158 The Australian dollar operated on a fixed exchange rate to sterling. In its 
operation, the Reserve Bank was obliged to clear the exchange market each day at 
great expense to the fisc. In addition, the sale of assets or the borrowing of 
Australian dollars to convert into foreign currency (usually US dollars or pounds 
sterling) placed upward pressure on interest rates.  266 
   
The devaluation created greater pressure on the wage deal aspect 
of the Accord social pact. Not only would there be no great social 
program or series of measures to offset wage restraint with a growing 
social wage, but the rising price of imports would create extra 
pressures for compensatory wage rises. As events unfolded, the social 
pact aspects of the Accord, the social wage, the prices policies, the 
vague promises of directing investment through activist industrial 
policies never eventuated. The government, from its first week in office 
when the deficit shock and capital flight had to be absorbed and 
reversed, broadly oriented its policies towards liberalizing and opening 
financial and product markets. The inability of the government to 
deliver social policies that compensated for wage restraint meant that 
the government retreated to tax and pension contributions from 
employers as bait for wage restraint. There are obvious similarities to 
the Irish experience here.159  
Australia’s precarious economic position dominated the National 
Economic Summit (NES) held between the government, the ACTU, and 
business and community organization leaders in mid-April 1983. The 
deficit was foremost in Hawke’s mind (Hawke 1994, 174).160 
                                                 
159 On the election campaign promises made by Hawke in a policy speech on 16 
February 1983 to accelerate the public works program, to maintain interest rate 
controls and extend them to building societies, to review the need for short-term 
assistance to in selected industries, and the absence of any mention of cuts to tariffs 
and trade protection, John Edwards, advisor to Treasurer Keating, concluded:  
“Ostensibly the program Labor was elected to carry out, it appears today like 
the fossilized remnant of traditional post-war Labor” (Edwards 1996, 194). 
160 Among business figures at the NES, mining, finance and agribusiness CEOs 
dominated including Sir Rod Carnegie (an ex-McKinsey consultant, CRA (mining) 
CEO, and later head of the BCA), Brian Loton (BHP), Sir Arvi Parbo (Western Mining), 
Alna Coates (AMP (finance and insurance)), Brian Kelman (CSR (sugar)) and Sir Keith 
Campbell (Hooker (agribusiness)) (Kelly 1996, 65-67).  267 
   
The budget deficit and the debt problem (see chapter 7) remained 
the number one macro-economic priority in the 1983 and 1984 
budgets (Edwards 1996, 197ff). Steering a course between the 
promises of expanded expenditure in order to create jobs, and 
Treasury demands to cut the deficit and ease pressure on debt and 
debt servicing, the Accord quickly became reduced to a wages policy in 
the face of Budget priorities. This was made explicit in the 1984 
election campaign where the government promised (known as the 
‘Trilogy’) that taxation receipts as a percentage of GDP would not 
increase, total government expenditure as a percentage of GDP would 
not increase and the size of the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP 
would not increase (Stilwell 1989, 15, 65-79).161 
Under Accord I, the centralized wage bargaining strategy was 
designed to contribute to two macro goals: low inflation and greater 
economic growth. Three features of Accord I are notable. First, wage 
increases were based around CPI increases every 6 months (via 
National Wage cases before the AIRC). Delays in the NWC meant that 
pay increases fell behind CPI, and real wages declined (Kenyon 1986, 
                                                                                                                                              
PM Hawke opened the summit with a speech that emphasized the problem of 
unemployment. Treasurer Keating followed in a speech that emphasized the need to 
keep inflation under control. Keating laid out three simple wage alternatives: a high, 
medium and low wage option. The low wage option was rejected because it was 
beyond the capacity of the summit to deliver. Instead, and predictably, most 
speakers who responded to the speech preferred the medium wage option (Kelly 
1996, 65-67). ACTU Secretary Bill Kelty followed with a speech that emphasized the 
central role of centrally bargained wage constraint for low inflation and sustained 
growth. The resulting communiqué mostly drafted by Kelty and transport industry 
CEO and personal friend of Bob Hawke, Sir Peter Abeles endorsed a return to 
centralized wage fixation (Kelly 1996, 65-67). 
161 These are classic liberal market economy macro-economic policies and 
mirror those that have been demonstrated by the Alesina cluster of studies 
(discussed in chapter 2) to be the most effective set of stabilization policies in the 
OECD in the last thirty years.  268 
   
140-147; also see chapter 8). Second, inscribed in Accord I, and a 
feature of Accords II though V, was a ‘no extra claims’ provision. This 
meant that there was to be no over-award wage claims from unions at 
the plant level. This meant that in practice wage setting was extremely 
centralized during Accords I and II where local bargaining was 
effectively banned.162 Finally, there was little or no consideration of the 
micro-economic effects of centralized wage bargaining by policy 
makers either before or during the operation of Accord I: of efficiency, 
productivity and production flexibility.  
Initially the calculus behind the preference for the centralized 
wage bargaining strategy remained macro-economic and remained so 
for Accord II negotiated in the middle of 1985. But the economic 
implications of a key event before Accord II began to alter the 
government’s motivations and preferred wage bargaining strategies: 
the floating of the Australian dollar. 
Keating advisor, John Edwards claims that the conversion of 
Treasurer Keating to market economics was due to his experience of 
the mining industry when he was Shadow Minister for Minerals and 
Energy from 1976 until early 1983 (Edwards 1996, 206).163 The first of 
Keating’s many important pro-market economic policy decisions was 
the float of the Australian dollar on 9 December 1983.164  165 
                                                 
162 Perhaps as much as 95% of wage movements can be accounted for by the 
central CPI increases via the NWC in Accord I. 
163 Hawke (1994, 235) also observes that this contact with the mining industry 
promoted free market ideas in Keating. 
164 There is some controversy over whether Hawke or Keating was the prime 
mover in initiating the float. In his Memoirs, Hawke takes credit and states that 
Keating was reluctant (Hawke 1994, 233-247). Edwards, one of Keating’s chief 
advisors concludes that Hawke’s account is, “certainly quite wrong” (Edwards 1996, 
217). According to Keating in his account appended in Edward’s biography of Paul  269 
   
Accompanying the decision to float the dollar was the abolition of 
capital controls (Edwards 1996, 229-230; Hawke 1994, 242).166 
The decision to float the dollar changed wage bargaining policy 
profoundly, a fact not lost on Edwards: 
“The value of the Australian dollar could be immediately 
and dramatically influenced by the views of the participants in 
the foreign exchange market. This essentially theatrical effect 
was to become one of the important influences on the pace of 
economic reform” (Edwards 1996, 229). 
From December 1983 when the dollar was floated until June 
1985, the dollar devalued around 30% (see figure 10.2). The increased 
price of imports placed great upward pressure on the inflation rate, 
which almost quadrupled from just over 2% for 1984 to over 8% for 
1985. As a result, the wage deal struck between the ACTU and the 
government in September 1985 (Accord II) agreed to discount the CPI 
wage increase by 2% for 1986 in exchange for equivalent tax cuts and 
improved superannuation (pension) contributions (Stilwell 1989, 17). 
The tax cuts, in association with the Trilogy promises made at the 
1984 election meant that public sector spending would be constrained. 
The approach taken by the ALP governments to public spending shows 
                                                                                                                                              
Keating, Keating went to Hawke with a plan to float the dollar in May 1983, a plan to 
be used in the event of a major run on the dollar (Edwards 1996, 547). That run 
came in December 1983, and the decision was made. 
165 During 1983, large volumes of money came into Australia, expanding the 
money supply and placing upward pressures on interest rates. The appreciating 
dollar was pricing Australian exports out of some markets and also encouraging 
massive speculation on the dollar enabled by the Reserve Bank’s intervention into 
the market each day to buy unsold foreign currency in an attempt to hit a pre-
announced daily exchange rate target (Kearney 1997, 88). Speculators used this to 
offset risk in a market where the dollar was almost sure to appreciate each day. 
Keating concluded is his characteristically colorful language that the, “crawling peg 
system had seen its best” and that, “speculators…after a while they are playing you 
like a trout on a line” (quoted in Edwards 1996, 545). 
166 In September 1984, foreign banks were allowed to apply for licenses for entry 
into the domestic market (Hawke 1994, 254).  270 
   
great similarity to the Irish experience: tax cuts paid for by relative 
expenditure cuts. Keating stated of the 1985 budget that:  
“None of these tax cuts will be financed by adding to the 
government’s deficit. They will be achieved by the most 
rigorous restraints on public sector outlays” (quoted in Stilwell 
1989, 18). 
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Figure 10.2: Average monthly exchange rate, Australian dollar in 
US dollars, 1978-1996 
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia, Bulletin Statistics, Table F11 (rba.gov.au, updated 11 May 2005) 
 
The imperatives of openness were already making themselves felt. 
Accord II marked a bridge between the increasing preoccupation of the 
ALP government leadership that wage bargaining policy should 
enhance firm competitiveness and the founding assumption that it 
was designed to stabilize inflation (Edwards 1996, 260-263).167 Accord 
                                                 
167 At the September 1985 National Wage Case, employers argued that CPI wage 
increases should be discounted in order to mute inflationary pressures that would 
eradicate the increased competitiveness of exporters that arose from the devaluation 
(Stilwell 1989, 17).  271 
   
II also marked the end of the social wage trade-off policy path and the 
entrenchment of the tax trade-off for wage restraint policy path 
inferred by the Trilogy announced in the November 1984 electoral 
campaign and begun in the August 1984 budget.168 The attempt to 
move the economy away from a liberal and towards a northern 
European model (be it social democratic or Christian democratic) had 
been stopped almost as soon as the Accord had left the starting 
gate.169 
10.3 The Banana Republic and Accord III  
It was the economic and political events of 1986 that took the 
changing assumptions that began to appear in Accord II – of wage 
bargaining primarily being used as an instrument of firm efficiency 
rather than as a mechanism to reduce inflation – and crystallized 
them. This was the year when it became obvious that the institutional 
mechanism that was used to deliver the centralized system was not up 
to the job of providing pay flexibility. It ended with the formulation of 
plans for the introduction of a two-tier system.  
This marked the beginning of the decline and marginalization of 
the wage tribunals. The Robe River dispute that began in the middle of 
the year demonstrated that unfettered export sector flexibility within a 
centralized system, a la Ireland, was not possible in Australia and that 
exporters, especially mining companies, wanted wage bargaining 
change. The centralized system as run through the arbitration 
                                                 
168 The 1984 budget gave earners of between $240 and $520 per week (gross) a 
$7.20 tax cut (Edwards 1996, 246). 
169 This has been the basis of critique among left-leaning academics and 
commentators in Australia. See, for instance, Stilwell 1989; and Hampton 1996.  272 
   
tribunals gave unions considerable amounts of power at the plant 
level. Decentralization arose as a result of a three-pronged attack by 
exporters on centralized bargaining, the tribunal system that limited 
exporters desire for more control over the process of setting of pay, and 
on unions who owed much of their power to the tribunal system. The 
central power of the tribunals over management had to be reduced in 
the view of the ‘new right’ and the BCA in 1986. Writing in early 1987, 
Plowman (1987, 89) concluded that Robe River had shown, “that what 
seemed daring in May [1986] now appears very tame…A new policy, 
with greater New Right input, is on the drawing board.” That policy 
was the decentralization of wage bargaining.  
Government adopted the view that decentralization was necessary 
to enhance competitiveness. The reasoning was that exporters and 
those firms competing against imports needed pay to reflect their own 
productivity, rather than the needs of the macro-economy. Second, 
there was a discernible hostility towards the tribunals themselves, 
especially when they attempted to block the move to enterprise 
bargaining in 1990. Decentralization was clearly a means to 
marginalize the tribunals in order that the goal of enhanced 
competitiveness could be achieved through the quelling of the 
‘irresponsible’ use of union power. The tribunals themselves vested 
much of that power. This concern became clear in PM Hawke’s and 
senior ministers reactions to the Robe River dispute.  
The government began to explore decentralizing options in the 
name of improved competitiveness after the BCA had rejected Accord II 
and the government’s proposed consumption tax at the Tax Summit in  273 
   
June 1985 (Kelly 1994, 277; Edwards 1996, 276). At the start of 1986, 
the government had publicly rejected enterprise bargaining on the 
basis that the additional flexibility it offered were outweighed by the 
wage restraint centralized bargaining offered (Stutchbury 1986a, 1). By 
the end of the year they were preparing to introduce what became 
known as two-tier bargaining which incorporated a universal wage rise 
component, and a local or plant-level component based on productivity 
gains. It was a significant u-turn in the space of one year. 
The reason for the change was the continuing shocks from 
international economic forces, namely a worsening trade balance and 
a currency that continued to decline in value against the US dollar.170 
By April 1, a cadre of senior Cabinet members was publicly pushing 
for greater wage flexibility (Hywood, 1986a, 1, 4).171 Disagreement in 
mid-April from Industrial Relations Minister, Ralph Willis, before a 
presentation in mid-May to the ACTU executive on wage flexibility 
indicated that it was a matter of hot debate within Cabinet and the 
ALP caucus (Taylor 1986a, 16; Noonan 1986b, 3).  
At the same time, the BCA soft-pedalled on the view that 
decentralization of wage bargaining was necessary, preferring to 
comment more on the power of trade unions (Noonan 1986a, 7). Since 
early 1986, the BCA had been lauding the need for a greater emphasis 
on improving efficiency at the plant level. That was soon to change in 
                                                 
170 A declining dollar was of no help to mining commodity exporters, whose 
contracts were usually negotiated in US dollars (see Copeman 1987). 
171 Senator Peter Walsh, Minister for Finance, John Dawkins, Minister for 
Trade, and Senator John Button, Minister for Industry.  274 
   
late 1986 and early 1987 with the development and publishing of 
policy that explicitly argued for EB or decentralized wage bargaining.  
The timing of the BCA shift is striking. It came after the 
government let it be known how serious it viewed Australia’s 
competitiveness problems and its resolve to alter the situation for the 
better: the government were serious about growing an economy that 
was open to world trade and financial markets. It also came in the 
shadow of the Robe River dispute. Coinciding with the March 1987 
National Wage Case, the BCA released its first fully-fledged policy 
document that declared an open preference for enterprise or 
decentralized bargaining (EB) (see chapter 9). 
As the exporter-dominated BCA shifted its attention to EB in the 
second half of 1986 so too did the government. The critical political 
event was Paul Keating’s infamous ‘banana republic’ comment on 
Sydney morning radio. After a series of meetings with Treasury and 
Reserve bank officials in April and early May 1986 and the release of 
the April 1986 trade balance of payments figures that showed a record 
$1.48 billion deficit, Treasurer Keating took a morning phone interview 
in the kitchen of a hotel on May 14 where he was attending a fund-
raising breakfast (Edwards 1996, 290-296). Speaking to Sydney radio 
interviewer, John Laws, Keating gave an assessment of the economy 
that framed labor market policy for the years to follow: 
“Keating: ‘We are importing about $12 billion more than 
we are exporting on an annual basis. What it means is that we 
are living beyond our capacity to meet our obligations by $12 
billion…we must let Australians know truthfully, honestly, 
earnestly, just what sort of international hole Australia is in. 
It’s the prices of our commodities – they are as bad in real 
terms since the Depression…and if we don’t make it this time  275 
   
we will never make it. If the government cannot make the 
adjustment, get manufacturing going again and keep moderate 
wage outcomes and a sensible economic policy, then Australia 
is basically done for. We will end up just being a third-rate 
economy…If in the final analysis Australia is so undisciplined, 
so disinterested in its salvation and its economic well being, 
that it doesn’t deal with these fundamental problems, then the 
fallback solution is inevitable because you can’t fund $12 
billion in perpetuity every year…the only thing to do is to slow 
growth down to a canter. Once you slow the growth under 3%, 
unemployment starts to rise again. 
Laws: ‘And then you have really induced a depression.’ 
Keating: ‘Then you are gone. You are a banana republic’” 
(quoted in Kelly 1994, 212). 
The ‘banana republic’ speech caused the dollar to fall three cents 
in an hour. In a speech to the nation on national television on 11 June 
that responded to the fall-out from Keating’s off-the-cuff remarks PM 
Hawke announced that the tax cuts of Accord II would be delayed until 
late in 1986. On July 28 the dollar fell a further 10% of its value 
against the US dollar to a low of 57.15 cents, less than half its value in 
the first quarter of 1981 (see figure 10.2). The August 1986 budget as 
a result was aimed purely at deficit reduction. In addition it sought a 
50% discount of CPI in wage increases for the following year ending, 
“wage indexation as an article of faith in the labour movement” (Hawke 
1994, 283, 369, 377-379; Walsh 1995, 149-151).  
The original Accord was now unrecognizable and was real wage 
restraint political vehicle that aimed to shore up union support for 
public sector and tax cuts rather than ensure social wage growth and 
non-market service provision expansion. This was the prelude to the 
introduction of two-tier bargaining: an experiment in combined central 
and plant level bargaining between March 1987 and late 1991 that  276 
   
was a resounding failure in terms of its ability to restrain wage growth 
and to enable re-structuring of work and pay at the micro-level. 
Keating’s initial reaction to the fallout from the ‘banana republic’ 
speech was to call for a Workplace Practices Summit. PM Hawke 
initially vetoed this. His reasons were mostly political – he wished to 
avoid a sense of panic. But the call from Keating showed a clear 
linkage in his and PM Hawke’s calculation between competitiveness 
and micro-economic efficiency (Kelly 1994, 214-216; Hawke 1994, 
373-374). It also made public in a way not done so before, of the level 
of worry and attention that this issue had attained within the 
government. While the issue of wage flexibility and Australia’s 
competitiveness had made regular appearances in Australia’s non-
tabloid press throughout the first half of 1986, the message that 
emanated from the government before the ‘banana republic’ speech 
was that wage flexibility and wage bargaining decentralization, even if 
only partial, was not necessary because the current centralized system 
was up to the job in ensuring that Australian goods and services 
remained competitive in export markets (see for instance, Stutchbury 
1986a). The ‘banana republic’ speech and Keating’s call for a mini 
summit on the workplace made it obvious that the government did not 
believe the current wage bargaining system was performing as it 
should, and that wage bargaining policy needed to re-address the 
issue of plant and enterprise efficiency. The political space for 
exporters to dictate terms on wage bargaining policy had been created. 
The Accord was transformed. The government was committed to an 
open economy, and international competitiveness was now the litmus  277 
   
test for any wage bargaining policy. The September 1986 Economic 
Planning Advisory Council meeting172 that Keating proposed to 
postpone for the Workplace Practices Summit, became a de facto 
workplace practices consultation. At the meeting, the BCA circulated a 
paper on restrictive workplace practices. The government agreed to a 
further meeting: Keating had his ‘Workplace Summit’ in late 
September. It was following this meeting that PM Hawke announced 
an end to wage indexation and the intention of the government to 
introduce a two-tiered wage bargaining system (Dabscheck 1990, 31-
32). 
Commenting later to a journalist in the June 1987 election 
campaign, Keating emphasized the importance of micro-efficiency 
concerns in a third term ALP government to journalists: 
“We have intellectually chosen the route of internation-
alisation. If you are going to internationalise it must be about 
being efficient in world terms, that is our place in the future. 
And that means you must attend to the micro issues of 
efficiency” (Australian Financial Review, 29 May 1987). 
The move to a two-tier wage bargaining system was a political 
decision as much as anything, and reflected the division in Cabinet 
and the ALP caucus between those who advocated wage flexibility such 
as Keating and Finance Minister Peter Walsh, and those like Ralph 
Willis, who were not yet completely in agreement with the idea. At the 
March 1987 National Wage Case, government, unions and employer 
representatives all agreed on the need for a two-tier system.173 It is an 
indication of the power of the shocks that the economy suffered in 
                                                 
172 EPAC was formed at the 1983 Summit. 
173 This agreement gave employers an input into Accord III they never enjoyed 
under Accord I and II.  278 
   
1986 that there was widespread agreement of the need for at least two-
tier bargaining by the start of 1987. Under what became Accord III, a 
flat rate of $10 minimum or 1.5% was granted, with a further 
possibility of a 4% wage rise over two years based on demonstrated re-
structuring and efficiency gains made at the plant level.174 
10.4 The failure of the two-tier system 
The two-tier system between March 1987 and November 1991 
failed to bring about the widespread re-structuring of the Australian 
workplace or the wage flexibility that employers wanted (Harden 1991, 
126).175 That shortcoming documented in this section was enough to 
ensure its failure and meant that there was no real alternative to the 
BCA preferred policy of EB. Once the move to the two-tier system was 
made it was politically difficult to go back to the centralized system. 
The BCA had opposed Accord II, and had opposed a consumption tax 
proposal from the government during the mid-1985 Tax Summit, a 
rejection that had signalled the extent to which the BCA was prepared 
to sacrifice a preferred tax policy in the name of defeating the 
                                                 
174 Accompanying the move to two-tiers was an increasingly tight fiscal policy. 
The May 1987 Budget Statement cut spending further than the 1986 Budget allowed 
for. These were followed by further cuts in the 1987 Budget (Edwards 1996, 311). 
175 Some critics have argued that it delivered wage restraint without much 
benefit to the union movement. Ewer et al 1991, 29 argue that compared to other 
periods of economic growth such as 1974-75 and 1981-82, Australian workers 
missed out. Such arguments seem to ignore that the wage rises of 1974-5 and 1981-
82 directly contributed to the loss of power of two governments, and were ultimately 
unsustainable. Some boosters have shown that because labor productivity rose after 
1987, the second-tier system was somehow responsible (Drago & Sloan 1988, 461). 
This ignores the capital and investment associated with the opening of financial 
markets in 1983 through 1985 that enabled higher output per labor unit input.  279 
   
government.176 What would it do if faced with a re-centralization of 
wage bargaining? 
The two-tier’s one achievement from an employer perspective was 
to stop some of the pay relativities that flowed throughout the 
economy from the benchmark metals industry award. The slowness of 
the system and the patchy awarding of the second-tier increase also 
generated de facto wage restraint for a time.177 In some quarters of the 
economy the inability or delay in winning second tier increases 
resulted in wages falling relatively behind, namely in some services 
(transport and storage, wholesale trade, cultural and recreational 
                                                 
176 The Tax Summit involved business leaders and umbrella association 
representatives, members of the ACTU executive, representatives from welfare groups 
and Cabinet members and support bureaucrats. In many respects it was the only 
time during the Accord that consultation approached the broad corporatist 
deliberative approach of Irish Social Partnership. The purpose of the Summit was to 
examine three taxation proposals from the government – taxation reform promised in 
the 1984 election campaign. The first (‘A’) was favored by Treasury officials and 
included a capital gains tax on all assets except the primary residence, a taxation on 
non-remuneration employee benefits (so-called ‘fringe benefits’), Reduction of 
negative gearing on rental properties, an identity card system in order to curtail tax 
avoidance, restrictions on farm write-offs, taxes on gold mining income, and foreign 
tax credits for foreign sources of income for Australian citizens. These changes would 
all fund a cut in the marginal rates of income taxation. Options B and C included 
elements of Option A, but an emphasis on the introduction of a broad-based 
consumption tax (AKA VAT) to fund cuts in the marginal rates. Option B, proposed a 
consumption tax of 5%- a straw man for Option C. Option C was preferred by 
Keating and the ALP Caucus after much debate and proposed a consumption tax of 
12.5%. Ultimately the BCA (along with the National farmers federation, the 
Australian Mining Industry Council,, the Australian Chamber of Commerce and the 
Confederation of Australian Industry) opposed Option C. they complained that 
Option C would lift business costs by 30% and reduce investment and growth 
because of the curtailment of various income shelters, and the taxing of fringe 
benefits and capital gains (see Kelly 1994, 155-177 for a full account of the events 
and proposals). The final tax package passed included a watered down wholesale tax 
reform, a handful of reforms to various tax shelters and no consumption tax. 
177 By the end of 1987, 25% of the workforce had won the second tier gains 
(Dabscheck 1989, 108). By June 1988, the figure had risen to 45% (Drago & Sloan 
1988, 461). In the heavily unionized metals industry, second tier increases were 
negotiated in December 1987. But in other areas of the economy with less militant 
unions and lower skill workers second tier increases still hadn’t reached around 20% 
of all workers covered by awards by the end of 1989 (Ewer et al 1991, 26, 27).  280 
   
services and personal services) and in public administration and 
defense (see chapter 8). But real wages having fallen since November 
1983 began to rise again in November 1988 and rose throughout the 
two-tier years (see chapter 8).178 
The two-tier years covered three versions of the Accord (III, IV and 
V) and were based around small universal wage increases and second 
tier increases based on supposed productivity-enhancing 
improvements. The two-tier years were framed by two principles that 
guided local negotiations. The 1987 Restructuring and Efficiency 
Principle (Accord III) allowed for up to a 4% pay-rise over two years 
based on productivity-enhancing changes being made at the applicant 
workplace. The Structural Efficiency Principle was introduced in 
Accord IV (August 1988) and allowed for a 3% pay rise in September 
1988 provided that employees agreed to an award review process. The 
second tier increase of $10 per week was available in March 1989 
provided real productivity improvements were made. SEP continued in 
Accord V (August 1989) and meant that total pay increases to June 
1990 when added to the 3% maximum centrally agreed increases did 
not exceed 6 ½% in total. Again productivity-based increases were the 
basis of a successful local claim.179 
                                                 
178 While the second tier pay rises were slow in coming in some quarters of the 
economy, there is evidence to suggest that most workplaces received the 4% second-
tier with little or no actual changes too work practices. See Norris 1989, 113). 
179 Reflecting Australia’s mix of workplace, industry and multiple employer 
bargaining that operated under the centralized Accord agreements between the 
ACTU and the government and ratified in the various National Wage Cases, second 
tier increases were negotiated and applied via a mix of wholly industry, partially 
industry and partially workplace, coordinated workplace (‘pattern bargaining’) and 
non-coordinated workplace bargaining. Reflecting the tendency of state tribunals to 
follow the lead of the federal tribunals, the states adopted two-tier wage bargaining  281 
   
The available evidence suggests that the changes at the workplace 
were relatively minor under the two-tier system, certainly not startling 
or widespread. The two-tier system proved too slow in implementing 
change (Dabscheck 1995, 52; Mitchell 1991, 112).180 This was an 
indictment of the inability of the tribunal system to deliver the process 
aspect of pay flexibility. The intimate involvement of the AIRC in the 
second tier generated wage increases tended to restrict employers in 
their quest for more flexible work practices and the pursuit of more 
flexible remuneration practices.  
A comparison with the Irish system illustrates the degree to which 
exporters were hampered by the tribunals and the centralized system. 
                                                                                                                                              
principles that were substantially similar to the federal model (McDonald & Rimmer 
1988, 478, 483). 
180 The metals industry was the most enthusiastic adopter of second-tier 
bargaining. Indeed, some evidence suggests that in the March 1987 wage case, the 
Metal Trades Industry Association and metals unions were prime movers and 
supporters for the two-tier system (Sheldon & Thornthwaite 1996, 181-185). Frenkel 
& Shaw (1989) in a study of second-tier changes in a representative sample of 23 
workplaces in the metals industry demonstrate that despite this support at the 
umbrella association level there is, “little evidence of fundamental change which is so 
necessary for gaining a competitive edge in world markets” (112). In an examination 
of 12 of what the authors term as ‘major agreements’, and a content analysis of 
workplace agreements in 1334 metals plants, Rimmer & Zappala (1988) find little 
evidence of actual wage flexibility being introduced via second tier agreements. The 
sole exception is in the banking industry (580). Most of the changes to wage 
flexibility were minor, such as agreements to change payment methods (i.e. to 
electronic transfer of funds) (571-573). According to these studies, the only major 
award to see any introduction of variable pay was in the Bank Officers Federal Award 
where performance-based pay increments based on performance appraisals were 
introduced (572). 
Evidence from the 1989-90 Commonwealth Department of Industrial Relations 
AWIRS survey shows that within the private sector, 12% of workplaces introduced or 
changed dispute-settling procedures (the procedural dimension of wage flexibility). Of 
the changes that may have affected wage outcomes (or the amount paid by an 
employer for any particular task for any particular period), 35% of workplaces made 
alterations to award classifications (matching job title and job description to wages) 
23% introduced new career paths, 21% introduced new pay increments, 38% altered 
working time arrangements, and 34% introduced new unspecified work practices. 
The introduction of electronic fund transfer for actual employee payment was the 
most common change, introduced at 34% of workplaces. 17% of private sector 
workplaces made no changes at all (Callus et al 1991, table 9.8).  282 
   
Whereas in Ireland, exporters were and are free to negotiate directly 
with employees over pay changes when re-structuring of the workplace 
is required by changes to production or service delivery (driven by ‘the 
need for speed’ discussed in chapter 2), Australian exporters, indeed 
all employers, had to navigate a cumbersome and slow tribunal system 
that delivered pay verdicts that often did not reflect the comparative 
strengths of the bargaining parties. The enhancement of union power 
via the tribunals and the Accord partnership meant that any wage 
policy move to enhance the pay flexibility of Australian exporters 
would have to marginalize the tribunal system. The obvious route was 
to introduce no limit enterprise bargaining, which then removed the 
tribunal as a closely supervising umpire on plant and workplace 
bargained wage levels. This is where Australian wage bargaining was 
headed after 1993. 
While the system was failing to deliver pay flexibility, economic 
pressures continued unabated. The October 1987 stock market crash 
increased pressure on policy-makers to align the wage bargaining 
regime with the needs of the traded sector. In the December 1987 
National Wage Case, the previously cautious Industrial Relations 
Minister Ralph Willis in his submission to the bench, spoke of the 
need for more wage flexibility and more scope for enterprise 
bargaining. 
By this stage, the BCA was engaging in research that became the 
basis of its 1989 publication, Enterprise-based Bargaining Units. 
Policy-makers were primed and ready for a decisive lobbying move 
from export employers. The decision to open the economy had been  283 
   
made, and worsening economic outcomes, especially the balance of 
payments, was exposing the rigidity problems of the centralized 
system. Key export employers such as Peko-Wallsend had rejected 
arbitration, centralized bargaining and the Accord. The exporter-
dominated BCA was becoming increasingly vocal in its opposition to 
the rigidities imposed on employers by the centralized system. The 
two-tier system was not up to the task of providing export employers 
with the flexibility they wanted. Pressure for enterprise bargaining was 
building in the Cabinet. The decentralization of Australian wage 
bargaining seemed only to be a matter of time. 
10.5 The Keating government & enterprise bargaining 
By 1989, the framework by which wage bargaining policy would be 
judged had been established. The measure would be flexibility and 
productivity-enhancement. The goal was improved competitiveness 
within the world economy and Australia’s trading partners. Paul 
Keating later described the wage bargaining decentralization policy 
thus: 
“Later in the period of the Labor Government, once the 
shares between wages and profits had been adjusted, we 
began to move away from broad wage adjustments through the 
national wage cases to enterprise bargaining. The objective 
was to lift enterprise productivity and share it by agreement 
between employers (profits) and employees (wages)” (Keating 
1999). 
While 1989 and 1990 were the years when the final decisions were 
made to decentralize wage bargaining, the seeds of the decision came 
much earlier. The events of 1989 and 1990 dotted the i’s and crossed 
the t’s on earlier causal events that shaped the move to 
decentralization: in 1983 (the float), and in 1986/7. The 1986 balance  284 
   
of payments crisis and the 1987 policy shift from the BCA in favor of 
EB meant that once the two-tier system had shown it shortcomings, 
there appeared to be a naturalness and inevitability about the move to 
EB: “[H]ow could it be stopped once it started?” concluded Keating 
speechwriter, Don Watson (Watson 2002, 367).  
Continuing economic pressures reminded policy makers of the 
need for pay flexibility. The balance of payments problems of 1989 and 
1990 reinforced the perception within the Cabinet of the need for 
increased wage flexibility at the plant level just as the ‘banana 
republic’ crisis of 1986 crystallized the change of purpose in wage 
bargaining policy from inflation control to micro-economic efficiency-
enhancer (Middleton interview 2001).  
Accord VI (September 1990) marked the start of the EB era. While 
key parts of centralized wage bargaining remained, namely the 
commitment to an 2.5% increase (ratified by the AIRC in April 1991), 
most of the potential wage increases were to be negotiated at the plant 
level based on improved productivity. The ‘no extra claims’ provisions 
of previous NWC and that were central to the Accord I through V 
negotiations was abandoned.181  
The BCA was now setting the agenda on wage bargaining policy 
within the political space created by the decisions to open the economy 
that started with the float of the dollar in 1983.182 Pre-launch copies of 
                                                 
181 ‘No extra claims’ provisions within AIRC agreements and written into each of 
the first five Accords prohibited extra over-award claims by unions at the plant-level. 
182 The BCA was aware of the vital importance of that decision. A June 1990 
Business Council Bulletin article, concluded: 
“When the Hawke government floated the $A in December 1983, and removed 
the exchange rate controls that still applied to the capital movements in and out of 
Australia, it let loose a variety of forces which were destined to have a profound effect  285 
   
the BCA’s Enterprise Bargaining Units had been available for five 
months (Dabscheck 1995, 61). During 1990, EB became the preferred 
policy position of not just the government and the BCA, but one with 
varying degrees of support from the ACTU and other business 
associations that had previously opposed it. In February 1990, the 
ACTU’s chief Accord negotiator and Secretary, Bill Kelty was quoted as 
saying that is wasn’t a question of whether enterprise bargaining 
would occur, but what kind of things and what kinds of goals would be 
bargained over at the enterprise level (from a quote in Dabscheck 
1990, 62; also see Tingle 1994, 289).183 This was a reversal from the 
Australia Reconstructed (ACTU 1987) wage bargaining policy position 
that had recommended industry-level bargaining within a centralized 
wage bargain pact framework as its preferred option: a policy solution 
very much based on the Swedish model. The Confederation of 
Australian Industry in March 1991 felt compelled to release a 
statement in an Australian academic journal explaining that the 
organization was not opposed to decentralization of wage bargaining, 
but it was concerned about, “attempting to retain an appropriate 
degree of control over aggregate outcomes” (Noakes 1991, 75). This 
was a reversal of 1989 opposition to the move to EB (Tingle 1994, 77). 
The MTIA shifted its policy towards enterprise bargaining albeit within 
industry guidelines in late 1989. Within the Metal Trades Industry 
Association, splits between small domestic and niche market and 
                                                                                                                                              
on the workings of the Australian economy…[T] he most profound change wrought 
by the floating of the $A was the extent to which it opened the Australian economy to 
international influence” (BCA 1990a, 4). 
183 T h e  A C T U  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  B C A  a n d  i t s  r o l e  i n  t h e  e m e r g e n c e  o f  E B  a r e  
further examined below.  286 
   
larger exporting employers appeared with the larger employers 
strongly pushing for EB and the rest for industry-level bargaining 
(Sheldon & Thornthwaite 1996, 185ff). In 1990, after Accord VI was 
negotiated, more than 30 of the MTIA’s larger members had already 
struck enterprise agreements. By the end of 1992, the MTIA was 
calling for a widened scope for enterprise bargaining (Sheldon & 
Thornthwaite 1999c, 84-85). 
Accord VI was negotiated in February 1990 in the lead up to the 
1990 federal election. Partially ratified in the National Wage Case that 
September, it allowed for enterprise bargaining with an upper limit on 
wage rises, in exchange for tax cuts and superannuation increases.184 
In a slice of economic fortune, the recession of the second half of 1990 
and the first half of 1991 meant that tax cuts were no longer necessary 
to generate wage restraint and the tax/wage trade-off was postponed 
until 1992 (Edwards 1996, 418, 420).185 
                                                 
184 Since 1983 the top marginal rate had been cut from 60% to 48% (Mitchell 
with Bassanese 2003, 134). Keating believed that the tax cuts that began in earnest 
with Accord II had begun to reach their limit, a belief that underlines the argument 
that the use of tax cuts to motivate wage restraint in the Irish system has a use-by 
date and that at some point, government must find other policy avenues that 
motivate wage restraint without boosting public spending. 
185 The recession arose out of a dual desire of the government to control 
inflation and to arrest the decline of the Australian dollar. In 1989-90 long term 
interest rates rose from the 3.6% of the previous financial year to an average of 7.5%, 
rising again to 9.2% for the first quarter of 1991 (Argy 1992, 205). This reflected a 
growing political interference in monetary policy from the middle of 1986. Keating, 
via Treasury was influencing the Reserve Bank to use interest rates policy as a crude 
macro-economic device in which inflation rate target goals were traded off for 
exchange rate target goals. This was done in the service of alleviating short-term 
balance of payment difficulties and to ease debt repayment burdens (Kearney 1997; 
Argy 1992, chapter 21; Tingle 1994, chapter 3). A succession of bad inflation and 
current account figures in early 1989 prompted the government to move interest 
rates higher from 14.5% (mortgage) to 16.25% between January and March 1989. 
Rates were further increased to 18% by the end of the year (Tingle 1994, 50). The 
result was a recession that Paul Keating later described famously as the, “recession 
we had to have” (quoted in Kelly 1994, 617).  287 
   
During 1991, the AIRC rejected, and then adopted the enterprise 
bargaining principle of Accord VI. The April 1991 decision asserted 
that employers and unions lacked the maturity for EB and that the 
two-tier years had not seen enough progress in award re-
structuring.186 Threatened with legislation to enforce the Accord 
decision and protestation from government, treasury officials unions 
and employers, the commission reluctantly changed its mind and 
reversed its April 1991 decision in October 1991 (Edwards 1996, 420-
421). In private, Keating threatened to abolish the AIRC if it refused to 
ratify the move to EB (Edwards 1996, 420). Kelly concluded on the 
tribunal’s failure to ratify the move to EB in the April 1991 decision 
that it had, “signed the death warrant for its influence” (Kelly 1994, 
669). 
The spread of EB accelerated with the start of the Keating 
government at the end of 1991.187 A major policy document, One 
Nation, released in February 1992 endorsed EB. Accord VII was 
released to the public on February 19 during the election campaign of 
the ‘unwinnable election’ of 1993.188 The centralized component of the 
deal was reduced to a guaranteed and arbitrated safety net of three $8 
increases for low-income earners. EB was to have no upper limits but 
would be carried out with regard to competitiveness, efficiency-
                                                 
186 This was essentially the position of the MTIA, the only submission to the 
bench that did not back some kind of move to EB (Briggs 2001, 36). 
187 Paul Keating initiated a leadership spill in Caucus and defeated PM Hawke 
by five votes on 29 December 1991. 
188 So named because of the high interest rates, high unemployment and, until 
polling day, the consistent trailing of the ALP government to the conservative 
Opposition in opinion polls.  288 
   
enhancement, productivity improvements and job creation (ACTU 
1993 in Wilson et al (eds) (2000, 358-363, 371).  
Following the election win (the ALP’s fifth since 1983), Keating 
appeared to broaden the idea of the safety net. Speaking to the 
Institute of Company Directors (ICD) on April 21, Prime Minster 
Keating addressed the issue of EB. He promised to extend EB, but 
within an AIRC monitored safety net that would ensure that employees 
received at least a prescribed minimum standard of pay and 
conditions of work. Here the safety net appeared to be the extent of the 
award system, rather than a set of minimum standards for it. 
Keating’s speechwriter described the deepening of EB: 
“In line with thinking that only a few years before was 
confined to the right, the Labor government now wanted the 
great majority of wages and conditions to be negotiated in 
workplaces by enterprise bargaining” (Watson 2002, 368). 
It was at this point that the ACTU and the government began to 
diverge in their vision for the future of wage bargaining (Watson 2002, 
368-369; Green 1994, 101-102). Such was the dominance of the BCA 
on the debate and the government’s concern to improve the 
competitiveness of the economy. Enshrined into legislation as the 
Industrial Relations Reform Act (1993), Accord VII legislated a key BCA 
policy demand: an Enterprise Flexibility Agreement (EFA) that was 
certifiable by the AIRC. Along with Certified Agreements, a stream of 
bargaining was established that was enterprise-based and separate 
from the awards system. For unions, the worry was that non-union 
bargaining could now create agreements that were equivalent to 
awards (Creighton & Stewart 2000, 6.64; Nomchong & Nolan 1996).  289 
   
Eligible unions (those covering at least one employee) could make 
representations to the employer about the content of an EFA but could 
be shut out of the negotiation process. Non-union collective 
agreements could substitute for awards provided they past the ‘no 
disadvantage test’.189 The Certified Agreements clauses of the 1993 Act 
allowed for plant level agreements that could replace awards, provided 
employees under those agreements suffered from ‘no disadvantage; a 
major concession to the ACTU, and their chief worry with the 21 April 
1993 speech to the ICD which omitted mention of the ‘no 
disadvantage’ test.  
Negotiations between the ACTU and the government over the EFA 
proposal were intense during the southern winter of 1993. The ACTU 
Secretary described the idea of non-union agreements as a, “scab 
show as a part of a bargaining trick” (quoted in Green 1994, 106). 
Green (1994, 108) describes the eventual union reaction to the 1993 
legislation as one of, “relief rather than enthusiasm.” The Keating 
government was now increasingly overt in its support of the views of 
employers, especially that of the BCA.190  
The support for the non-union bargaining agenda was the 
breaking point for relations between the ACTU and the Keating 
government. Kelty described the 1993 legislation allowing non-union 
                                                 
189 The no disadvantage test means that employees under a Certified Agreement 
or an EFA must not suffer a disadvantage in conditions and pay compared to award 
workers in similar jobs. This usually involves a great deal of interpretation by the 
AIRC (see Creighton & Stewart 2000, 6.111). 
190 For instance, in a speech to the Confederation of British Industry not long 
after the April 21 speech the new Minister for Industrial Relations, Laurie Brereton 
told listeners that in return for a recognition of the right to strike by employers, 
unions would have to accept measures that allowed collective non-union wage 
bargaining.   290 
   
certified agreements as, “ill conceived” (Kelty 2003, 344). This break 
manifested itself in the events surrounding the industrial dispute at 
Weipa, a bauxite mine owned and operated by CRA, on the coast in 
remote northwest Queensland just three months before the 1996 
federal election. CRA had been slowly replacing its mining employees 
with independent contractors. As old employees left, independent 
contractors were employed. These contractors earned far more than 
trade union member employees doing the same job. CRA was clearly 
trying to drive union members out of its operation. Weipa revealed the 
ugly truth behind the McKinsey path to employee/management trust 
and mutual obligation: a novel approach to union busting.191 In 
response to this, the ACTU imposed a maritime ban on Weipa 
operations. Other unions struck at CRAs coal mines in sympathy. CRA 
lawyers threatened employees with civil actions in a repeat of the ‘new 
right’ strategies of the mid-1980s at Dollar Sweets.  
In a stunning turn of events, Bill Kelty hired ex-Prime Minister, 
Bob Hawke, the very same PM ousted in a bitter and acrimonious 
political battle by Paul Keating five years prior in a leadership spill vote 
in Caucus, to represent the unions at the AIRC hearings.192 While the 
motives of Kelty are unclear, the move clearly showed the level of 
mistrust between the government and the ACTU executive, and the 
suspicion over whether the Labor government would fully support the 
union movement against an export employer seeking to de-unionize a 
                                                 
191 Remembering that Sir Rod Carnegie was an ex CRA CEO and ex-McKinsey 
consultant. 
192 Hawke settled the dispute, in a bad defeat for the government just weeks 
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key workplace. Keating responded in private that the dispute signalled 
the end of the Accord (Watson 2002, 655-664). The new conservative 
government further entrenched decentralized bargaining in 1996 
legislation by allowing for individual workplace agreements (AWAs) 
that were reviewable by the AIRC and that could replace awards. 
The striking aspect of the period of decentralization after 1987 is 
how reforms delivered the BCAs core wage bargaining policy 
preferences: award rationalization (moving towards single unit 
bargaining), plant-level bargaining, and then finally, non-union plant 
level bargaining. This was despite the ALP’s close relationship with the 
union movement, and the shared policy deliberations that 
accompanied Accords I through VI. The policy-influencing power of 
exporters was never more dramatically clear. 
10.6 Alternative causal explanations 
I now briefly examine two alternate arguments for the 
decentralization of wage bargaining. First, I examine the claims of 
Briggs (2001), and Dabscheck (1995) that trade unions were partially 
or wholly responsible for wage decentralization. Second, I examine 
whether public sector wage growth and expansion were responsible – 
the other path to LME wage decentralization I argue for in chapters 1 
and 2 and demonstrate was responsible for wage decentralization in 
Ireland in the early 1980s.  
I argue both sets of arguments fail to convince based on the 
evidence. On the union argument: The actions of trade unions were 
largely reactive to employer moves and government accommodation to 
those moves to decentralize wage bargaining. However, the political  292 
   
rationalization used by the ACTU that guaranteed support from 
militant member unions was that EB would enable higher wage rises 
than under a centralized or semi-centralized system. This suggest that 
while wage drift did not directly cause the decentralization of 
Australian wage bargaining, the repression of it led unions to abandon 
their earlier opposition to decentralized bargaining and justify their 
defeat on the issue by export employers.193 In discussing this alternate 
explanation, I summarize the argument that supports my theoretical 
perspective here: that export employers had their wage bargaining 
policy preferences accommodated by the government once the open 
economy model and path to economic growth became a framing policy 
assumption.  
On the public sector argument: Public sector wage rises and 
employment expansion remained relatively restrained during the 
centralized and two-tier years of the Accord, thanks mainly to the 
adoption of the ‘twin deficits theory by policy makers’ that linked 
increased public spending to worsening balance of payments. 
10.6.1 Were trade unions responsible for decentralization? 
After the 1996 election, ACTU Secretary and chief Accord 
negotiator, Bill Kelty remained defiant in his belief that 
decentralization was caused by the union movement and the Labor 
government acting together. This they did for the benefit of 
Australians, future economic security, and the future of the union 
movement (see his comments in Briggs 2001, 33 and Kelly 1994, 670). 
                                                 
193 Indeed, ACTU leaders  from the time have since claimed that they were 
responsible for decentralization. In light of the reversal of opinion, this can only be 
described as a self-serving justification.  293 
   
This appears to be post hoc rationalization, or as Kelly concludes 
“wisdom of hindsight” and “pontification” (Kelly 1994, 670).  
Briggs (2001) argues that union influence is key to understanding 
the decentralization of wage bargaining during the Accord. But the 
sequencing of events suggest otherwise. First, the economic 
environment changed after Labor floated the dollar. After that, the 
balance of payments and debt drove wage bargaining policy away from 
a pure focus on inflation control, and towards the issue of improved 
productivity and efficiency. The assumptions behind Accord I were 
replaced. Ultimately, that replacement opened a political opportunity 
for export employers who exploited it both individually via key 
disputes, through the hard line radicalism of the HR Nicholls Society 
formed opportunistically for the purpose of eradicating the tribunal 
system and centralized wage fixing, and through the research driven, 
agenda-setting and consistently moderate Business Council of 
Australia. 
Second, the balance of payments and the rapidly depreciating 
dollar drove policy-makers to pay immediate heed to the issue of how 
wage bargaining policy could be used to increase export firm 
productivity. The answer was quick: changes to the centralized system 
in a decentralized direction. This was a politically palatable ‘half-way 
house’ to a fully decentralized system, one that unions were prepared 
to accommodate. 
Third, the two-tier system did not work. The reasons were neatly 
summarized in the 1989 BCA report, Enterprise Bargaining-based 
Units: wage setting was still too coordinated. Workplaces had too many  294 
   
unions. Centralized rigidities prevented plant level flexibility. BCA 
literature became increasingly anti-union in line with its alignment 
with the McKinsey HRM way of thinking that firmed after Sir Rod 
Carnegie became President and Fred Hilmer was hired as the head of 
research.  
Fourth, 1989 and 1990 saw the government shift policy again as 
Australia’s balance of payments continued to worsen. Earlier ACTU 
opposition to EB, expressed most forcefully in the ACTU’s 1987 policy 
document Australia Reconstructed, was reversed in reaction. It was a 
matter of agreeing to the wage bargaining changes and staying at the 
policy table, or rejecting the changes and risk being, as Keating 
adviser Don Russell termed it, “no longer being part of the ruling 
group” (quoted in Watson 2002, 661). This hardly appeared to be the 
actions of an organization taking the lead on wage bargaining. The 
result was Accord VI where decentralized wage bargaining was allowed 
without a centrally set limit to increases.  
Fifth, the Keating government deepened the decentralization 
changes in 1993 legislation that allowed enterprise agreements and, 
worse still for the union movement, non-union agreements. This was 
major win for the BCA and a legitimating of non-union workplaces 
within the wage bargaining policy regime. This aroused considerable 
suspicion among unions in 1993. The events surrounding Weipa 
demonstrated that suspicion, and the lack of ACTU trust in the 
Keating government to support the union campaign against CRA. 
Arguments for the causal effect of trade unions in wage 
decentralization in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Australia rely on  295 
   
the personal accounts of key participants. But essentially structural 
and economic causes will rarely be gleaned from a reliance on such 
information. In this chapter, I have argued for the causal effect of 
export employers. But the extent of their influence is, in many 
respects, subtle and structural. A simple counterfactual clarifies the 
argument: If export employers had announced they were happy with 
the centralized system, or with the two-tier system, would the ACTU 
have so readily changed its policy preference from the 1987 position 
that was pro-industry-level bargaining, to the 1989 and 1990 position 
that was pro-enterprise bargaining? Would the government have 
initiated a move to EB without export employer support? Would the 
ACTU support for EB be enough? This seems extremely unlikely. After 
the float and the banana republic, wage bargaining policy was, at the 
least, about accommodating employers’ labor market regulatory 
preferences as far as politically possible. In practice, this meant a 
gradual shift to EB, one that tested and eventually found the limits of 
ACTU loyalty to the Labor government. 
Briggs claims that the August 1989 Accord VI NWC decision 
changed the policy position of the ACTU. Left-wing unions could hold 
back wage pressures from their skilled membership no longer (also see 
Spooner 1990 on the disquiet within the union movement in 1989). 
Skilled, blue-collar workers within left unions that pushed for the 
move to a more decentralized wage bargaining regime in order to 
access larger pay rises according to Briggs (2001, 32-34). Unions 
supported the move to decentralization to release latent wage drift 
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This strategic mistake by the ACTU certainly aided the 
decentralization cause even if, as Briggs claims, the goal of ACTU 
support was to merely win over-award wage rises in order to release 
wage pressures (2001, 35).194 But, given the open economy economic 
growth policy assumptions held by the Labor government, the 
relatively poor economic environment and trade balance and the 
persistent and consistent voicing of the BCA decentralization 
preference -- a combination at work for four years -- it is hard to see 
the ACTU move as doing little to actively cause decentralization. It may 
have advanced the timing of it by a couple of years. But the ascension 
of the Keating government made decentralization look inevitable, with 
or without union blessing. As the 1993 legislation and machinations 
and union suspicions that arose from the negotiations around it 
makes plain, the Labor government was prepared to test the loyalty of 
the union movement as far as possible. I would suggest, therefore, that 
the desire from the ACTU to release wage pressures by acquiescing to 
Accord VI and the decentralization of wage bargaining, only brought 
forward that event but not enough to support an argument that the 
union movement caused the decentralization of Australian wage 
bargaining. 
                                                 
194 Briggs (2001) argument here is supported by the observation made by Chief 
Industrial Advocate for the Australian Chamber of Manufacturers that: 
“[T]he ACTU concept of decentralized bargaining is not the same as 
advocated by most employer groups. One wonders whether the ACTU 
would accept wage decreases based on company losses and whether they 
would always accept common accounting standards for measuring profit. 
Some employer groups entered the concept of enterprise bargaining, 
provided the agreement was freely entered into, flow-ons were prevented, 
real improvements in productivity were achieved and the quantum 
reflected individual circumstances” (Harden 1991, 132).  297 
   
10.6.2 Was public sector wage drift & employment growth 
responsible? 
In 1999, Keating summarized the public sector policies of the 
Hawke and Keating governments: 
“We wanted a public sector large enough to sustain the 
social contract but not so big that it crowded out employment-
creating private investment. Unlike some people on the left of 
politics we believed that if the call by the government sector on 
national resources was too high it did squeeze private sector 
activity and initiative” (Keating 1999). 
Evidence supports this small state goal. As expected by Iversen & 
Wren (1996) and anticipated by the analysis of policy makers actions 
above, liberal economy Australia showed no signs of expansion in 
public sector expenditure and employment during the Accord years. 
Figure 10.3 shows that after a minor increase in public sector 
employment at the commonwealth and state levels between 1983 and 
1985, employment then declined slowly throughout the 1980s, and 
dipped further in the 1990s as the Commonwealth privatized some 
public corporations.195 These trends in public sector employment and 
expenditure are consistent with the Irish experience in the 1990s and 
show a trend towards fiscal restraint in LME-style corporatism. 
Public sector expenditure as a percentage of GDP remained steady 
during the Accord, averaging 33.8% between 1980 and 1989, and 
33.6% in the 90s. Spending as a percentage of GDP rose slightly 
during the recession of 1990/91 (1990, 32.8%, 1991 34.5%) but 
                                                 
195 States rely upon the Commonwealth on what are known as Section 90 block 
grants (after the constitutional section) to fund a significant part of their annual 
spend. Hence federal government budget decisions will greatly influence state 
spending. The result is that we observe a secular trend across state and federal 
jurisdictions with respect to public employment.  298 
   
declined again to 33.7% by 1996 when the ALP lost power (OECD 
2001, table 6.4). 
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Figure 10.3: Public sector employment, Australia 1983-1996 
Source: ABS cat. 6248.0.55.001. 
 
As the above analysis suggests, this reduction in spending was 
achieved because of the large deficit inherited by the Hawke 
government, and the persistent balance of payments problem that has 
driven a budget surplus motivation in order to reduce debt and capital 
outflow that would contribute to negative current account figures. 
Early manifestation of this was the Trilogy commitment in the 1984 
election. But it was the Banana Republic that cemented this as a core 
policy for the ALP. The May 1987 Budget statement made bigger 
spending cuts than the June 1986 allowed for. As Edwards 
summarized, the message the government came back to time and time  299 
   
again in 1987 was, “’foreign debt is bad’…The threat of foreign debt 
was used to drive fiscal tightening” (Edwards 1996, 311). 
Public and sheltered sector wages were kept in check, too, during 
the Accord. Real wages for government administration and defense, 
education, health and the electricity, gas and water declined from 
1983-1987. During the two tier years when real wages rose on average 
between 2% and 4.5% in the export and foreign firm high competition 
industries (mining, manufacturing, finance and insurance and 
property and insurance), public administration and defense real wages 
remained at the CPI, while sheltered real wages with the exception of 
the highly innovative communication services rose by less than 2%. 
Real wages in the services declined in the two-tier years, reflecting 
their inability to generate ‘productivity-rises’ in weakly unionized areas 
of the economy. Hospitality and retail real wages rose by over 2% as 
unemployment declined (see chapter 8).  
From this data, it is obvious that existent public and sheltered 
sector wage drift and employment growth were not responsible for the 
decentralization of Australian wage bargaining during the Accord 
years. 
10.7 Australian wage decentralization 
The Australian and Irish experiences with central wage bargaining 
are very different and not just in their outcomes. The two differed 
markedly in the institutions they used to deliver central wage 
bargaining and in the economic environment central wage bargaining 
was conducted. The Accord was a far more rigid centralized system 
with far greater controls from the center over local wage outcomes.  300 
   
This was due to the set of institutions the Accord was to. Essentially 
composed of legal institutions, the Australian system gave procedural 
and bargaining power to unions and managerial discretion over actual 
wage outcomes to tribunal judges. The Australian centralized wage 
bargaining experiment was far more ambitious than the Irish system, 
which has allowed a significant and easy opting out safety valve for 
exporters (and indeed any employer who wants it).  
Whereas Ireland was an extremely open and trade dependent 
country in 1987, Australia was still struggling towards the basic 
decision to open the economy; something the Irish had done in the late 
1950s and early 1960s. With that decision firming in the 1983-1986 
period, policy-makers began to consider wage bargaining policy in a 
new light. No longer a mechanism to deliver low inflation, it became a 
means to improve the trade performance of Australia. This change in 
attitude reflected the problems of the tribunal system: it was far too 
rigid and slow and made pay flexibility difficult. Export employers had 
made this plain through key disputes and the activities of the BCA. 
Decentralization therefore not just arose as a way of giving exporters 
and import competing firms more control over pay outcomes, but it 
was also designed to minimize tribunal interference in that process. 
Events since 1996 have furthered this marginalization. 1996 
legislation under the Howard right wing government minimized the 
aspects of enterprise agreements that the AIRC could review, and 
introduced individual agreements that could over-ride awards (called 
Australian Workplace Agreements or AWAs). Legislation slated for late-
2005 proposes to remove the pay review function from the AIRC  301 
   
altogether to a new body, called the Fair Pay Commission. Minimum 
wages will be legislated, rather than arbitrated.  
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Chapter 11 
Comparing Irish & Australian experiences with 
centralized wage bargaining. 
 
In this concluding chapter, I address a number of issues raised by 
this dissertation. In the first section I explicitly answer the first set of 
research questions asked in chapter 1, about the causes of the 
differences in outcomes between the Irish and Australian cases. I then 
consider five issues raised by this dissertation. First, I consider the 
temporal scope and possible application to non-liberal economies of 
my argument. Second, I examine the question of compensatory polices 
for wage restraint and ask: When are they successful in helping 
generate wage restraint and when are they not? Third, I examine what 
implications my study has for state theory. Fourth, I re-examine the 
core dynamics of LME employer collective action, re-visiting arguments 
from chapters 2 and 3. Finally, I discuss a series of conditions that 
suggest that wage bargaining centralization may be increasingly an 
institutional configuration of the past. I use this discussion to 
introduce my final commentary of this dissertation that is based on 
the second and third sets of questions raised in chapter 1: Is Ireland a 
new breed of economy? What are the implications of this study to 
questions of institutional convergence? 
11.1 Explaining the different outcomes 
In chapter 1, I asked why has Irish Social Partnership and wage 
bargaining centralization lasted since 1987, and why did Australian 
wage bargaining decentralize in the early 1990s? In answering the 303 
   
question I have proposed that there are two paths to wage bargaining 
decentralization in liberal market economies: because exporters found 
the centralized system compromised the flexibility of their pay policies 
and practice, or because of large public sector wage drift.  
Australia during the Accord fell down the first path: where export 
firms faced constraints on their ability to set pay as they see fit. This 
resulted in them lobbying for the release of those constraints in the 
form of a non-coordinated plant level bargaining regime. This lobbying 
was successful because the state had made the decision and was 
committed to an open economy model of economic growth. This made 
firm competitiveness a primary concern of policy-makers. Exporter 
preferences were given special attention and priority in wage 
bargaining (and labor market) policy because these firms were 
considered a competitiveness litmus test by policy-makers. As we have 
seen from the Australian and Irish post-1987 case, this road to 
decentralization is dependent to some degree on two factors: the 
rigidity of the institutional arrangements that constructs and 
maintains the centralized wage bargaining regime, and the degree to 
which exporters are likely to be become highly vocal in their opposition 
to the centralized regime. Australia was and is different from Ireland 
on both counts.  
On the first: In Australia, the central institutions delivered a 
considerable amount of power to unions by giving them a guaranteed 
bargaining forum via compulsory arbitration. Decisions made by the 
tribunals were legally enforceable. This gave unions a second road to 
an industrial relations victory in a dispute via the courts. In Ireland,  304 
   
while the Labor Court and the LRC are able to pass judgement on 
disputes, they are only binding if and only if both parties agree that 
they will be binding. The Irish system is voluntarist, whereas the 
Australian system is legally based. This meant that the Australian 
system was less likely to give export employers the freedom over the 
wage setting process they desired. This coupled with the second major 
point of difference between the two cases – the structure of the export 
sector – meant that Australian employers became loud opponents of 
the centralized system. By contrast, the Irish system sought to 
accommodate exporter preferences to remain largely separated from 
the coordinated and centralized wage system. 
On the second: How does the structure of the export sector matter 
for the likelihood that employers will become militant? The key is the 
degree to which export employers have possible alternative locales for 
their operations. There are three dimensions that are relevant: skill 
requirements, the cost of sunk capital, and specific geographical 
factors. In general, the lower the skill requirement of the export sector, 
the lower the amount of sunk capital and the less the importance of 
geographic factors, the more likely firms will use the threat of exit from 
the economy to coerce policy-makers into line with their preferences. 
As the amount of sunk capital and the labor skill required by the 
export sector increases, the more likely that the threat of exit will be 
less credible. Sunk capital may be sunk, but unless depreciation 
schedules are very steep, firms still worry about abandoning capital-
intensive plant. Where skill requirements are high, the relatively small 
group of countries that have the quantity and quality of labor required  305 
   
compromises the credibility of firms threatening exit. While we know 
that FDI patterns do suggest that firms, among high skills countries, 
choose lower labor cost and lower labor regulatory countries, the 
probable high store of firm-specific knowledge that would be lost by 
moving to a new locale, and the cost of training a new cadre of 
employees suggests that exit is a fairly drastic move.  
The least credible threat of exit is from an export sector that relies 
on geographic factors for its competitive advantage: be they a natural 
resource, or close access to markets in order to minimize transport 
costs. The clearest case is the mining industry, where the rarity of 
high grade deposits, the high cost and risks associated with finding 
them, and the very high transport costs in shipping product to 
consumer means that firms have little option in practice to ‘go 
elsewhere’ in order to find and build a facility that can fill its orders 
and that can be shipped at a competitive price. Add in the massive 
capital investment of a large scale mining operation and mining 
companies must rely, in the last resort, on the somewhat drastic 
threat of closing the mine: not so much exit as extinction. Their 
alternative is, using the Hirschman (1970, 36-43) exit/voice model, to 
use their voice to change policy in order to benefit them. Given that 
firms in the sectors such as mining or large-scale agriculture cannot 
make terribly credible threats of exit, in order for them to maximize 
their labor market policy influence in democratic states they must rely 
on policy makers being committed to an open economy. Their other 
sources of influence are, of course, the threat of loss of taxation 
revenues and employment due to mine closure. But in a closed  306 
   
economy, the costs of these losses may be more easily offset and the 
threat of mine closure may be not as powerful influence on the 
government as in an open economy.  
It is reasonable to expect that given the high cost of exit, mining 
companies will pour considerable resources into their voice option: a 
‘full court press’ lobbying effort, irrespective of the policy orientation of 
policy-makers.196 This certainly occurred in Australia, with mining 
executives and firms dominating the most important employer groups 
in the 1980s and early 1990s. Consistent with the discussion of the 
power of small groups in chapter 2, these groups rose to prominence 
quickly. The key to their success was their relatively small size (in 
terms of members) but considerable resources (in terms of member 
firms resources), and the propensity of policy-makers to pay heed to 
their demands once the decision to grow an open economy had been 
made and confirmed through the events of 1986. 
In Ireland, the export sector is dominated by two kinds of firms: 
highly capital-intensive, high skill firms (pharmaceuticals, software, 
drink concentrate), and lower skill, but still fairly capital-intensive 
assembly manufacture (computers and precision instruments). 
Feeding off these industries is a number of service industries. The 
design of the Irish wage bargaining system is caused by the constant 
prospect of exit from the economy by a large proportion of the export 
sector, especially the lower skill ‘high tech’ sector, and the desire of 
                                                 
196 The lack of credibility of exit also suggests why mining companies in non 
democracies and democracies where legal scrutiny of corrupt practices in the state is 
low or deficient, may be inclined towards various forms of corrupt and patronage 
practices. Chile and Jamaica appear to be cases in point here.  307 
   
Irish policy makers to maintain the competitiveness of the Irish 
economy.197 In practice this means keeping wages as low as possible 
and the means by which wages are set as flexible as possible.  
Irish wage bargaining centralization is designed to curb public 
sector and sheltered sector wage increases. This keeps the price of 
labor low for exporters. The export sector is more or less excluded from 
the Social Partnership deliberative process, yet their benefit and 
growth is very much the subject of it. The exclusion of the export 
sector from the centralized bargaining process and the commensurate 
absence of wage movement responsibility that goes with being largely 
excluded from the process, allows the export sector a freedom to set 
pay as they wish. If they do find themselves with a labor supply or 
turnover problem, the virtual non-existent monitoring and 
coordination of export sector wages further enables export sector wage 
flexibility: they can raise wages in order to secure labor, with few 
macro-economic or political repercussions. A key to this arrangement 
is the growth of non-union plants in the export sector that has been 
encouraged by the Irish state (in particular, the IDA). 
The limits to this arrangement are becoming clear. The limits 
question is important because it has ramifications for the question as 
to whether Ireland can be thought of as a new breed of economy since 
1987. Ireland is in danger of falling down the second wage bargaining 
decentralization path as it did in the early 1980s: via massive public 
sector wage drift. The reality of the existence of real wage restraint in 
                                                 
197 This threat of exit has become all the more real with the entrance into the 
EU of the ascension countries.  308 
   
the Irish public sector is becoming increasingly debatable, and 
debated within the union movement. As the labor market tightened in 
the late 1990s, public sector unions became far more militant. They 
argued that private sector pay was far ahead of their own. But the 
reverse was true: there was still a healthy public sector wage premia in 
the mid-to-late 1990s. In order to break the old wage relativities from 
driving Social Partnership into a replay of the late 1970s where public 
service pay increased dramatically and made further centralized 
agreements untenable, the benchmarking process was introduced in 
2001. But this has resulted in still greater public sector pay increases. 
The result has been a growing and now public rumble within the 
union movement about public sector pay moving ahead of private 
sector pay (EIRO 2005b). This may yet see a return to late 1970s style 
leapfrogging pay claims and the end of centralized wage bargaining. 
11.2 Theoretical issues raised by the argument 
I now briefly discuss the implications of this dissertation for five 
important theoretical issues. 
11.2.1 The scope of the argument 
There are two aspects to the theoretical scope of my argument: the 
time period and to the kind of economy to which it applies. I examine 
each in turn. 
My argument is applicable for the last 25 years or since around 
the early 1980s. Clearly, the exporters’ ‘need for speed’ outlined in 
chapters 1 and 2 is a fairly recent phenomena. In the last 25 years, 
several developments and trends have contributed to the need for and 
ability of companies to respond far more quickly to changes in  309 
   
competitive markets. This has driven a wedge in terms of preferences 
over wage bargaining between firms serving these markets, who prefer 
pay flexibility and those serving more sheltered and local markets, who 
by comparison have less need or desire for pay flexibility. This 
development has created a growing need for states to accommodate 
the ‘need for speed’ and associated preference for pay flexibility among 
firms serving competitive markets, especially exporters who are critical 
to the macro-economic health of the open, trade-driven growth state. 
Even in standard product markets such as raw commodities, the 
growing ‘need for speed’ among companies using those products has 
lead to a growth in spot markets and a need for mining companies to 
be able to respond to changing demand. This has induced a preference 
for pay flexibility among mining companies as was illustrated in the 
case of Peko-Wallsend in chapter 9. 
There are two major historical developments driving the ‘need for 
speed’. First, there are the much-mentioned developments in computer 
and microprocessor technology that has greatly reduced the life span 
of the product cycle in competitive markets. The time from innovation 
to full production to imitation and copying and a renewed need for 
innovation is ever shortening. This is mostly due to the increasing 
computer-driven mechanization of production. This has led to a 
greater reliance by companies on a core of highly skilled, computer-
literate employees who they must worry about retaining. This section 
of the workforce is the one Iversen (1999, 98ff) and Mathews (1989) 
focus on: the high skill worker who has received a great deal of firm 
investment in his or her human capital, and who is ultimately  310 
   
responsible for the quality of the product or service the firm provides. 
Pay flexibility is necessary for these employees and means paying more 
than the centrally agreed terms when necessary in order to reflect skill 
investment by the firm and in order to thwart poaching of them by 
competitors.  
Technological change also means the insertion of computer 
technology into every stage of the production, supply chain and sales 
processes. This too shortens the life span of the product cycle. Digital 
micro-processor technology has led to a quantum jump in the speed 
and volume of information available to firms about markets and has 
introduced the need for companies to respond ever more quickly to 
new and detailed information about markets, consumer demand, and 
the products of other firms. This has led companies to re-invent how 
they produce goods and services. Increasingly, goods and services are 
customized to the needs of consumers, rather than being produced en 
masse. While post-Fordism is a much-abused concept, technology has 
enabled companies to develop niche markets and specifically tailored 
products. At the extreme, this involves consumers designing their 
order and companies producing on that order. BMW is a classic case 
here, where consumers order their car how they want to see it, and 
BMW manufactures the car to those specifications.  
Supply chains have been re-formed as the demand for and supply 
of goods and services to upstream firms has changed qualitatively. 
Upstream firms now pare down inventories and use sales information 
to generate orders from suppliers of components and services. In this 
case, computer technology both enables the speed of production of  311 
   
components and targeted services and the speed of information flows 
necessary to make low inventories feasible. Suppliers must be 
adaptable to the changing inventories and needs of their upstream 
purchasers, and wary of new supplier competition using new 
technologies and promising cheaper and more reliable productions 
and services. This all implies a growing ‘need for speed’ and a growing 
need for pay flexibility. 
For the company demanding supplies of goods and services, 
computer technology has enabled the increasing use of contracting out 
and outsourcing, especially in services to manufacturing firms. 
Countries such as Ireland and now India and Poland have become 
service centres for manufacturers and larger service companies who 
use cheap offshore labor to conduct routine tasks (see Friedman 
2005). Computer technology, especially the internet, has enabled 
cheaper and easier monitoring of outsourced services and production. 
The lowering of this monitoring cost has encouraged greater use of 
outsourcing and contracting out. Hence within the production process, 
computer technology has not also enabled the emergence of the high 
skill, digital-savvy employee in upstream firms who handle core tasks 
and manage important relationships (with suppliers, consumers and 
other employees), but it has also enabled the emergence of new 
relatively low wage labor markets among suppliers and within 
upstream firms who have kept routine task and production within 
house. Computerization has not just created an increased demand 
among firms for upward pay flexibility, but also an increased need for  312 
   
downward pay flexibility among suppliers and upstream firm non-core 
employees. 
While we should expect these developments to affect all 
competitive markets, for the exporter hoping to compete in 
international markets and coping with the burden of transportation 
costs and costs associated with marketing and monitoring in places 
sometimes away from the central office, the need for pay flexibility 
associated with the changes is usually even greater. 
More generally, computer technology has enabled highly developed 
consumer marketing strategies and product development based on 
surveys of consumers, analysis of actual sales and raw information 
about prices and products. Coupled with an increasing market in 
information about ‘best practice’ production and service processes, 
companies now adapt ever more quickly to changing markets with 
changes to production and service processes in a bid for greater 
efficiency. All these changes necessitate pay flexibility as employees 
must adapt to new roles and learn new skills while companies must 
ensure that pay encourages retention, and where necessary can be 
shifted downward to reflect keener competition and the need to lower 
unit labor costs. 
The second historical development driving the ‘need for speed’ 
comes from the increasing density of equity and venture capital 
markets and the growing financial integration of the world in the last 
25 years. These developments have meant that firms and 
entrepreneurs can respond more quickly to changing tastes, markets 
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difficult to ‘rest on their laurels’ as their markets are likely to be 
eroded by new companies, or old companies doing new things. An 
existing dominant market position can still enable corporate strategies 
to create monopolies or oligopolies (for instance, Microsoft or amazon), 
but in many areas of the economy, the increase in investment has 
meant increasing competition between firms, and an increasing need 
for firms to be light on their feet and quick to respond to new market 
challenges. All these developments point to a growing need for pay 
flexibility, especially for firms wanting to be competitive in export 
markets. 
Having addressed the temporal scope of my argument, I return 
again to the question of the kinds of economy to which my argument 
pertains. In chapter 1, I limited the scope of my argument to advanced 
capitalist liberal economies because this dissertation does not examine 
the experience of central wage bargaining in an advanced capitalist 
non-liberal economy, such as Sweden or Norway. 
Is there reason to believe that my argument is more universal? The 
primary argument for limiting my thesis to liberal economies is to 
suggest that the non-liberal economies such as the social democratic 
states of northern Europe (Denmark, Norway, Sweden) or the 
Christian democratic states of central Europe (Germany, Austria, 
Switzerland) have something which limits the ‘need for speed’ among 
exporters, or which decreases the state’s need to pay heed to exporters’ 
preferences with regards pay flexibility.  
There seems no reason to suggest either. A primary point of 
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their supply-side training policy regimes where employers cooperate 
with various degrees of state assistance to ensure a steady supply of 
skilled labor (Soskice 1994; 1999). A second point of difference is a 
decreased reliance on equity-finance due to the penetration of bank 
finance (especially in Germany), while a potential third is various 
collusive practices in local markets that carve up markets and reduce 
outright competition. The second point of difference suggests differing 
time-horizons for primary investors giving managers more time to 
make returns on capital, while the third suggests that these practices 
may override the increasing competition caused by the two historical 
developments briefly described above.  
While a more reliable supply of skilled labor may mitigate the need 
for pay flexibility by easing poaching problems, it will do nothing to 
ease demand for downward pay flexibility. Also, the basic premise that 
coordinated market economies do training better and have fewer skill 
shortages than liberal economies is doubtful, even if good measures 
could be created on which to base a comparison. Finally, given the 
growing speed of markets and the shortening of product cycles, it 
seems doubtful whether all the skills at the ‘right’ price can be found 
and incorporated into the one workplace - hence the growing need for 
outsourcing and contracting out. Pay flexibility will still appear as an 
imperative. 
The second point of difference is a peculiarity of Germany where 
recent changes allowing banks to divest holdings and the increase in 
equity finance suggests that even in that stronghold of bank finance, 
the managerial long-term profit horizon is under attack from the  315 
   
penetration of equity finance (Grahl & Teague 2004). The third point of 
difference doesn’t appear to be credible in the face of the changes I 
have outlined above. At best it appears to be a defensive mechanism 
that may stave off the inevitable day of full-blown competition, if it has 
not yet arrived. 
These three objections to the travel of my argument from the 
English-speaking economies to continental Europe appear to be weak, 
but confirmation of the relevance and efficacy of my argument must 
wait until an examination of these cases as an explicit test of my 
argument; a future research project task. 
11.2.2 Tax cuts & side payments 
There is a further problem that threatens to bring Irish wage 
bargaining centralization undone and is a problem now for any 
government wanting to pursue wage restraints through a central 
incomes policy: the limits of the tax cut strategy designed to 
compensate workers for pay restraint. Tax cuts cannot go on forever. 
Budgets must be balanced: government debt, it is widely perceived, is 
bad. This suggests tax cuts have a ‘use by’ date as a side payment 
strategy. In addition, as the state stalls in size relative to that of the 
economy because of a stall in relative revenues, tax cuts limit new 
social welfare initiatives and policies as a potential side payment 
strategy. In Australia, the Labor governments turned to increasing 
pension contributions from employers, as well as the tax cut strategy. 
But this only increased a widespread antipathy to the Accord among 
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The side payment strategies of the Australian and Irish 
governments both contain tax cuts but have considerable differences, 
however. Each had their limitations and weaknesses that caused 
strains on central wage bargaining. In the Australian case, the Accord 
was built upon the close relationship between the Australian Labor 
Party and the ACTU. This meant that when the social wage strategy 
was all but abandoned during the 1984 election campaign with the 
adoption of the ‘Trilogy’, tax cuts came into play. But a party of 
organized labor feels electoral pressure to deliver more than tax cuts, 
and this is why the pension strategy came into use.198 This side-
payment strategy caused its own tensions among employers, 
provoking opposition to the latter versions of the Accord that relied on 
increases in employer contributions to superannuation.  
There is no such close relationship between the Irish union 
movement and any one political party. Nominally the Labour Party is 
supposed to be the party of labor, but the 1997 election win for Fianna 
Fail (FF) and exit poll data from that election suggest that FF currently 
gets the majority of union votes (Laver & Marsh 1999, 169-170). As a 
consequence of the divided loyalties of union voters, and the universal 
adoption of the Social Partnership process by all parties no 
government feels as compelled as the ALP was to deliver some kind of 
social welfare side payment in exchange for agreeing to real wage 
restraint. In addition, the experiences of the 1970s and the failure of 
government after government to deliver economic and job growth has 
                                                 
198 Superannuation contributions also had the added effect of boosting saving 
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meant that job creation has become the number one ‘social welfare’ 
policy. Accommodating policy to the demands of markets has been the 
1980s and 1990s policy response to create jobs. The tax cuts strategy 
dovetails neatly with this priority. But no matter how consistent the 
policy be with the pro-market aims of the succession of Irish 
governments since 1987, tax cuts as compensation for real wage 
restraint and decline is a finite strategy, suggesting that the 
widespread wage drift, especially in the public sector, may well soon 
create the demise of centralized wage bargaining, Irish-style. 
11.2.3 Policy choice 
I now turn to consider two wider sets of implications around state 
and group behavior arising from this dissertation. I consider state 
behavior first. 
This dissertation has deliberately avoided an extensive discussion 
and over theorizing of how the state behaves. In general, my approach 
has suggested that policy choices are explained by interest group 
preferences. I have further argued that existing economic policies 
provide an economic or market environment that largely compels 
present and future policy priorities. In the case of wage bargaining 
policy, a commitment to an open economy model of economic growth 
creates a strong policy response logic. Specifically, this means that 
trade balances become a barometer of the health and veracity of labor 
market and wage bargaining policy. Governments react to bad news, 
as they did in the Australian case, and change wage bargaining policy 
so that firms can become more efficient in order that in time, export 
markets and sales will expand. Government’s also anticipate and  318 
   
accommodate export firms’ needs in order to avoid bad news: the Irish 
case. 
My conception of the state suggests no state autonomy from social 
interests or international economic forces at all. But it should be 
stressed that this implication is only relevant to certain kinds of 
economic circumstances -- that of an open economy -- and to certain 
kinds of policy domains: wage bargaining policy. I bracket the question 
as to whether states and policy-makers have degrees of choice over 
other policy domains, and in other kinds of economic conditions where 
protectionist policies are actively used.  
The most important policy choice that is the most heavily 
contested (and it is by no means clear that exporters will win the 
debate) is over the question of openness itself. While open capital 
markets have come to characterize the OECD, they are by means open 
or largely open in developing countries. Malaysia is but one example of 
a country that has fairly strict capital controls (and widespread tariffs). 
In advanced industrial countries, the debate over free trade is ongoing 
and it is far from clear that the political movement for free trade will 
continue to win over protectionist forces. Manufacturing trade unions 
in the OECD have been in the forefront of anti-free trade political 
movements in recent years, as have broader-based NGOs worried 
about the decline in living conditions caused by job loss to developing 
nations. Domestic firms under threat from import competition are 
vociferous opponents of free trade and have proved to be very effective 
lobbyists for trade protection. The clearest cases of successful anti-free 
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States. So to suggest that once the decision has been made that an 
open economy model of growth will be pursued – a decision that brings 
about the win of exporter preference for decentralized wage bargaining 
-- signals the end of classically centralized wage bargaining (and by 
extension classical corporatist arrangements) ignores the possibility 
that states will resort to protectionism and the re-assertion of capital 
and exchange rate controls. The re-emergence of the closed economy 
may well see a resurgence of more centralized wage bargaining. More 
importantly and as this dissertation illustrates, the Irish case suggests 
that a peculiar form of centralized bargaining, one where export firms 
and employees lie outside the system is possible and perhaps 
desirable. 
11.2.4 Employer collective action 
The aspect of employer collective action most notable in this 
dissertation is the high degree of opportunism exhibited by employers 
in forming, joining and leaving employer groups, if they bother with 
these groups at all. The lack of common interests in firms in liberal 
economies compared to ones in northern European countries has 
resulted in a very low degree of employer collective solidarity. Liberal 
economy firms are not motivated to remain in groups for the purpose 
of securing access to strike funds, gaining information about the 
technology of their competitors, for the purpose of coordinating 
training with their industry counterparts. They are actively driven 
apart by their product market competition. 
In Ireland, the result has been a very atomistic approach to 
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approach between the state and the unionized, non-export parts of the 
economy. Exporters, largely MNCs in Ireland, have very little 
involvement in the peak employer body, IBEC. This is because the 
have very little that binds them to the non-export sector of the 
economy. They have no wish to be bound by coordinated and centrally 
negotiated wage deals, they rely on the Irish tertiary sector to largely 
provide them with skilled entry-level employees,199 and far from 
sharing information with others about what they do, are secretive 
about operations because many of them are outsourced US operations 
and information about them may provoke a political backlash in the 
United States (Beesley 2005).200 
Non-exporters in Ireland have been encouraged to remain within 
the centralized wage system because as detailed in chapter 5, it has 
delivered wage restraint (until the late 1990s) while allowing, thanks to 
the voluntarist nature of the arrangement, a great deal of wage 
flexibility if and when needed. Thus they have shown a high degree of 
unity but in circumstances, it should be stressed, that have not tested 
loyalty. 
In Australia, exporters and large firms competing against foreign 
competitors in local markets decided very early in the Accord years 
that the existing employer groups did not serve their needs. Preferring 
                                                 
199 With the exception of the pharmaceutical industry in south-west Ireland, 
Irish exporters do not cooperate to overcome skill shortages and poaching problems 
associated with skill shortages (Rigney interview 2000). 
200 This secrecy was a source of irritation to this researcher, whose inquiries as 
to operations were met with constant refusals to take calls or replies of ‘I don’t think 
we can help you,’ and ‘We don’t talk about those things outside the company.’ Ex-
Taoiseach, Dick Spring commented, “US companies don’t like to talk about what 
they do here to journalists” (Spring interview 2000).  321 
   
free trade and wage flexibility, they opted to form their own association 
largely for the purpose of dismantling the centralized system. In 
addition a new group of prominent individuals rather than firms, 
featuring many CEOs from mining and agribusiness, emerged for the 
sole purpose of eradicating the tribunal system altogether. This group 
proved to be very effective in shifting the debate on wage bargaining in 
a politically right direction, and created a political space for the more 
politically moderate BCA to control the agenda on wage bargaining 
reform. 
The tendency of liberal economy employers to splinter and to have 
a low degree of associability does not appear to be a source of political 
weakness. Indeed, the external appearance of unity of purpose among 
small groups dominated or comprised of export employers is very 
powerful and sends a clear preference message to policy-makers. They 
are ‘unsplittable’ and hence policy-makers find it hard to use 
disagreement among them to weaken their message and to diffuse 
their campaign. Where splits do occur, firms rather than staying 
within the association to fight for a preferred policy position exit the 
group and move to a group with views more congruent with their own 
policy needs. This is what happened to the Confederation of Australian 
Industry (CAI). Hence employer groups in liberal economies do not so 
much as form, evolve and mature as different firms resolve their 
differences within the association, but are created quite quickly and 
either die quite quickly or left with a rump membership are merged 
and re-badged. As a result the liberal economy employer association 
landscape is quite volatile and in constant flux.  322 
   
11.2.5 The growing likelihood of wage bargaining 
decentralization  
There are three conditions and trends that mean that wage 
bargaining is far less likely to be centralized at either the industry or 
central level in the future. The first two concern the exporter-led road 
to wage bargaining decentralization; the third, the public sector wage 
creep road. 
The first condition is the growing non-union preference of MNCs: a 
preference that is having an effect on domestic firms that must 
compete with MNCs in local and international markets. Starting in the 
US in the 1970s and picking up speed in the 1980s, the non –union 
workplace is being spread by US MNCs, in particular, throughout the 
world. But the evidence introduced in chapter 2 shows that the anti-
union bias is not confined to US MNCs. MNCs base their investment 
decisions on union density and collective bargaining coverage, no 
matter what their country of origin. MNCs prefer countries with lower 
union densities than their home country’s and with lower collective 
bargaining coverage than their home country. The Irish case detailed 
in this dissertation demonstrates how this practice then spreads to 
local companies. This spread is due to several factors. First, the 
demonstrated market success of these non-union firms both in profit 
terms, and in their ability to politically resist moves from the union 
movement to unionize their plants provides an example which 
domestic firms can monitor and copy. Second, evidence of non-union 
plants in the MNC sector is a clear signal from government that the 
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encourage union recognition (such as in the UK). Finally, as the 
Australian case shows, the influence of consultants and employer 
groups who advocate the benefits of non-union plants is also critical, 
at least in the English-speaking countries. The role of HR and 
management consultancies, many of which are either themselves 
multi-national concerns (such as McKinsey, Mercer, KPMG and the 
‘big 5’ accounting firms), franchise management consultancy systems 
from the US, or borrow ideas from the leading management 
consultancies should not be underestimated in accounting for the 
non-union workplace trend. The move to non-union plants is at least 
as driven by ideology as any demonstrated cost-savings from avoiding 
union presence.201  
The second condition that indicates that centralized wage 
bargaining is less likely in the future is the preference of exporters for 
flexible forms of pay. As market competition increase thanks to more 
firms, information flows improving from customers to firms (market 
research) and from firms to customers (targeted advertising and 
marketing), transportation costs decreasing and product cycles 
shortening, product markets will be increasingly more volatile and 
profit horizons will shorten. The premium on flexibility within a firm – 
be it on manufacturing or service processes, research and 
development, the deployment of labor (increases in the use of 
contractors, part-time and temporary workers and the outsourcing of 
                                                 
201 There is weak evidence in Australia in the late 1980s for a relationship 
between union presence and activity in a workplace and perceived lower productivity 
and profits, however. See Nunes et al 1993; Drago & Wooden 1992; Crockett et al 
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functions), or remuneration (increases in productivity-based pay, 
profit-based bonuses, gain sharing, performance pay, and competency 
pay, as well as greater control over the wage setting process) – means 
that exporters, in particular (but all firms in competitive markets 
eventually) will be less willing to compromise on wage setting 
outcomes and processes set through collectivizing institutions and 
more willing to campaign for decentralized and non-coordinated wage 
bargaining. 
The final condition concerns the public sector wage drift road to 
wage decentralization and has several components. There are two 
main motivators for public sector workers exercising wage restraint via 
centralized agreements: compensatory policies for wage restraint, and 
the desire to see left governments stay in power. Each has their own 
limitations that may lead to the re-emergence of pay drift and the 
undermining of centralized wage bargaining. As well as the potential 
problems from the limitations to the major motivations that drive 
public sector wage restraint, there is also the problem associated with 
a growing dominance within trade union movements in all countries of 
public sector workers.  
To examine the main motivators and their limitations first: First, 
there must be compensatory policies for wage restraint. Tax cuts 
aimed at middle-income earners work in this regard to a certain extent 
because of the public sector wage premia and the tendency of the 
public sector to have a greater proportion of higher skill and higher 
paid jobs. This will result in a greater percentage of public sector 
employees that will benefit from the tax cuts than in the private sector.  325 
   
But as I have argued many times throughout this dissertation, there 
are limits to the tax cuts strategy. They cannot go on forever. Even in a 
high income tax country such as Ireland, twenty years would appear 
to be the stretching the boundaries of what this policy strategy can 
achieve in terms of securing wage restraint. Still, twenty years is a 
significant period.  
Second, one key reason public sector workers may exercise wage 
restraint is because they wish to ensure that a current left government 
oversees good economic performance, wins elections, and continues to 
expand the role of the state. There is a demonstrated affinity between 
centralized union movements, left government and economic growth, 
and low inflation and unemployment (Alvarez, Garrett & Lange 1991). 
Left governments in liberal economies, and to a lesser extent in no-
liberal or coordinated economies, are liable to increase social welfare 
spending compared to right governments between 1962 and 1995 
(Pontusson & Kwon 2003). Left government, high union density and 
highly open economies in OECD countries are associated with public 
sector expansion and higher government spending than other 
combinations of these three variables (Garrett 1998, 76-85).202  
I would suggest that the value of such findings is somewhat 
limited when discussing wage restraint among public sector workers, 
however. While left governments may spend more and expand the 
public sector more than right governments, much of the motivation 
behind public sector wage restraint lies with the expectations of what 
the left government will do in power. Recent experiences in the OECD 
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suggest that high hopes will and were almost certainly dashed by 
restrictive economic circumstances. It is not so much a case of what 
was delivered, but how policies in practice matched the promises and 
rhetoric of election time and the period immediately before office. 
Whether it be the ALP u-turn in 1984 and 1985, the Mitterand u-turn 
in the early 1980s, the generally status quo policies of the Blair 
government in the UK, or the unwillingness of Mary Clark’s 
government in New Zealand to overturn the radical deregulatory 
policies of the 1980s, left governments seem unwilling or unable due 
to economic circumstances to deliver traditional left policies such as 
welfare state expansion. While the argument has been made that 
partisanship does matter in terms of spending and taxation, the 
question must be asked: Is the difference so great as to be sufficient 
enough compensation for real wage restraint and, as in the Australian 
cases, decline? The labor movement in Australia has shown both 
under the Whitlam labor government in the 1970s and the Keating 
government in 1995 and 1996, that there is a point at which wage 
restraint and support for a left government is not worth the price for 
unions. Too little is delivered to the union movement, and too much is 
demanded of them in terms of wage restraint, especially when left 
governments remain committed to an open economy model of growth. 
Union members and their leaders feel, rightly or wrongly, that they are 
not being sufficiently protected by their party. In liberal economies this 
is an especially problematic issue, considering the already minimal 
welfare states and the low level of employment protection (unfair 
dismissal, redundancy etc). The public sector union motivation that  327 
   
left governments remain in power is therefore precarious in these 
economies. 
 
Table 11.1 
Public sector share of trade union membership, 1967- 1990. 
 
 
% 
 
  1967-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-90 Change   
67-74 to  
85-90 
 
 
Austria 
 
22 
 
24 
 
26 
 
31 
 
+ 9 
Sweden  23 26 29 38 +  15 
Norway  29 33 35 44 +  15 
Finland  26 24 28 34 +  8 
Denmark  22 22 25 35 +  13 
Germany  29 28 28 30 +  1 
Italy  17 17 18 23 +  6 
UK  29 30 31 32 +  3 
Belgium  27 29 30 35 +  8 
Netherlands  31 34 36 43 +  12 
Australia  31 35 37 37 +  6 
Canada  20 24 28 35 +  15 
Japan  18 19 20 17 -  1 
USA  23 24 25 34 +  11 
France  60 61 55 51 -  9 
 
 
Source: Garrett1995, appendices A, B, C, D.  
Note: Percents are period means. 
 
This precariousness feeds into the implications of the trend that 
public sector unions are increasingly dominating union movements. In 
chapter 2, I reviewed how this could lead to pay drift based on work by 
Garrett & Way and Franzese. Table 11.1 shows the rise of the public 
sector share in trade unions in most of the 15 OECD countries 
reported (with the exception of France where union membership by the 
1990s is under 10%, and Japan, where unions are employer-based 
entities). Growing public sector union power within a union movement 
compounds the problems of the limits of compensatory policies and  328 
   
the relative absence of supposed benefits for public sector workers of 
having a left party in power. Public sector workers do not face the 
same incentives as traded sector workers to exercise wage restraint. 
They are not exposed to product market discipline, as are trade sector 
workers. They must be persuaded to exercise restraint by 
compensatory policies and the promise of left governments enacting 
favourable policies. Where both of these are in short supply, the 
growing power of public sector union workers will therefore threaten 
wage restraint more quickly and more fundamentally. 
11.3 A new economy? & the issue of convergence 
I conclude this dissertation with a discussion of the implications of 
its argument and findings for expectations of convergence among all 
advanced capitalist economies on a US-like model. 
The critical case here is Ireland. Ireland has, against all prediction, 
apparently sustained a centralized wage bargaining regime for almost 
20 years after 1987. The most important finding of this dissertation 
has been the way the export sector has been largely excluded both 
from the Social Partnership wage deal negotiations and from extensive 
monitoring of actual wage movements. Where labor markets have been 
slack, they have benefited from the wage restraint in the non-export, 
unionized parts of the economy especially in the public sector. As 
markets have tightened, exporters have been free to increase wages as 
needed in order to recruit and retain labor. In short, exporters have 
been free riders on the wage-coordinated sector of the economy. This  329 
   
coordination has, however, been constructed mostly for their 
benefit.203 
The second deceptive aspect of Irish wage bargaining 
centralization is implied by developments in the last five years that 
suggest that the central agreements are becoming increasingly 
irrelevant to wage outcomes. This suggests that the wage agreements 
before this time succeeded because they were largely consistent with 
market forces. In the mid-to-late 1990s there is a clear adherence to 
the wage deals throughout most of the economy, but the new millennia 
saw considerable pay drift in parts of the public sector and the export 
sector. Low unemployment has seen labor markets tighten and 
expectations about pay increases in the good economic climate 
increased. In short, market forces have re-emerged as important in the 
profitable parts of the economy, especially in the export sector. This 
has encouraged public sector unions to exercise their industrial power 
to extract higher wage increases. A new process designed to re-
configure wage relativities (‘benchmarking’) and control public sector 
pay has failed to so because it has linked public sector pay grades to 
private sector pay grades during an economic boom. This suggests 
trouble for the future if and when the Irish ‘Celtic Tiger’ is put back on 
the leash, economic growth stalls and unemployment rolls lengthen 
again. 
                                                 
203 A second major goal of the wage component of Social Partnership is to stop 
wage movements in profitable export sector firms from driving up wages in the 
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To return to my second set of research questions posed at the 
beginning of this dissertation: Is Ireland a new breed of economy? My 
answer is, based on these arguments and the experiences of Australia 
where real constraints on wage setting behavior was attempted (and 
failed) via the centrally negotiated Accord deal, is that it is best 
considered a significant variation on the liberal economy theme.204 The 
Irish case demonstrates the large variation possible within a broadly 
liberal economy context. Social Partnership represents liberal market 
institutional solutions to the policy need to coordinate and restrain 
wage growth. Is this a third way? Perhaps, but it is circumscribed by 
certain limitations. These are: 
• Central wage bargaining must not coordinate and constrain 
export sector pay movement; 
• Where non-export sector pay movements are restrained by 
central agreements, the inability of policy-makers to deliver anything 
other than tax cuts as a substantial compensation for real wage 
restraint suggest a time-limit to the central wage bargain policy 
strategy, and,;  
• The tendency of market forces to re-emerge as powerful shapers 
of wage outcomes when labor markets tighten imply that employers in 
these economies lack the non-market cooperation around labor supply 
issues to enable wage-outcome effective centrally-negotiated pay deals 
in boom times. 
                                                 
204 This statement would also apply to the question as to whether these cases 
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The lack of complementary institutions such as coordinated 
training and different forms of finance predicating different attitudes 
towards profitability and hence, to labor cost issues proves to be a 
decisive set of barriers to any move from an essentially liberal 
economy. Also decisive is the if not small state, then the comparatively 
smaller state approach to liberal economy welfare and social policy 
development that hampers any compensatory policy strategy that may 
not just ensure a continued central wage bargaining system but also 
build labor supply capacity via training that would ease incentives to 
poach labor and induce wage drift. 
On the final question: that of convergence, this dissertation has 
shown that while growing integration into international capital and 
product markets suggests some kind of homogeneity of response of 
governments in how they treat the export sector (towards lesser 
institutional interference in wage bargaining), considerable differences 
are still possible in how states handle public, domestic and the non-
traded sector wage bargaining policy. Australia represents one 
solution, that of decentralization and marginalization of industrial 
relations institutions that was dictated largely by the inadequacy of 
the old institutions to cope with the process aspects pay flexibility 
demands of the open economy and to accommodate the needs and 
preferences of exporters. Australia’s decentralization therefore is a 
story of an old institutional design encountering and not coping with 
new times. 
On the other hand, Ireland’s institution’s proved to be far more 
malleable, thanks to their largely voluntarist raison d’etre. This proved  332 
   
to be a perfectly compatible with the preference of exporters to be let 
alone with respect to wage bargaining. One could imagine that 
between the two systems, Australia’s legalism and Ireland’s 
voluntarism, a spectrum of institutional designs that allowed for 
export pay flexibility in order to maximize the trade performance of the 
economy, while attempting to solve the problem of public and the non-
traded sectors’ propensity for wage militancy. In the end, the 
conclusion to be made from the two cases examined here is a 
common-sense statement: growing economic integration has 
encouraged convergence in areas of the economy directly exposed to 
the international economy, but leaves scope for difference in areas that 
are not. 
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